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ABSTRACT 
 
 
HUNG VIET NGUYEN. Three essays on corporate debt mix, maturity structure, and 
inside debt compensation (Under the direction of DR. TAO-HSIEN DOLLY KING) 
 
 
 In Chapter 1, we use a large sample of new debt to examine the determinants of 
corporate debt mix and to test the substitute/complement effects among debt sources. We 
find that both firm-level factors and macroeconomic variables are important determinants 
of debt mix. In addition, the set of determinants varies across time and economic 
conditions. In general, we find evidence for a substitution effect between public debt and 
private debt, both at rating downgrades and new issuance events.  
 In Chapter 2, we examine the impacts of product market competition and 
corporate governance on debt maturity. We find that firms in less competitive industries 
use more short-term maturity than firms in more competitive industries, while firms with 
weak corporate governance use less short-term maturity. However, there is mixed 
evidence on the impact of the interaction between product market competition and 
corporate governance on maturity. 
In Chapter 3, we study the relations between inside debt compensation and 
corporate policies. We find a positive relationship between inside debt and leverage, 
indicating that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings tend to use higher leverage. We 
also find strong (weak) evidence on the negative relationship between inside debt and 
R&D activities (capital expenditures). We provide the first evidence about the 
relationship between inside debt and debt maturity. In one direction, short-term maturity 
increases in inside debt. However, in other direction, inside debt decreases in short-term 
maturity. Additionally, we document new evidence about the determinants of inside debt. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE DEBT MIX 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) predicts that firms use 
internal capital first, and seek external capital in the form of debt and equity if internal 
funds are insufficient. The theory implies the preference of debt over equity in a firm's 
financing decisions. For external debt financing, firms can borrow from public, bank, and 
non-bank private lenders.
1
 An important question is what factors drive a firm's choice of 
debt when external debt financing is used. 
The literature contains a large body of theoretical models on the determinants of 
new debt financing. One group of theories argues that the choice of new debt type relates 
to the degree asymmetric information. Diamond (1984), Fama (1985), and Nakamura 
(1989) predict that, due to greater information asymmetry, small and young firms prefer 
private debt, while their counterparts use more public debt. Diamond’s life cycle theory 
(1991) implies that firms borrow from private sources first and access public sources 
when they become more established. The work of Berlin and Loyes (1988), Berlin and 
Mester (1992), and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argue that the choice of debt mix 
depends on how easy and efficient it is for borrowers to negotiate with lenders to avoid 
inefficient liquidation in default situations. They predict that firms with a low likelihood 
of distress (a high credit quality) prefer public debt, but firms with a high credit risk (a 
                                                          
1
  Similar to Johnson (1997) and Denis and Mihov (2003), we define non-bank private debt as 144A debt 
and use these terms interchangeably. 144A debt is issued under SEC Rule 144A which allows low credit 
quality firms to issue debt to private lenders. This type of debt shares some features of bank debt and low 
grade public debt. See Denis and Mihov (2003) for more discussions on the characteristics of 144A debt. 
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low credit quality) prefer private debt. The last group of theories argues that firms with 
high costs of asset substitution and underinvestment find bank monitoring valuable, and 
thus prefer private to public debt. Hoshi et al. (1993) predict that firms with valuable 
assets in place and low leverage prefer public debt financing. 
Empirical studies on debt mix suggest findings that are generally consistent with 
theoretical claims. Large, profitable, and older firms with high proportions of tangible 
assets, and high or stable cash flows borrow from the public bond markets (Cantillo and 
Wright (2000), Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), Denis and Mihov (2003), and 
Arena (2010)). Credit rating is a major determinant of debt sources: firms with highest 
rating borrow from public source, while the middle and lowest rating quality firms use 
bank loans and non-bank private debt, respectively (Denis and Mihov (2003) and Rauh 
and Sufi (2010)). Firms are likely to choose private debt when disclosure costs, earnings 
volatility, market-to-book ratio, or the probability of financial distress is high (see 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004), Johnson (1997), Krishaswami et al. (1999), and Denis and Mihov 
(2003)). Conversely, Hoshi et al. (1993) find that market-to-book ratio and leverage have 
a negative effect on the probability of choosing private debt.  
The empirical literature suggests a set of firm characteristics that are major 
determinants of corporate debt mix. However, three important issues remain unexplored. 
First, given the rich evidence on the importance of firm level factors, such as firm size, 
asset tangibility, profitability, and credit rating quality, there is little evidence on whether 
the impacts of these factors vary over time as macroeconomic conditions fluctuate. Using 
incremental new debt issues in the period of 1995-1996, Denis and Mihov (2003) find 
that firm-level factors such as credit rating are important determinants of a company’s 
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debt mix. However, they question if these determinants change over time and suggest 
examining this issue under different market conditions. Theoretically, Diamond (1991) 
predicts that high-rated firms prefer public debt but they switch to bank loans if 
uncertainty about interest rates and profitability is high. This implies that macroeconomic 
variables are important when analyzing the debt mix of corporations. Julio et al. (2008) 
and Khang and King (2012) provide evidence on the impacts of economic conditions on 
the structure of public and bank debt. We hypothesize that the pattern and determinants 
of the choice between bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt are time-variant. 
We emphasize that macroeconomic variables affect firms’ debt mix choices. Previous 
studies use snapshots of firms at a given point in time and focus on the determinants for 
the cross-sectional variation in debt mix (e.g., Houston and James (1996) and Denis and 
Mihov (2003)). Second, Denis and Mihov (2003) and Rauh and Sufi (2010) find that 
credit rating quality is a major determinant of the debt mix, but there is little evidence on 
how firms choose among debt sources under the dynamics of ratings upgrades and 
downgrades. Rauh and Sufi (2010) find that fallen angels rely heavily on subordinated 
bonds, which is inconsistent with the theoretical prediction that low credit quality firms 
do not use arm’s length debt.  
Third, theoretical models assume the choice between public and private debt is 
discrete, thus implying substitution between the two types of debt. For example, 
Detragiache (1994) assumes that public and private debt are perfect substitutes, and 
argues that the choice depends on the costs of renegotiation in the case of default. In 
addition, moral hazard models such as Park (2000) suggest that firms choose debt priority 
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structures to solve the manager-creditor incentive problems.
2
 These models imply that the 
substitute effect among different debt sources depends on the severity of these problems. 
However, in practice firms often issue debt from different sources simultaneously at a 
given point of time. In a recent study, Rauh and Sufi (2010) find evidence of complement 
effects between public debt and bank loans for a small sample of firms with credit rating 
downgrades. In particular, they discover that firms do not reduce both public and private 
debt when their credit quality deteriorates. Instead, in these cases the use of secured bank 
debt and subordinated bonds both increase. There has been limited research on the 
substitute/complement effect between public and private debt, and it remains an 
important issue to examine if such effects exist among debt financing sources. 
Based on a large sample of new debt (bank loan, 144A debt, and public debt) 
issued by 988 firms in the period of 1993-2007, we examine the determinants of debt mix 
across distinct economic periods, explore how debt mix changes for firms that experience 
rating changes and have new debt issues, and test the substitute/complement effects 
among debt types. In particular, we develop an incremental new issues sample and an 
outstanding debt mix sample to perform the analyses. We have several important and 
interesting findings. First, firm age and firm size are significant drivers of corporate debt 
mix. Larger and older firms prefer public debt to private debt, and choose bank over non-
bank private if private debt is considered. This finding is consistent with the information 
asymmetry explanation. Asset tangibility, probability of distress, and earnings volatility 
have significant impacts on corporate debt mix. A higher fixed asset ratio or lower 
earnings volatility leads to more public than private debt. Profitable firms prefer bank 
                                                          
2
  See Rauh and Sufi (2010) for detailed discussions on these models. 
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debt out of all debt types. Firms with a higher probability of distress prefer non-bank 
private to bank debt. Consistent with Denis and Mihov (2003), we find that issuers with a 
higher credit rating are more likely to borrow from public sources, while they prefer bank 
to non-bank private when private sources are considered. In addition, we show that firms 
who are novice to the debt markets are more likely to start with non-bank private debt. 
On the other hand, experienced borrowers with a high percentage of public debt typically 
choose public over private debt, and prefer bank to non-bank private. Most importantly, 
we are the first to document that macroeconomic factors including prime interest rate, 
yield curve slope, interest rate volatility, and GDP growth are major factors of corporate 
debt mix, which is consistent with Diamond (1991). 
Second, we find that the set of determinants of corporate debt mix changes over 
time. In particular, firm age is an important consideration during poor economic 
conditions, but not in favorable ones. The early period of 1993-1997 is unique in terms of 
having the least number of significant factors among the three periods. Credit quality, 
earnings volatility, prior issuance behavior, and macroeconomic factors have very limited 
or no impacts on corporate debt mix in this period, while they are important drivers in the 
two later periods of 1998-2002 and 2003-2007. We also find that the set of drivers differ 
by interest rate volatility. When market uncertainty is high, firm age and earnings 
volatility matter much more to borrowers when deciding on corporate debt mix. 
Third, we find evidence for a general substitution effect between public and 
private debt over time. In other words, for a given firm there is a strong and negative 
relation between public debt and bank debt. Furthermore, based on a sample of 513 firms 
that experience rating downgrades we find that public debt and non-bank private debt are 
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substitutes before the downgrade event. After the downgrade, there is a substitute effect 
between bank and non-bank private debt. However, the analysis of the 446 firms with 
rating upgrades provides little evidence of a substitute/complement effect. Finally, we 
extend the substitute/complement effect to new debt issuance events and find support for 
the substitute effect among the three types of debt sources. Specifically, at a new issue of 
non-bank private or public debt, the percentage outstanding of the other two debt types 
declines significantly after the issuance. For the sample of bank loan issuance, we find 
evidence consistent with a substitution effect between private (both bank and non-bank 
private) and public debt.  
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we use a large 
sample of new debt issues and the issuers’ outstanding debt mix over an extended period 
of time to examine the determinants of debt type. We find that debt mix varies 
significantly across different economic conditions, macroeconomic variables are major 
determinants of corporate debt mix, and the set of determinants varies across time and 
economic uncertainty. Previous studies such as Johnson (1997), Denis and Mihov (2003), 
and Arena (2010) document the factors determining new debt choices, but they do not 
examine the pattern of debt mix over time and across economic conditions. Nor did they 
examine the role played by macroeconomic factors. Second, we extend the literature by 
providing important evidence on the substitute/complement effect among debt financing 
sources. Rauh and Sufi (2010) are one of the first to provide evidence for a complement 
effect between bank loan and public convertible debt when an issuer is downgraded from 
investment to speculative grade. However, their evidence is based on the balance sheet 
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data and a small sample of fallen angels. We test the substitute/complement effect for a 
large sample of firms with credit rating upgrades and downgrades. 
The structure of the rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews 
the literature on corporate debt mix. Section 1.3 describes the data and presents the 
characteristics of new debt issues. Section 1.4 presents the empirical analyses of the 
determinants of new debt sources. In section 1.5 we test the substitute/complement effect 
hypothesis. Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2  Literature Review 
In this section, we review the existing theories and empirical evidence on 
corporate debt mix. In particular, we present literature on three groups of determinants: 
firm characteristics and quality, industry factors, and macroeconomic conditions. 
1.2.1 Firm Characteristics and Quality 
Previous theories show that a firm’s characteristics and quality are important 
determinants of its choice of debt financing sources. We follow the approaches of Denis 
and Mihov (2003) and Kale and Meneghetti (2010) and classify debt mix theories into 
three theoretical frameworks including information asymmetry, efficiency of 
renegotiation and liquidation of debt contracts, and agency costs associated with asset 
substitution and underinvestment problems.
3
 
Information asymmetry: Theories predict a relation between the level of 
asymmetric information and the likelihood of borrowing from a specific source of debt. 
Diamond (1984), Fama (1985), Nakamura (1989) argue that firms’ choices between 
                                                          
3
  In fact, Kale and Meneghetti (2010) classify debt mix theories into smaller groups: information 
production models, proprietary information models, moral hazard models, and liquidation and 
renegotiation models. Johnson (1997) groups these theories based on the demand and supply side of 
capital. 
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private and public debt are based on the level of asymmetric information and the related 
cost of monitoring and producing information. Smaller and younger firms with greater 
information asymmetry have relatively higher costs of monitoring and producing 
information than older and larger firms. Therefore, it is predicted that smaller and 
younger firms prefer private debt (e.g., bank loans), while their counterparts choose to 
borrow from public sources. In addition, Diamond’s life cycle theory (1991) shows that 
firms borrow from private sources first in order to build their reputation, then switch to 
public sources when they have sufficient reputation in the capital markets. His model 
implies that younger firms are likely to use more private debt. Furthermore, theories 
indicate that firm quality is an important factor driving firms’ choices of debt sources. 
Diamond's (1991) model implies that firms with high (middle) credit ratings rely on 
public (bank) debt, while very low rated firms are rationed. Yosha (1995) theoretically 
shows that firms with high quality projects prefer private to public debt due to the high 
cost of disclosing their proprietary information. However, Rajan (1992) argues that 
because bank monitoring might distort a borrower’s incentives, firms with low quality 
projects are more likely borrow from banks. 
In general, empirical evidence is consistent with the above theories. Cantillo and 
Wright (2000) find evidence that large, profitable firms with high proportions of tangible 
assets, and high or stable cash flows borrow from bond markets. Houston and James 
(1996), Johnson (1997), Denis and Mihov (2003), and Arena (2010) find a positive 
association between firm size and the use of public debt. The work of Johnson (1997) and 
Arena (2010) provide evidence in support of Diamond’s (1991) model prediction of a 
positive relation between firm age and public debt. Denis and Mihov (2003) find that 
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credit rating is a major determinant of debt sources: firms with highest rating borrow 
from public source, while middle and lowest rating quality firms use bank loans and non-
bank private debt, respectively. However, evidence on the relation between project 
quality and the use of debt is mixed. Denis and Mihov (2003) find no relation between 
R&D expenditure and the probability of using bank loans, while Dhaliwal et al. (2004) 
find evidence consistent with Yosha (2005) that firms are more likely to issue private 
debt when disclosure costs are high. 
Efficiency of renegotiation and liquidation: The work of Berlin and Loyes (1988), 
Berlin and Mester (1992), and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argue that firms’ choice 
of debt sources depends on the ease and value of renegotiations with lenders in order to 
avoid the costs of inefficient liquidation. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argue that 
firms with a low likelihood of distress (high credit quality) find renegotiation less 
valuable, thus preferring public debt, but firms with greater credit risk (low credit quality) 
value the benefits from renegotiation, therefore preferring private debt even if the costs 
are high. These theories also imply that firms with high profitability and low operating or 
credit risk tend to borrow from public sources. 
As to empirical evidence, Johnson (1997) finds that public debt use negatively 
correlates with earnings volatility. Krishaswami et al. (1999) find a positive relation 
between unexpected earnings and the proportion of private debt. Denis and Mihov (2003) 
find that firms with high financial distress (Altman’s Z-score <1.81) use less public debt. 
This finding supports the prediction by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) that firms that 
are more likely to suffer financial distress need lenders who can make correct liquidation 
and renegotiation decisions, thus preferring bank debt. In addition, Denis and Mihov 
10 
 
 
 
(2003) and Rauh and Sufi (2010) find evidence that credit rating quality is a major 
determinant of debt mix. However, Rauh and Sufi (2010) challenge existing theories by 
discovering that firms do not reduce both public and private debt when their credit quality 
deteriorates. Instead, they find a complement effect among private and public debt, where 
the use of secured bank debt and subordinated bonds both increase. 
Agency cost of asset substitution and underinvestment: Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Myers (1977) argue that firms with high leverage and growth opportunities 
face significant agency costs associated with asset substitution and underinvestment 
problems. This argument implies that these firms find bank monitoring useful, and 
therefore would prefer private to public debt. Hoshi et al. (1993) predicts that firms with 
high net worth (valuable assets-in-place and low leverage) prefer public debt financing. 
However, empirical evidence is mixed. Krishaswami et al. (1999) find a positive relation 
between market-to-book ratio and private long term debt, while Hoshi et al. (1993) find a 
negative relation. Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), and Denis and Mihov 
(2003) find an insignificant relationship between market-to-book ratio and bank loans. 
Hoshi et al. (1993) find a negative relation between leverage and bank debt. 
1.2.2  Industry Factors 
 Firms in different industries may have different preferences for their debt sources, 
depending on industry-specific characteristics. Firms with specialized assets have lower 
collateral value due to less marketability of their assets at liquidation. This argument 
implies that these firms prefer bank to public debt. Extending this argument, firms in 
regulated industries prefer public to private debt because of their typically high collateral 
value. The literature documents evidence consistent with these predictions. Johnson 
11 
 
 
 
(1997) finds that the interaction between a dummy for specialized assets and the fixed 
asset ratio has significant impact on a firm’s choice of debt sources. Krishnaswami et al. 
(1999) find that firms in regulated industries have a lower proportion of private debt in 
their capital structure.
4
 
1.2.3 Macroeconomic Conditions 
 Previous studies show that macroeconomic factors are important determinants of 
firms’ capital and debt structures. For example, Korajczyk and Levy (2003) examine the 
relation between firms’ capital structure and macroeconomic conditions. They find that 
capital structure of financially constrained firms is more affected by the state of the 
economy than that of the unconstrained firms. According to Diamond (1991), economic 
conditions are a dominant factor that firms consider when issuing debt. His model implies 
that highly rated firms prefer public debt, but these firms switch to bank borrowing if the 
economy is poor, interest rates are high, or there is a high uncertainty of profitability. 
Julio et al. (2008) finds that economic states significantly affect firms’ public debt 
structure, which is consistent with Diamond (1991). 
1.3 Data Sources and Sample 
1.3.1  Data Sources 
We study the debt mix choice of non-financial firms (excluding SIC 6000-6999) 
in the period of 1993-2007. By comparison, the sample in Denis and Mihov (2003) and 
Arena (2010) is from 1995-96 and 1995-2003, respectively. We collect data on new debt 
issuances from two sources: Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) New Issues Database 
for public debt and non-bank private (144A) debt, and Loan Pricing Corporation’s 
                                                          
4
  See Mackay and Phillips (2005), Erhemjamts et al. (2010), and Leary and Roberts (2010) for more about 
the impacts of industry factors on firms’ financial decisions. 
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Dealscan for bank loans. SDC’s database provides information on many dimensions of 
public and 144A debt contracts, including principal amount, proceeds, yield to maturity, 
type of debt, credit rating, maturity, as well as purpose of new debt issuances. Dealscan 
provides detailed characteristics of bank loans at issuance, such as facility and deal 
amount, maturity, syndicated or sole bank lenders, loan purpose, as well as offer prices. 
A typical bank loan (deal) contains multiple tranches (facilities) with different 
characteristics. Because our analysis is based on deals rather than facilities, we aggregate 
facilities by deal contracts on a yearly basis. We aggregate multiple debt issues by type 
within a year as a single issue as in Denis and Mihov (2003) and Brockman, Martin, and 
Unlu (2010). The principal of the aggregated debt is computed as the sum of the principal 
of single debt issues, while the maturity is the weighted maturities with principal as the 
weight. Other related studies use different aggregation approaches. For example, Gomes 
and Philips (2005) aggregate debt issues by type on a monthly basis, Arena and Howe 
(2009) and Arena (2010) aggregate within a quarter. We argue that aggregating on an 
annual basis is appropriate for the length of our sample period and the different 
aggregation methods do not influence the empirical results. Denis and Mihov (2003), 
Arena and Howe (2009), and Arena (2010) report that their results remain the same if 
debt issues are collapsed on either a monthly or yearly basis. Finally, we obtain firms' 
financial data and issuer credit ratings from Compustat.
5
 Macroeconomic data are 
collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
 
                                                          
5
  We use valid ratings reported in SDC and FISD databases to fill in any missing issuer ratings in 
Compustat. 
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1.3.2  Sample of New Debt Issues 
For the period of 1993 to 2007 we collect all bank loans issued from Dealscan and 
match the loan sample with the set of public debt and 144A debt reported in SDC. This 
matching leads to 9,353 bank loans, 2,096 issuances of 144A debt, and 5,000 issuances of 
public debt issued by 1,370 unique firms. We next require valid Compustat data for the 
sample firms. This process results in 988 firms with valid financial and accounting data 
and a sample of 7,422 new bank loans, 1,576 new 144A debt issues, and 4,112 new 
public debt issues. Table A in the Appendix reports the descriptive statistics for new debt 
issues for the 988 firms in our sample.
6
 Panel A reports characteristics for 7,422 new 
bank loan packages (10,342 facilities). The average amount for a facility and package is 
$459.9M and $645.4M, respectively. For comparison, bank loans have a larger principal 
amount, but a shorter maturity than both public and non-bank private debt. In terms of 
loan type, most bank loans are multi-year revolvers (54.4%) and 364-day facilities 
(24.5%). In contrast to public and non-bank private debt, bank loans are used for multiple 
purposes, including general purposes, debt payment, commercial paper 
backup/enhancement, and takeover/LBO. 
Panel B provides characteristics for the non-bank private debt. 716 firms had 
1,576 non-bank private debt issuances during the sample period. Number of issues and 
firms issuing non-bank private debt increase dramatically over time, which indicates the 
growing importance of non-bank private debt as an alternative form of debt financing. 
Unlike public debt, the majority of non-bank private debt is debentures (64%) and 
convertible bonds (31%). The average principal amount of 144A debt is higher than that 
                                                          
6
  We report characteristics of new debt issues before collapsing individual debt issues by year. The reason 
is to provide their characteristics in more detail. 
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of public debt ($307.9M vs. $237.6M). Maturity is approximately 10 years, which is 
similar to that of public debt. Also, similar to public debt, the main purposes of non-bank 
private debt are general and refinancing. It is interesting to note that, non-bank private 
debt is mainly used for general purposes or takeover/LBO during 1993-1997, and 
becomes more diversified after that. Panel C shows that 596 firms had 4,112 new public 
debt issuances during the sample period. Fifty-nine percent and one third of these new 
public debt issuances are debentures and medium term notes (MTNs), respectively. On 
average, each new public debt has a principal amount of $237.6M, and approximate 
maturity of 10 years. Most of the public debt issues are used for general and financing 
purposes (64% and 26%, respectively). 
1.4  Determinants of Corporate Debt Mix 
1.4.1 Incremental Debt Issues and Outstanding Debt Mix Samples 
To examine the determinants of corporate debt mix, we form two samples. The 
first sample is created based on the incremental approach and contains individual new 
debt issues. At the end of year for a given firm we aggregate the total principal amount of 
all debt by debt type.  For example, we compute the sum of the principal amount of all 
144A debt issues in 1993 for a given firm. The same procedure is repeated for each of the 
other two types of debt. Based on the sample of 1,576 144A debt issues, 4,112 public 
debt issues, and 7,422 new bank loans by 988 issuers, we arrive at a firm-year sample of 
8,608 observations. It is important to note that there are cases in which a given firm 
issues more than one type of debt in a given year. To explore the factors that drive an 
issuer’s decision on a certain type of debt, it is important to focus on the firm-year 
observations in which only one type of debt is issued by a given issuer in a given year. 
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Therefore, we exclude all observations in which a firm issues more than one types of 
debt. We arrive at the final sample of 5,079 firm-year observations associated with 967 
unique firms, which we call the “incremental debt issues sample.” 
The second sample is constructed by documenting the history of outstanding debt 
by debt type. In particular, we build the history of outstanding debt of the 988 sample 
firms from 1993 to 2007. For each firm in a given year, we examine all debt issues 
reported in Dealscan and SDC and determine at the end of each year the total debt 
outstanding based on the maturity structure of the issues. We record dollars outstanding 
of all debt, and that of each of the three debt types. Outstanding debt mix in a given year 
consists of the percentages of the three debt types calculated using dollars outstanding. 
The above process yields a sample of 11,329 firm-year observations associated with 988 
firms, which we call the “outstanding debt mix sample.” 
1.4.2  Univariate Analysis 
To examine the determinants of corporate debt mix, we first show the 
characteristics of the issuers at the time of issuance by debt type using the incremental 
debt issues sample. In Table 1, we present the descriptive statistics for a set of firm 
variables that reflect an issuer’s reputation, size, investment policy, profitability, 
leverage, and credit risk. This set of variables is selected to test the theoretical 
explanations of corporate debt mix. First, we use firm age and size to test the information 
asymmetry explanation. Firm age is the difference between the issuance year of a new 
debt and the year in which the firm is founded. Total asset (to proxy for firm size) is the 
book value of assets shown in millions of dollars. Second, we use several variables to test 
the renegotiation and liquidation hypothesis. Fixed asset ratio is ratio of net property, 
16 
 
 
 
plant, and equipment to total assets. R&D expenditure ratio is R&D expenditures scaled 
by sales. Capital expenditure growth is the average growth in capital expenditures during 
the three-year period prior to a new debt issue. Profitability is EBITDA divided by total 
assets. The dummy of Altman's Z-score equals one when Altman’s Z-score is less than 
1.81, and zero otherwise. The Z-score is calculated as (3.3 × EBIT + 1.0 × Sales + 1.4 × 
Retained earnings + 1.2 × Working capital)/Total assets + 0.6 × Market value 
equity/Total debt). Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the first difference of 
EBITDA scaled by total assets during the 5-year period prior to the debt issuance. Third, 
credit risk is measured by the following three variables. Credit rating is the S&P senior 
debt rating from Compustat and is converted into a number between 1 and 24: 24 
represents the highest rating and 1 the not-rated. Investment grade is an indicator variable 
that equals to 1 if the firm has credit rating of 14 (BBB-) or higher, and zero otherwise. 
Unrated firms are firms that are not rated. Finally, we use market-to-book ratio and 
leverage to test the agency cost explanation. Market-to-book ratio is calculated as the 
ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Market value of assets is the book 
value of total assets minus book value of common equity plus market value of common 
equity. Market leverage is total debt divided by the market value of assets. Total debt is 
the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. 
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Panel A presents the means of the firm variables by issuer group. Public debt 
issuers are the largest in firm size with an average total asset of $9.758 billion, and the 
most mature with an average firm age of 71.16 years. They also have the largest fixed 
asset ratio of an average of 74%, and the highest credit rating with an average rating of 
15.88 (between BBB and BBB+). The non-bank private debt group has the smallest firm 
size, age, fixed asset ratio, and proportion of investment grade firms. In addition, these 
issuers have the largest amount of R&D expenditures. Interestingly, non-bank private 
debt and bank debt groups have an average credit rating of 9.12 (between B and B+) and 
10.74 (between B+ and BB-) respectively, both in the speculative grade. However, 
market leverage and proportion of firms with an Altman’s Z-score less than 1.81 for these 
two groups are similar to those for the public debt group. 
To see the impact of macroeconomic environment on the issuers’ decisions about 
debt type, we show the results by time period in Panels B through D and by GDP growth 
in Panels E through F. GDP growth is measured in the year prior to the debt issuance. By 
examining Panels B, C and D, we find that the above results for the full sample period 
remain mostly consistent across time periods. Interestingly, the average credit quality of 
non-bank private debt issuers is significantly lower than that of bank debt issuers in the 
2003-2007 period, but not in the two earlier periods. Similarly, we see the same pattern in 
the period with high GDP growth. This finding suggests that non-bank private debt 
issuers are more likely to be lower quality firms during favorable economic conditions 
than during poor ones. This is consistent with the prediction of Diamond’s model that 
borrowers may switch between types of debt sources when economic conditions change, 
given the same target capital structure. 
22 
 
 
 
In addition to examining the choice of debt type in the new issuances sample, we 
believe it is very important to examine the mix of corporate debt types by studying the 
issuers’ outstanding debt at given points of time. To do so, in Table 2 we report the 
statistics of the percentages of bank, non-bank private debt, and public debt based on the 
outstanding debt mix sample described above. We show these percentages by each of the 
firm and macroeconomic factors that are potential determinants of corporate debt mix. 
We find several interesting results. First, large and mature firms have an average of 51% 
in bank debt, 38% in public debt, and the remainder in non-bank private debt. Small and 
young firms, on the other hand, use more private (bank and non-bank) debt and less 
public debt. Second, the investment grade issuers have a relatively even weight on public 
(47%) and bank (44%) debt, whereas speculative grade firms rely heavily on bank debt 
(65%). The finding is confirmed by the grouping results using Altman’s Z-score. Third, it 
is interesting that the percentage of non-bank private debt is on an upward trend over 
time from 4% in 1993-1997 to 25% in 2003-2007, while that of public debt is on the 
downward slope from 37% in the earliest period to 21% in the latest. The percentage of 
bank debt remains relatively flat between 53% and 61%. Finally, we find that interest rate 
volatility may lead to a substitution between public and non-bank private debt. 
Specifically, high interest volatility prompts the issuers to shift from public to non-bank 
private debt.  
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1.4.3   Multivariate Analyses: The Incremental Debt Issues Sample 
 In this section, we perform a multivariate analysis by using the multinomial 
logistic model to predict the likelihood of a given type of new debt issue. In practice, the 
logistic model fits the analysis of debt mix choice based on a sample of new debt issues. 
It helps determine, at a given time, the factors driving a firm’s preference for a specific 
source of new debt issues. Our approach is similar to that of Denis and Mihov (2003), 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004), and Arena (2010), but different from those of Houston and James 
(1996) and Johnson (1997).
7
 The specification of the general multinomial logistic model 
is described as follows.
8
 
                  
           
            
 
   
                      (1) 
where b is the base group (comparison group). J indicates three types of debt financing 
(bank, non-bank private, and public debt) in our sample, where m takes a value of 1 if the 
firm issues a bank loan, 2 for non-bank private debt, and 3 for public debt. X is the vector 
of explanatory variables. 
To test the determinants suggested by theoretical explanations and supported by 
empirical work (e.g., Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), Denis and Mihov 
(2003)), we include the following set of explanatory variables. Firm age and firm size 
(log of total assets) are used to test the information asymmetry explanation. For the 
renegotiation and liquidation hypothesis, we employ fixed asset ratio (a proxy for asset 
tangibility), profitability, a dummy for Altman's Z-score <1.81 (a proxy for financial 
distress), and earnings volatility (a proxy for operating risk). For credit risk, we use the 
                                                          
7
  Houston and James (1996) and Johnson (1997) use the balance sheet data, and the OLS and Tobit 
models, respectively. 
8
  See Long and Freese (2001) for the general specification of multinomial logistic models. 
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dummies for investment grade and unrated firm. To examine the agency cost explanation, 
we use market-to-book ratio and leverage. To control for the characteristics of the new 
debt issues and outstanding debt, we use the dollar principal amount of the new debt issue 
(a proxy for flotation costs), a dummy for outstanding public or private debt as in Denis 
and Mihov (2003), and the public debt mix ratio. For industry factors, we use a dummy 
for regulated industry as in Johnson (1997). To examine the impacts of macroeconomic 
variables, we follow Khang and King (2012) and use GDP growth, the slope of the yield 
curve and interest rate volatility. Slope is the difference between the 10-year and 1-year 
Treasury constant maturity rates. Interest rate volatility is the standard deviation the 10-
year Treasury constant maturity rate in the year prior to the debt issuance. We also use 
the prime interest rate to test the Diamond's (1991) prediction about the impact of interest 
rates on firms’ preferences for debt sources. Finally, we take into account the panel 
structure of our data by including dummy variables of industries to control for 
unobserved industry factors. We do not include the year dummies to control for 
unobserved time effects because our models include various macroeconomic variables 
already. In unreported results, we find almost the same results when controlling for both 
time and industry effects. The descriptive statistics of the above variables are presented in 
Table 3. 
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TABLE 3: Descriptive statistics of the incremental debt issues sample 
 
This table reports summary statistics of key variables used to estimate the likelihood of 
debt source in Table 4. Firm age is the log of the difference between the founding year and 
the issuance year of a new debt issue. Firm size is the log of the book value of total asset. 
Fixed asset ratio is ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total asset. Profitability is 
the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by the 
book value of total asset. The dummy of Altman's Z-score<1.81 takes a value of 1 if 
Altman's Z-score<= 1.8, and zero otherwise. The Z-score is calculated as (3.3 x EBIT+ 1.0 
× Sales + 1.4 × Retained earnings +1.2× Working capital)/Total assets + 0.6 × Market 
value equity/Total debt). Earnings volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the first 
difference of EBITDA within 5 fiscal years and scaled by the average total assets of that 
period. Unrated firm is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm has no available 
debt rating and zero otherwise. Investment grade is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
firm has a credit rating of BBB or higher, and zero otherwise.  Market-to-book ratio is 
calculated as (book value of total assets minus book value of common equity plus market 
value of common equity) divided by book value of total assets. Leverage is total debt 
(long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) scaled by the market value of assets (book 
value of total assets minus book value of common equity plus market value of common 
equity). Principal amount is the log of the principal amount of a new debt. No outstanding 
public or private debt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has neither outstanding 
public nor private debt at year t-1, zero otherwise. Public debt mix ratio is outstanding 
public debt scaled by total outstanding debt at year t-1. Regulated industry is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm has SIC codes ranging from 4000 to 4999, zero otherwise. 
Prime interest rate is the bank prime loan rate (%). Slope is the spread between constant 
maturity rates of the 10 year Treasury bond and the 1 year T-bill. GDP growth is annual 
growth rate (%). Interest rate volatility is the standard deviation of monthly 10 year 
constant maturity rate the year before the debt issue date. All accounting variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
Firm age (log) 4520 3.60 1.04 0.69 5.16 3.74 
Firm size 4520 7.76 1.56 3.41 11.21 7.77 
Fixed asset ratio 4520 0.64 0.39 0.03 1.75 0.58 
Profitability 4520 0.14 0.08 -0.17 0.38 0.13 
Altman's Z-score <1.81 (dummy) 4520 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Earnings volatility 4520 0.04 0.10 0.00 1.13 0.02 
Unrated firm 4520 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Investment grade 4520 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Market to book 4520 1.84 1.05 0.83 6.99 1.49 
Leverage 4520 0.22 0.15 0.00 0.69 0.31 
Principal amount (log) 4520 5.82 1.22 2.34 8.63 5.82 
No outstanding public or private 
debt (t-1) 
4520 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Public debt mix ratio (t-1) 4520 0.28 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.14 
Regulated industry 4520 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Prime interest rate 4520 6.93 1.70 4.12 9.23 7.96 
Slope 4520 1.15 1.02 -0.14 2.77 0.72 
GDP growth 4520 5.38 1.06 3.17 6.62 5.92 
Interest rate volatility 4520 0.38 0.33 0.00 1.35 0.34 
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We estimate the multinomial model specified in Equation (1) for the full sample 
and report the results for two models in Table 4. For each model, the first two columns 
represent the probability of issuing non-bank private and public debt relative to bank 
debt, respectively. The last column shows the probability of issuing public debt versus 
non-bank private debt. 
Firm age, a proxy for reputation, is positively related to the probability of issuing 
public debt relative to bank debt, and this relation is significant in Model 1. In addition, 
firm age has a significantly positive effect on the likelihood of issuing public versus non-
bank private debt, and a significantly negative effect on the choice between non-bank and 
bank debt. These relations imply that older firms prefer public to bank and to non-bank 
private debt, and prefer bank to non-bank debt if private debt is chosen. The finding lends 
support for Diamond’s (1991) life cycle hypothesis, which implies that young firms use 
more bank debt, and then switch to public debt as they mature. The result for firm size 
suggests that larger firms are more likely to issue public debt relative to both bank and 
non-bank private debt. This finding is consistent with the empirical literature that large 
firms are more likely to issue public debt.  
Our results show that asset tangibility is a significant determinant of corporate 
debt mix. We find that firms with a high fixed asset ratio are more likely to borrow from 
public sources. This evidence supports the findings of Hoshi et al. (1993), Houston and 
James (1996), Johnson (1997), Denis and Mihov (2003). They document that bank 
borrowers have fewer tangible assets than public issuers. In addition, we find that 
profitable firms are more likely to prefer bank debt to non-bank private or public debt. 
This finding is inconsistent with the theoretical prediction and empirical evidence that 
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profitable firms use more public debt (e.g., Cantillo and Wright (2000)). Not surprisingly, 
we find that credit rating is an important determinant of the choice of debt mix. We also 
find that firms with a higher probability of financial distress (Altman’s Z-score < 1.81) 
use more non-bank private debt relative to bank debt. However, we find no evidence 
supporting the relation between the proxy for financial distress and the likelihood of 
issuing public debt versus private debt. Our finding is inconsistent with the theoretical 
prediction by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) that firms with a high probability of 
financial distress prefer private debt for the benefits of monitoring activities even at 
higher costs. In addition, we find a significant and negative relation between earnings 
volatility and the probability of issuing a public debt. This is consistent with the finding 
of Cantillo and Wright (2000), who document a positive relation with high or stable cash 
flows and the use of public debt. 
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TABLE 4: The likelihood of debt source: base results 
 
This table reports the results of multinomial logistic regressions predicting the probability 
of debt source. The data source is the incremental sample (N=5,079). Columns 1 & 4 and 
columns 2 & 5 report the log-odds ratios of the probability of issuing non-bank debt 
(144A) and public debt versus bank debt, respectively. Columns 3 & 6 report the log-
odds ratio of the probability of issuing public debt relative to non-bank private debt. 
Variables are defined as in Table 3. All regressions include industry dummies based on 
the Fama-French 48 industry classifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Model 1 Model 2 
  
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(1) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(2) 
Public vs. 
Non-bank 
(3) 
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(4) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(5) 
Public vs.  
Non-bank 
(6) 
Firm age (log) 
  
-0.111 0.137 0.249 -0.114 0.091 0.205 
(0.065)* (0.064)** (0.087)*** (0.065)* (0.064) (0.088)** 
Firm size 0.032 0.489 0.457 -0.012 0.450 0.462 
  (0.068) (0.058)*** (0.085)*** (0.068) (0.058)*** (0.085)*** 
Fixed asset ratio -0.176 0.571 0.748 -0.115 0.539 0.654 
  (0.211) (0.187)*** (0.269)*** (0.210) (0.189)*** (0.269)** 
Profitability 
  
-2.681 -2.485 0.195 -2.735 -2.448 0.287 
(0.718)*** (0.953)*** (1.118) (0.713)*** (0.958)** (1.122) 
Altman's Z-score <1.81 
  
0.292 0.047 -0.246 0.295 0.079 -0.217 
(0.174)* (0.162) (0.226) (0.172)* (0.162) (0.225) 
Earnings volatility 
  
-0.477 -6.152 -5.675 -0.351 -5.850 -5.500 
(0.616) (2.028)*** (2.098)*** (0.616) (1.974)*** (2.047)*** 
Unrated firm -1.440 -2.751 -1.312 -1.172 -2.640 -1.468 
  (0.173)*** (0.301)*** (0.337)*** (0.163)*** (0.295)*** (0.328)*** 
Investment grade 
  
-0.974 0.564 1.538 -0.882 0.503 1.385 
(0.175)*** (0.156)*** (0.221)*** (0.177)*** (0.157)*** (0.224)*** 
Market to book 0.267 0.109 -0.157 0.245 0.114 -0.131 
  (0.059)*** (0.073) (0.088)* (0.059)*** (0.073) (0.088) 
Leverage 
  
-0.085 -0.963 -0.877 -0.495 -1.028 -0.533 
(0.495) (0.550)* (0.702) (0.491) (0.550)* (0.700) 
Principal amount (log) 
  
-0.266 -0.930 -0.664 -0.235 -0.898 -0.663 
(0.071)*** (0.060)*** (0.087)*** (0.070)*** (0.060)*** (0.087)*** 
No outstanding public or 
private debt (t-1) 
0.898 0.036 -0.861    
(0.152)*** (0.150) (0.202)***    
Public debt mix ratio (t-1) 
  
-0.913 0.653 1.566 
    
(0.271)*** (0.157)*** (0.300)*** 
Regulated industry 
  
-0.343 0.047 0.390 -0.225 0.005 0.230 
(0.900) (0.824) (1.166) (0.920) (0.816) (1.177) 
Prime interest rate -0.682 0.482 1.163 -0.530 0.437 0.967 
  (0.091)*** (0.070)*** (0.111)*** (0.090)*** (0.070)*** (0.110)*** 
Slope 
  
-0.929 0.284 1.213 -0.678 0.194 0.872 
(0.155)*** (0.118)** (0.187)*** (0.152)*** (0.119) (0.186)*** 
GDP growth 
  
-0.387 -0.247 0.140 -0.366 -0.264 0.102 
(0.061)*** (0.058)*** (0.080)* (0.061)*** (0.058)*** (0.081) 
Interest rate volatility 0.174 -0.857 -1.031 0.187 -0.869 -1.056 
(0.166) (0.163)*** (0.221)*** (0.165) (0.164)*** (0.221)*** 
Constant 6.499 -3.145 -9.644 5.759 -2.591 -8.351 
  (1.555)*** (1.416)** (2.027)*** (1.552)*** (1.421)* (2.031)*** 
Observations 4520 4520 4520 4520 4520 4520 
Pseudo R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 
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Similar to Denis and Mihov (2003), we find that relative to speculative grade 
firms, investment grade firms use more public than private debt. In addition, firms with 
investment grade ratings use less non-bank private debt than bank debt. One possible 
explanation is that these firms find bank monitoring efficient. Thus they prefer borrowing 
from banks rather than from non-bank private debt sources that are without the 
monitoring benefits. Using unrated firms as a proxy for access to capital markets, we find 
that unrated firms use less public debt than private debt and also borrow less non-bank 
private debt relative to bank debt. This finding is different from that of Denis and Mihov 
(2003). They report an insignificant relation between unrated firms and the choice 
between public debt and non-bank private debt. Finally, we find a significant and positive 
relation between the market to book ratio and the likelihood of issuing non-bank versus 
bank debt. For leverage, we find that firms with a high leverage ratio use less public 
relative to bank debt. The finding, although relatively weak, is consistent with the 
prediction and evidence provided by Hoshi et al. (1993) that low leverage firms use more 
public debt.  
As in Denis and Mihov (2003) and Arena (2010), we control for the principal 
amount of new debt in our regression analysis.
9
 We find that new issues with a larger 
principal amount reduce the likelihood of borrowing from a public source. This evidence 
is not consistent with the literature. For example, Kishnaswami et al. (1999) report that 
larger firms and firms with larger issue sizes have a lower proportion of private debt. 
However, we find evidence consistent with the literature that firms’ choice of debt 
sources is closely related to their debt issuance history (e.g., Denis and Mihov (2003) and 
                                                          
9
  We also use the ratio of principal amount to total amount of outstanding debt as an alternative measure of 
principal amount. The results (not reported) are similar to those reported in Table 4. 
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Rauh and Sufi (2010)). The estimated coefficients of the dummy of no outstanding public 
or private debt indicate that firms with no outstanding debt prior to a new issue are more 
likely to issue non-bank private debt. We further use the public debt mix ratio as 
alternative measure of the issuer’s history of debt issuances. We find that firms with a 
higher public debt ratio prefer public to private debt, and within private debt they choose 
bank to non-bank private debt.  
Interestingly, we find no evidence to support that debt mix choices differ between 
regulated and non-regulated firms. This may be due to the fact that we have considered 
the fixed asset ratio, which is correlated with industry effects. In addition, the fixed asset 
ratio is a more direct and cleaner measure for the renegotiation and liquidity explanation 
than the regulated firm dummy variable. Consistent with the theoretical prediction of 
Diamond (1991), we find that economic conditions are major factors determining firms’ 
choices of debt sources. All coefficients on the macroeconomic variables (prime interest 
rate, slope, and GDP growth) are statistically significant. For the choice within private 
sources, we find that high interest rates, a steep slope, or a high GDP growth reduces the 
likelihood that firms borrow from non-bank private debt versus bank debt. The results 
further show significant and positive relations between these macroeconomic variables 
and the likelihood of borrowing public versus private (non-bank private and bank) debt. 
More specifically, higher interest rates, slope, and GDP growth lead to a higher 
likelihood that firms borrow from public rather than private sources. This finding is 
generally consistent with Diamond’s prediction (1991) that firms borrow more from 
public markets (banks) if economy is favorable (poor). High interest rates and a steep 
yield curve often reflect an economic boom. Along with GDP growth, these 
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macroeconomic variables indicate that when economic conditions are favorable, public 
debt becomes a relatively more popular option for debt financing. 
To examine if determinants of new debt sources are similar for investment grade 
and speculative grade firms, we estimate the Model 1 for each of the two subsamples. We 
add a dummy variable that equals one for issuers with a rating of A or above in the 
investment grade subsample, and a dummy that equals one for issuers with a rating of B 
or above in the speculative grade subsample. The results are reported in Table B in the 
Appendix. We find that the subsample results for firm size, fixed asset ratio, principal 
amount, and the dummy for no outstanding public or private debt are similar to the full 
sample results discussed above. However, interesting results emerge for some of the other 
variables when we compare between the two subsamples. First, we find that firm age 
remains a significant determinant of the debt mix for investment grade issuers, but 
becomes insignificant for the speculative grade firms. Second, investment grade firms 
with a higher rating use more public than private debt, but are indifferent to bank loans 
and non-bank private if private debt is considered. Speculative grade firms, however, are 
more likely to choose non-bank private or public debt instead of bank loans when they 
have a better rating. Interestingly, profitability and prior issuance history matter for 
speculative grade firms, but not for the investment grade forms. Third, regulated firms in 
the investment grade subsample use more bank debt than public or non-bank private debt 
than non-regulated firms. Finally, macroeconomic factors are not significant factors to 
consider when investment grade issuers choose between bank and non-bank private debt. 
We perform two additional robustness checks by dividing the sample by time 
period and interest rate volatility respectively. Table C in the Appendix reports the results 
34 
 
 
 
by time period. The results are generally similar across time; however, there are some 
interesting differences. First, credit rating has very limited effects on the likelihood of 
debt sources during the 1993-1997 period, whereas it is an important factor in the other 
two periods. The coefficient on the investment grade dummy is generally insignificant in 
the earliest period. In addition, previous outstanding debt and macroeconomic factor play 
a significantly lesser role in determining the likelihood of debt source in the earliest 
period versus the later periods. Comparing the three time periods, economic conditions in 
the mid-1990s are the most favorable with the highest average GDP growth and interest 
rates. It is likely that during the good economic states in which the capital markets are 
more heavily utilized to support growth, the issuers’ credit standing and debt issuance 
history matter minimally to firms’ motivations to borrow using a certain type of debt 
source. Similarly, macroeconomic factors play a much less important role in determining 
which debt source to use when economy is a relatively good shape. Finally, Table D in 
the Appendix shows the regressions by interest rate volatility. We find that firm age and 
profitability are major drivers of likely debt sources when interest rate volatility is high, 
but not when it is low. Interestingly, we find that the GDP growth leads to a higher 
(lower) probability of bank debt during periods of high (low) interest rate volatility. 
Similarly, during the high volatility periods an increase in volatility leads to more bank 
debt, while the reverse holds true during the low volatility periods. To sum up, we find 
that the set of determinants differs across time periods and by interest rate volatility.  
The above analysis shows that credit rating is one of the major determinants of 
debt financing types. In particular, we find that firms with investment grade ratings use 
more public than bank debt and unrated firms use less public debt. We further examine 
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the impacts of credit ratings on firms’ choice of new debt sources. To do this, we re-
estimate Equation (1) with the dummies of credit rating categories as unique explanatory 
variables. The results are reported in Table 5. The omitted rating is AA or better. We 
report two models: Model 1 includes only the rating dummy variables and Model 2 
includes additional explanatory variables used in the regressions reported in Table 4. 
We find strong results on the importance of credit rating in determining corporate 
debt mix. Signs of the coefficients are as expected, and all coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The results indicate that firms with a lower credit rating use 
more non-bank private or bank debt than public debt, and prefer non-bank private debt to 
bank debt. This finding is consistent with Denis and Mihov (2003). The results remain 
the same if we control for firm-level factors, industry and macroeconomic variables.  
Thus, the results indicate that Denis and Mihov’s (2003) results are robust to economic 
environment and time period, and not confined to the 1995-1996 period. 
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TABLE 5: The likelihood of debt source: credit rating regression 
 
This table reports the robust results taking into account the role of credit ratings as the 
main factor driving the choice of debt source. The data source is the incremental sample 
(N=5,079). Note that firms with no rating are excluded from this analysis. Columns 1 & 4 
and columns 2 & 5 report the log-odds ratios of the probability of issuing non-bank debt 
(144A) and public debt versus bank debt, respectively. Columns 3 & 6 report the log-
odds ratio of the probability of issuing public debt relative to non-bank private debt. In 
model 1, all explanatory variables are indicator variables of credit rating. For instance, A 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has an A rating, and zero otherwise. The 
omitted rating is AA or better. Model 2 includes rating dummies, as well as firm-level 
and macroeconomic variables. Other variables are defined as in Table 3. All regressions 
include industry dummies based on the Fama-French 48 industry classifications. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
  
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(1) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(2) 
Public vs.  
Non-bank 
(3) 
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(4) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(5) 
Public vs.  
Non-bank 
(6) 
       A rating dummy 1.059 0.223 -0.836 1.221 -0.026 -1.247
(0.467)** (0.145) (0.478)* (0.520)** (0.177) (0.536)** 
BBB rating dummy 1.525 -0.313 -1.838 1.642 -0.326 -1.968 
(0.449)*** (0.147)** (0.463)*** (0.511)*** (0.193)* (0.534)*** 
BB rating dummy 2.475 -0.921 -3.396 2.499 -0.621 -3.120 
 
(0.439)*** (0.171)*** (0.460)*** (0.516)*** (0.240)*** (0.552)*** 
B rating dummy 2.827 -1.080 -3.907 2.711 -0.500 -3.211 
(0.444)*** (0.211)*** (0.477)*** (0.543)*** (0.311) (0.604)*** 
CCC and below rating 
dummy 
3.029 -1.550 -4.579 2.706 -1.429 -4.135 
(0.606)*** (0.752)** (0.917)*** (0.723)*** (0.840)* (1.026)*** 
Firm age (log) 
     
-0.087 0.132 0.219 
   
(0.077) (0.066)** (0.096)** 
Firm size 
     
0.196 0.536 0.341 
   
(0.085)** (0.062)*** (0.099)*** 
Fixed asset ratio 
   
-0.131 0.403 0.534 
  
   
(0.251) (0.196)** (0.300)* 
Profitability 
     
-1.808 -1.299 0.509 
   
(1.023)* (1.063) (1.363) 
Altman's Z-score <1.81 
     
0.315 0.063 -0.252 
   
(0.207) (0.168) (0.251) 
Earnings volatility 
     
-0.297 -7.618 -7.321 
   
(0.950) (2.241)*** (2.388)*** 
Market to book 
     
0.309 0.069 -0.240 
   
(0.082)*** (0.080) (0.105)** 
Leverage 
     
0.163 -0.946 -1.108 
   
(0.591) (0.575) (0.771) 
Principal amount (log) 
     
-0.503 -1.000 -0.497 
   
(0.086)*** (0.063)*** (0.099)*** 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
      No outstanding public 
 or private debt (t-1) 
  
   
1.092 0.064 -1.028
   
(0.179)*** (0.156) (0.222)*** 
Regulated industry 
     
-0.229 0.018 0.247 
   
(0.919) (0.834) (1.179) 
Prime interest rate 
     
-0.454 0.526 0.980 
   
(0.112)*** (0.073)*** (0.128)*** 
Slope 
     
-0.557 0.350 0.908 
   
(0.189)*** (0.123)*** (0.215)*** 
GDP growth 
     
-0.378 -0.261 0.117 
   
(0.072)*** (0.059)*** (0.088) 
Interest rate volatility 
     
0.148 -0.892 -1.040 
   
(0.191) (0.167)*** (0.238)*** 
Constant 
  
-4.849 -2.170 2.679 1.713 -2.543 -4.256 
(1.141)*** (1.056)** (1.521)* (1.934) (1.529)* (2.366)* 
Observations 3910 3910 3910 3518 3518 3518 
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.23 0.23 
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1.4.4   Multivariate Analyses: The Outstanding Debt Mix Sample 
 In this section, we use the fractional multinomial logit model (FMLM) to examine 
the determinants of outstanding debt mix. FMLM regression, proposed by Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996), is an approach for modeling fractional dependent variables that range 
between 0 and 1. This method models the conditional expected value of the dependent 
variable as a logistic function. The model is fitted by maximum quasi-likelihood. Our 
goal is to analyze how factors such as firm characteristics drive the proportions of bank 
debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt. Thus, the fractional multinomial logit 
regression fits our analysis well. We estimate the model using fmlogit module by Maarten 
Buis (2008). The functional form of FMLM is similar to that of the multinomial logit 
model (MLM). One difference is that the dependent variable of FMLM takes values 
continuously from 0 to 1, while that of MLM takes either 0 or 1. This approach is similar 
to that of Houston and James (1996), and Johnson (1997), and Rauh and Sufi (2010), in 
which balance sheet data are used. We employ the same set of explanatory variables used 
in regressions in Table 4. The panel data sample consists of percentages of bank, non-
bank private, and public debt outstanding at year-ends for all firms and the corresponding 
firm, industry, and macroeconomic variables. The descriptive statistics of the debt mix 
percentages and explanatory variables are reported in Table 6. 
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TABLE 6: Descriptive statistics of the outstanding debt sample 
 
This table provides summary statistics of variables used in the regression models in Table 
7. The data source comes from the debt mix sample (N=11,329). The proportion of 
outstanding bank debt (non-bank debt) is calculated as outstanding bank debt (non-bank 
debt) divided by total outstanding debt, where total outstanding debt is outstanding bank 
debt plus outstanding non-bank private debt plus outstanding public debt. Similarly, the 
proportion of outstanding public debt is outstanding public scaled by total outstanding 
debt. The definitions of the other variables are the same in Table 3. All accounting 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
 
      
Percentage of  outstanding 
bank debt 
10252 0.56 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.60 
Percentage  of outstanding 
non-bank private debt 
10252 0.16 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Percentage of outstanding 
public debt 
10252 0.28 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.14 
Firm age (log) 10252 3.57 1.03 0.69 5.16 3.68 
Firm size 10252 7.67 1.53 3.59 11.14 7.63 
Fixed asset ratio 10252 0.63 0.39 0.03 1.74 0.57 
Profitability 10252 0.14 0.08 -0.20 0.37 0.13 
Altman's Z-score <1.81 10252 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Earnings volatility 10252 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.62 0.02 
Unrated firm 10252 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Investment grade 10252 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Market to book 10252 1.81 1.01 0.82 6.79 1.48 
Leverage 10252 0.22 0.16 0.00 0.69 0.20 
No outstanding public or 
private debt (t-1) 
10252 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Regulated industry 10252 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Prime interest rate 10252 7.01 1.67 4.12 9.23 7.96 
Slope 10252 1.11 1.02 -0.14 2.77 0.72 
GDP growth 10252 5.32 1.06 3.17 6.62 5.67 
Interest rate volatility 10252 0.38 0.33 0.00 1.35 0.34 
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Table 7 reports the base case FMLM regressions of percentages of debt mix on 
explanatory variables.
10
 The results confirm what we find in the MLM regressions using 
the incremental debt issues sample. Most importantly, we find that macroeconomic 
conditions are major determinants of corporate debt mix. Table E in the Appendix reports 
the results by investment and speculative grade firms. There are several interesting 
comparisons. First, for both investment and speculative firms, better ratings always result 
in public rather than private debt. However, a higher rating leads to more non-bank 
private than bank debt for speculative grade issuers but does not matter for investment 
grade issuers. Second, the risk of financial distress has a strong impact on the debt mix 
for speculative grade firms, but has a much weaker effect for the investment grade firms. 
This result confirms that financial distress is a major determinant of corporate debt mix 
and its impact is most prominent for borrowers with a high probability of distress. 
Finally, earnings volatility is significantly related to the outstanding debt mix for 
speculative grade firms, but not for the investment grade issuers.  
  
                                                          
10
 We do not report the goodness-of-fit measure such as R-squared because it is not appropriate for 
fractional multinomial logistic model. This model is one with multiple dependent variables, thus ruling 
out the R-squared. Theoretically, the R-squared is the proportion variance in the dependent variable 
explained by the independent variables. So, it becomes a problem for models with multiple related 
dependent variables. We thank Maarten Buis for providing this explanation. 
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TABLE 7: Estimating the proportions of debt mix: base results 
 
This table reports the results of the fractional multinomial logistic model (FMLM) 
estimating the proportions in the debt mix. The data source comes from the debt mix 
sample (N=11,329). The dependent variables are the proportions of outstanding bank 
debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt. Their definitions are as in Table 6. Control 
variables are defined as in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 provide the log-odds ratios of the 
proportions of outstanding non-bank private debt and public debt relative to the 
proportion of outstanding bank debt, respectively. For comparison, the last column 
reports the log-odds ratios of the proportion of outstanding public debt versus non-bank 
private debt. The regression includes industry dummies based on the Fama-French 48 
industry classifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(1) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(2) 
Public vs.  
Non-bank 
(3) 
Firm age (log) 
  
-0.101 0.135 0.235 
(0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.029)*** 
Firm size -0.206 0.094 0.300 
  (0.020)*** (0.016)*** (0.024)*** 
Fixed asset ratio -0.211 0.414 0.625 
  (0.068)*** (0.066)*** (0.090)*** 
Profitability 
  
-3.897 -2.046 1.851 
(0.300)*** (0.317)*** (0.388)*** 
Altman's Z-score <1.81 0.059 0.023 -0.037 
  (0.059) (0.052) (0.073) 
Earnings volatility 
  
0.912 0.892 -0.019 
(0.341)*** (0.390)** (0.485) 
Unrated firm -0.374 0.062 0.436 
  (0.063)*** (0.069) (0.087)*** 
Investment grade 
  
-0.378 0.703 1.081 
(0.055)*** (0.049)*** (0.067)*** 
Market to book 0.241 0.026 -0.215 
  (0.026)*** (0.028) (0.035)*** 
Leverage 
  
-0.637 -0.969 -0.332 
(0.178)*** (0.183)*** (0.240) 
No outstanding public or 
private debt (t-1) 
  
-1.692 -2.698 -1.006 
(0.079)*** (0.096)*** (0.123)*** 
Regulated industry 
  
-0.568 -0.916 -0.348 
(0.223)** (0.318)*** (0.424) 
Prime interest rate -0.729 0.520 1.249 
  (0.031)*** (0.023)*** (0.037)*** 
Slope 
  
-0.981 0.902 1.884 
(0.051)*** (0.040)*** (0.061)*** 
GDP growth 
  
-0.183 0.060 0.243 
(0.022)*** (0.017)*** (0.026)*** 
Interest rate volatility 0.082 -0.188 -0.270 
(0.066) (0.050)*** (0.077)*** 
Constant 7.039 -6.194 -13.233 
  (0.513)*** (0.359)*** (0.561)*** 
Observations 10252 10252 10252 
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 Table F in the Appendix reports the regressions by interest rate volatility.
11
  The 
subsample results are generally similar to those in Table 7, with a few distinct 
differences. We note that interest rate level and slope remain significant factors with a 
higher level and slope leading to more public debt (than private debt) and more bank debt 
if private debt is used. Interestingly, GDP growth and interest rate volatility have 
significant impacts on corporate debt mix only when interest volatility is high. In other 
words, issuers are most sensitive to economic conditions when making corporate debt 
mix decisions during times of high uncertainty. 
1.5  Substitute or Complement Effect 
1.5.1  Full Sample Analysis 
One of the major contributions of this paper is the examination of complement 
and substitute effects between public and private debt over time. Using Lee and Tang’s 
(2011) model, we test whether public and private debt are substitutes or complements. 
Lee and Tang (2011) develop a model to test the substitute/ complement effect between 
managerial compensation components. We revise their model as follows. At a given point 
in time, a firm’s outstanding debt is funded by private and public sources. As in Denis 
and Mihov (2003) and Johnson (1997), we define private debt as bank and non-bank 
private (144A debt). Let TD, PUBL, PRIV be total debt, public debt, and private debt, 
respectively. Thus, total debt at a given time is defined as: 
                                                       (2)                  
By taking the log of both sides of Equation (2) and assuming that X is the vector of the 
determinants of total debt, we have: 
                                                          
11
 We also perform the regressions by time period, and the results are qualitatively similar to those reported 
in Table C in the Appendix. 
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                                                         (3) 
Equation (3) becomes: 
                        
    
    
               
    
    
                  (4) 
Finally, the testable model is: 
                   
    
    
                
    
    
              (5)                
where,    predicts the relation between public debt and private debt. If    is 
negative, public debt and private debt are substitutes. Otherwise, this relation implies a 
complementary effect between the two. The explanatory variables in vector X are the 
same as those in the regressions reported in Sections 1.4.3 and 1.4.4.  
We estimate the model in Equation (5) by using the OLS regression framework 
with fixed and random effects. The regression results are presented in Table 8. We find 
that, in both two models, the estimate of    is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
This implies the existence of a substitute effect between public debt and private debt. In 
general, this evidence is consistent with the theoretical assumption in the literature that 
public debt and private debt are alternative sources. However, our finding is not 
supported by previous evidence in Rauh and Sufi (2010). They document evidence of a 
complement effect between the two. 
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TABLE 8: The substitute/complement effect 
 
This table reports the result of OLS regression testing whether public debt and private 
debt are substitute or complement. Data source comes from the debt mix sample 
(N=11,329).  Note that firms with no outstanding public debt are excluded from this 
analysis. The dependent variable is the log of outstanding public debt. The main 
interested explanatory variable is the log (1+ ratio of outstanding private debt to public 
debt). Outstanding private debt is the sum of outstanding bank debt and non-bank private 
debt. Other variables are defined as in Table 3. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
Dependent variable: 
Log of outstanding public debt 
Model 1 (Fixed effect) Model 2 (Random effect) 
Log of (1+ private 
debt/public debt) 
  
-0.402 -0.433 
(0.014)*** (0.013)*** 
Firm age (log) 
  
0.156 0.071 
(0.058)*** (0.027)*** 
Firm size 0.449 0.568 
  (0.023)*** (0.016)*** 
Fixed asset ratio -0.287 -0.095 
  (0.063)*** (0.045)** 
Profitability 
  
0.149 0.139 
(0.151) (0.148) 
Altman's Z-score<1.81 -0.010 -0.006 
  (0.027) (0.026) 
Earnings volatility 
  
1.090 1.209 
(0.146)*** (0.145)*** 
Unrated firm -0.088 -0.097 
  (0.041)** (0.039)** 
Investment grade 
  
0.125 0.086 
(0.028)*** (0.027)*** 
Market to book  0.050 0.059 
  (0.015)*** (0.015)*** 
Leverage 
  
0.875 0.804 
(0.097)*** (0.091)*** 
Regulated industry 
   
0.072 
 
(0.064) 
Prime interest rate -0.224 -0.210 
  (0.012)*** (0.010)*** 
Slope 
  
-0.368 -0.348 
(0.020)*** (0.018)*** 
GDP growth 
  
-0.050 -0.047 
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
Interest rate volatility 
  
0.052 0.048 
(0.017)*** (0.018)*** 
Constant 4.245 3.338 
  (0.348)*** (0.212)*** 
Observations 6076 6076 
R-squared 0.41 0.40 
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For brevity, we omit the detailed discussions of the results on the other 
explanatory variables because the main coefficient of interest is    which indicates a 
substitute or complement effect between public and private debt sources. The explanatory 
variables are included as control variables to better discern the effect of interest. In 
addition, the above model requires that the ratio of outstanding private debt to public debt 
is valid, implying removal of firm-year observations with zero outstanding public debt. In 
other words, the above results are based on firms with nonzero outstanding public debt. 
1.5.2  Rating Downgrades and Upgrades 
In this section we analyze the substitute/complement effect among public debt, 
bank debt, and non-bank private debt when there is a change of credit rating.
12
 As shown 
in Section 1.4, credit quality is one of major determinants of corporate debt mix. 
Therefore, a credit rating downgrade or upgrade of credit rating may trigger a shift 
among the debt sources. We find that 513 out of 988 firms in our sample have at least one 
credit rating downgrade and 446 firms have at least one credit rating upgrade during the 
sample period. We examine if a substitute or complement effect exists among public 
debt, bank debt, and non-bank private debt during the five-year period before a ratings 
change event and the five-year period afterwards. 
We follow Rauh and Sufi’s (2010) approach and test the econometric model 
below: 
            
                         
          
          
          
          
          
        
    
       
          
          
           
                (6) 
                                                          
12
 We do not make assumptions about the reasons triggering an upgrade or downgrade of credit ratings. 
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where the dependent variable is the proportion of public debt, bank debt, and non-bank 
private debt to total debt outstanding. The I variables are indicator variables for the years 
before and after the downgrade or upgrade year. For instance, I 
t-5
 and I 
t+5
 are five years 
before and five years after the downgrade or upgrade year t, respectively. As in Rauh and 
Sufi (2010), we use the year right before the downgrade or upgrade year as the 
comparison group (I 
t-1
 is omitted). The objective is to test if the pattern changes 
significantly around the year of the rating change. The signs of the coefficients indicate 
whether there is a substitute or complement effect among alternative financing sources. 
More specifically, a positive sign on the coefficient of an indicator variable shows an 
increase (complement effect) in the proportion of a specific debt type relative to the 
omitted year, while a negative sign indicates a decrease (substitute effect).  
The model estimates of Equation (6) for the subsample of credit rating changes 
are presented in Table 9. Panel A presents the results for rating downgrades. For rating 
downgrades, we see a clear pattern of substitution between the public and private debt. In 
particular, from years -5 through -3, firms borrow significantly more from public debt, 
but less from non-bank private debt; but the difference declines as the ratings downgrade 
approaches, indicating a shift from public toward non-bank private debt. The pattern in 
bank debt is generally negative but not significant. This finding implies that a substitute 
effect is significant between public and non-bank private debt before a downgrade.  
 
  
47 
 
 
 
TABLE 9: The substitute/complement effect around ratings changes 
 
There are 513 (446) of 988 firms having at least one ratings downgrade (upgrade) in two 
consecutive fiscal years during the period of 1993-2007. From the debt mix sample, we 
create these firms’ debt mix history within 5 years before and 5 years after the event of a 
ratings downgrade (upgrade). This table reports the results of OLS regressions testing 
whether bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt are substitutes or complements 
when the firms’ rating is downgraded (Panel A) and upgraded (Panel B). The dependent 
variables are the proportions of outstanding bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public 
debt. The explanatory variables are indicator variables of time before or after the 
downgrade/upgrade year. The omitted indicator variable is the year right before the 
downgrade/upgrade year. The positive (negative) sign of a coefficient indicates the 
complement (substitute) effect. All regressions include industry dummies based on the 
Fama-French 48 industry classifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Sample of firms with rating downgrade 
 
  
% outstanding  
bank debt 
% outstanding  
non-bank debt 
% outstanding  
public debt 
Five years before the downgrade -0.023 -0.049 0.072 
  (0.015) (0.009)*** (0.016)*** 
Four years before the downgrade -0.021 -0.033 0.054 
  (0.015) (0.009)*** (0.015)*** 
Three years before the downgrade -0.008 -0.024 0.032 
  (0.014) (0.009)*** (0.014)** 
Two years before the downgrade -0.011 -0.012 0.023 
  (0.013) (0.009) (0.014)* 
The year of the downgrade 0.003 0.019 -0.022 
  (0.013) (0.009)** (0.013)* 
One year after the downgrade -0.028 0.036 -0.008 
  (0.013)** (0.010)*** (0.013) 
Two years after the downgrade -0.049 0.047 0.002 
  (0.013)*** (0.010)*** (0.013) 
Three years after the downgrade -0.043 0.050 -0.007 
  (0.013)*** (0.010)*** (0.014) 
Four years after the downgrade -0.040 0.052 -0.012 
  (0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.014) 
Five years after the downgrade -0.031 0.044 -0.012 
  (0.014)** (0.011)*** (0.015) 
Constant 0.455 0.005 0.540 
  (0.043)*** (0.009) (0.040)*** 
Observations 9367 9367 9367 
R-squared 0.07 0.16 0.13 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Sample of firms with rating upgrade 
 
 
% outstanding 
bank debt 
% outstanding 
non-bank debt 
% outstanding 
public debt 
Five years before the upgrade 0.020 -0.061 0.041 
  (0.018) (0.012)*** (0.019)** 
Four years before the upgrade 0.005 -0.040 0.035 
  (0.017) (0.012)*** (0.017)** 
Three years before the upgrade 0.000 -0.024 0.024 
  (0.017) (0.012)* (0.017) 
Two years before the upgrade -0.007 -0.012 0.019 
  (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) 
The year of the upgrade -0.005 0.017 -0.012 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
One year after the upgrade 0.004 0.006 -0.011 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
Two years after the upgrade 0.008 0.008 -0.015 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
Three years after the upgrade -0.003 0.012 -0.009 
  (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) 
Four years after the upgrade -0.021 0.016 0.005 
  (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) 
Five years after the upgrade -0.045 0.029 0.017 
  (0.017)*** (0.014)** (0.017) 
Constant 0.802 0.105 0.093 
  (0.036)*** (0.020)*** (0.036)** 
Observations 6430 6430 6430 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.13 
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During the year of a downgrade, the coefficients reverse, indicating a continued 
shift toward non-bank private debt and away from public debt
13
.  During the five years 
after the downgrade, we observe that firms borrow relatively less from banks; while 
borrowing significantly more from non-bank private lenders. This finding suggests a 
substitute effect between toward non-bank private debt and away from bank debt after a 
downgrade. Overall, this pattern is consistent with a deterioration in the credit quality of 
firms that experience downgrades, both before and after a ratings downgrade. Prior to the 
downgrade, these firms have higher levels of outstanding public debt and lower levels of 
non-bank private debt relative to the year before the downgrade. Further, the pattern over 
time indicates a shift toward non-bank private debt and away from public debt.  
After the downgrade, they have higher levels of non-bank private debt and lower 
levels of bank debt relative to the year before the downgrade. Thus, public lenders appear 
to react to a deterioration in a firm’s credit quality and reduce its ability to access public 
debt even before a downgrade.  Bank lenders appear to restrict access to bank financing 
only after a downgrade, perhaps because this event affects the firm’s ability to operate. 
This is consistent with bank lenders monitoring borrowers and giving them more time 
through renegotiation if they experience credit quality issues. Note that it does not 
indicate that banks are slow to react to a firm’s deteriorating condition, because the 
downgrade sample is conditional on firms having been downgraded. In other words, there 
is a sample selection issue. It may be that a majority of the firms that banks give more 
                                                          
13
 Note that the coefficient reverses, but this indicates a continuation of the pattern because it is now after 
the omitted year rather than before.  For example, suppose the firm is 50% public debt/50% private debt in 
the omitted year.  Suppose the year before the omitted year we have 60%public/40% private debt.  This 
would yield a positive coefficient on public debt and a negative coefficient on private debt.  Suppose the 
year after the omitted year we have 40% public/60% private debt.  This would yield a negative coefficient 
on the public debt and a positive coefficient on the private debt.  However, both indicate a trend toward less 
public debt and more private debt, though the coefficient switches sign. 
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time by renegotiating their debt contracts ultimately avoid being downgraded, so these 
cases would be excluded from this sample. 
We repeat the analysis for the firms with credit ratings upgrades and the results 
are presented in Panel B. Surprisingly, we do not find evidence in support of a substitute 
or complement effect among the three debt sources when a firm’s credit rating is 
upgraded. In fact, our results show that firms are likely to use more public debt and less 
non-bank private debt during the pre-upgrade period, but use less public but more non-
bank private debt in the post-upgrade period. However, most of the estimates of 
coefficients on the substitute and complement variables are not statistically significant. 
1.5.3 New Issuance Events 
In this section, we examine the substitute/complement effect among public, bank 
and non-bank private debt in the five years before and five years after the event of a new 
debt issue. Based on the model shown in Equation (6), we define the I variables as 
indicator variables for the years before and after the year of a new debt issue with the 
year before issuance being the omitted year. We estimate the model for 5,079 debt 
issuances by 967 firms and the results are reported in Table 10. 
 Columns 1 and 2 show the results for the bank debt issues. We find that before a 
bank debt issuance, the proportion in non-bank private debt is lower in years -5 through -
2 than in the omitted year (-1). After a bank debt issuance, the proportion in non-bank 
private debt stays below the level in the omitted year (-1) for years 0 and +1, but then 
rises above in years +3 through +5. Conversely, before a bank debt issuance, the 
proportion in public debt is higher in years -5 through -2 than in the omitted year (-1), 
though the amount by which it is higher declines over those years. After a bank debt 
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issuance, the proportion in public debt then drops below the proportion in the omitted 
year (-1) and stays below that level, indicating less public debt in years 0 through +5. 
This is consistent with an eventual substitution effect (years +3 onward) toward non-bank 
private debt and away from public debt both before and after the bank debt issuance.
14
  
Further, after a bank debt issuance, the magnitude of the coefficients in years +3 through 
+5 indicates a shift toward private debt (both bank debt and non-bank private debt) and 
away from public debt since the negative coefficients for the public debt are larger than 
the positive coefficients on the non-bank private debt.   
 Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates for the proportions of bank and public debt 
around the omitted year (-1) when there is an issuance of non-bank private debt. 
Interestingly, there is very little effect on the bank or public debt mix in the pre-issue 
period. From the issuance year and onward, we find that both the proportion of bank and 
public debt drop significantly. All coefficients on the indicator variables from years 0 
through +4 are negative and statistically significant. The finding supports a substitute 
effect between the non-bank private and bank/public debt in the post-issue period. We 
present the results for the public debt issues sample in the last two columns. The pattern 
is very similar to that in the non-bank debt issues sample. In particular, prior to the 
issuance of public debt there is no discernible effect in the percentages of the other two 
debt types. After the issuance, the percentages of bank and non-bank private decrease, 
indicating the substitutability between public and private debt.  
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Note that in years 0 through +1, both non-bank private debt and public debt are lower, which is 
consistent with bank debt having just been issued, increasing its proportion versus the other two. 
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TABLE 10: The substitute/complement effect at the event of a new issuance 
 
From the incremental sample of 5,079 unique debt issues, we pull out the samples of 
3,860 bank debt, 452 non-bank private debt, and 767 public debt issuances. Next, we 
create the debt mix history for the firms around 5 years before and 5 years after the event 
of a new issuance. For each issuance sample, we test the substitute/complement effect 
among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt. This table reports the OLS 
regression results: Columns 1&2 for the bank debt sample, columns 3&4 for the non-
bank private debt sample, and columns 4&5 for public debt sample. The dependent 
variables are the proportions of outstanding bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public 
debt. The explanatory variables are indicator variables of time before and after the 
issuance. The omitted indicator variable is the year right before the issuance. The positive 
(negative) sign of a coefficient indicates the complement (substitute) effect. All 
regressions include industry dummies based on the Fama-French 48 industry 
classifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Bank issuance sample Non-bank issuance 
sample 
Public issuance sample 
  
% 
outstanding 
NB debt 
(1) 
% 
outstanding  
public debt 
(2) 
% 
outstanding  
bank debt 
(3) 
% 
outstanding  
public debt 
(4) 
% 
outstanding  
bank debt 
(5) 
% 
outstanding  
NB debt 
(6) 
Five years before the 
issuance 
  
-0.054 0.052 0.070 0.050 -0.013 0.006 
(0.005)*** (0.009)*** (0.025)*** (0.019)*** (0.021) (0.012) 
Four years before 
the issuance 
  
-0.040 0.037 0.026 0.048 -0.029 0.014 
(0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.025) (0.019)** (0.020) (0.011) 
Three years before 
the issuance 
  
-0.024 0.028 0.019 0.031 -0.029 0.015 
(0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.024) (0.018)* (0.019) (0.011) 
Two years before 
the issuance 
  
-0.013 0.009 -0.004 0.011 -0.016 0.002 
(0.005)*** (0.008) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (0.010) 
Year of the issuance -0.037 -0.078 -0.299 -0.044 -0.154 -0.031 
 (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.021)*** (0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.008)*** 
One year after the 
issuance 
  
-0.012 -0.062 -0.283 -0.042 -0.122 -0.034 
(0.005)** (0.007)*** (0.022)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.008)*** 
Two years after the 
issuance 
  
-0.000 -0.059 -0.282 -0.047 -0.103 -0.038 
(0.005) (0.007)*** (0.022)*** (0.014)*** (0.017)*** (0.008)*** 
Three years after the 
issuance 
  
0.014 -0.054 -0.258 -0.037 -0.078 -0.029 
(0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.023)*** (0.015)** (0.017)*** (0.008)*** 
Four years after the 
issuance 
  
0.028 -0.064 -0.261 -0.029 -0.083 -0.020 
(0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.024)*** (0.016)* (0.017)*** (0.008)** 
Five years after the 
issuance 
  
0.048 -0.052 -0.241 -0.008 -0.064 -0.009 
(0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.027)*** (0.020) (0.017)*** (0.009) 
Constant 0.050 0.315 1.040 0.018 0.241 0.063 
  (0.008)*** (0.024)*** (0.026)*** (0.014) (0.053)*** (0.009)*** 
Observations 32260 32260 3677 3677 6295 6295 
R-squared 0.08 0.13 0.29 0.17 0.17 0.14 
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 It is worth noting that the different results for bank issuance versus public and 
non-bank private issues may be explained by the result in Denis and Mihov (2003). They 
find that those with the worst credit use non-bank private debt, those in the middle use 
bank debt, and those with the best credit use public debt. This means that non-bank 
private debt and public debt are used by firms at the two ends of the credit spectrum, with 
banks in the middle. Thus, firms that that have public debt and bank debt that issue non-
bank private debt are moving down in the credit spectrum. They are substituting non-
bank private debt to replace public and bank debt, which are higher in the credit 
spectrum. Conversely, firms that have non-bank private and bank debt that issue public 
debt are moving up in the credit spectrum. They are substituting public debt to replace 
non-bank private and bank debt. Hence, there is a straightforward substitution in each 
case.   
 However, the issuance of bank debt is different because it is in the middle of the 
credit spectrum.  Firms with public and non-bank private debt that issue bank debt could 
be moving up or down on the credit spectrum. Our results indicate that the eventual move 
is predominantly downward, though. This is likely due to our sample being 
predominantly populated with firms that also have public debt, so they have issued public 
debt in the past, putting them at the higher end of the spectrum. So there is more 
movement downward than upward, given the sample selection. If a firm is moving down 
in the credit spectrum, then it can issue bank debt and non-bank private debt to replace 
public debt (or non-bank private to replace bank and public). If a firm is moving up in the 
credit spectrum, then it can issue bank and public debt to replace non-bank private (or 
public to replace bank and non-bank private). Our results indicate that firms who issue 
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bank debt eventually increase their non-bank private debt.  Thus, they are using bank and 
eventually non-bank private debt to replace public debt. This is consistent a greater 
proportion of the firms issuing bank debt in our sample being firms moving down in the 
credit spectrum (firms with no public debt are not in the sample). This is consistent with 
Rauh and Sufi (2010) who show that higher rated companies that move down in credit 
rating often lose access to the commercial paper market and use bank loans instead.       
 In summary, this section examines the substitute/complement effect among debt 
financing sources around the event of an issuance of a specific type of debt. We first 
observe that, when firms obtain a new bank loan, their non-bank private and public debt 
percentages change before and after the issuance. In particular, before the bank debt 
issue, firms have higher levels of public debt but lower levels of non-bank private debt. 
After the issue, firms have lower levels of public debt and eventual higher levels of non-
bank private debt and bank debt. This is consistent with a substitution effect of private 
debt (both bank and non-bank) and for public debt both before and after the bank debt 
issuance. Second, we find empirical evidence supporting the substitutability of non-bank 
private debt and for other two types of debt after the issuance of non-bank private debt. 
Similarly, we find evidence consistent with the substitutability of public debt for bank 
and non-bank private debt after a new issuance of public debt. This evidence is consistent 
with Detragiache’s (1994) argument on the substitutability between these debt types. 
1.6  Conclusion 
Based on a sample of 988 firms with new debt issuances in the period of 1993-
2007, we examine the factors that drive firms’ choice among public debt, non-bank 
private debt, and bank debt over time. Our study is related to Denis and Mihov (2003), 
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Arena (2010), and Rauh and Sufi (2010). However, unlike these studies, we examine if 
the determinants of new debt sources vary over time and under different macroeconomic 
conditions. In particular, we develop an incremental new issues sample and an 
outstanding debt mix sample to perform the analyses. In addition to our examination of 
the determinants of corporate debt mix using the two different samples and most 
importantly, we test whether there is a substitute/complement effect among different debt 
financing sources. Using the balance sheet data, Rauh and Sufi (2010) provide evidence 
on a complement effect among debt types for fallen angels. We examine the 
substitute/complement effect for a large sample of firms in general, at ratings upgrades 
and downgrades, and at new issue events. 
We have the following main findings. First, firm age and firm size are significant 
drivers of the probability of debt type in new issuances and the percentage of debt mix. 
Larger and older firms prefer public debt to private debt, and choose bank over non-bank 
private if private debt is used. This finding is consistent with the information asymmetry 
explanations of corporate debt mix. Asset tangibility, probability of distress, and earnings 
volatility lead to significant impacts on corporate debt mix. In particular, a higher fixed 
asset ratio or a lower earnings volatility is associated with more public than private debt. 
Interestingly, more profitable firms prefer bank debt to the other two debt types. Firms 
with a higher probability of distress prefer non-bank private to bank debt. Not 
surprisingly, credit quality is an important determinant of corporate debt mix. Consistent 
with Denis and Mihov (2003), we find that investment grade firms are more likely to 
borrow from public sources, while they prefer bank to non-bank private when private 
sources are considered. An in-depth analysis using individual rating categories confirms 
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the above conclusion. Using the prior issuance history and outstanding debt mix, we 
show that firms who are newer to the debt markets are more likely to start with non-bank 
private debt. In addition, experienced borrowers with a high percentage of public debt 
typically choose public over private debt, and prefer bank to non-bank private. Most 
importantly, we find that macroeconomic factors such as prime interest rate, slope, 
interest rate volatility, and GDP growth significantly impact the probabilities of issuing 
new debt of a particular type and the percentages in the outstanding debt mix.  
Second, we find that the set of determinants of corporate debt mix change over 
time. In particular, firm age matters in the 1998-2002 period, but not in the other two 
time periods. Interestingly, asset tangibility is a significant factor in the early and later 
periods, but not in the 1998-2002 period. The early period of 1993-1997 is unique in 
terms of having the least number of significant determinants among the three periods. 
Credit quality, earnings volatility, prior issuance behavior, and macroeconomic factors 
have little or no impacts on corporate debt mix in the 1993-1997 period, while they are 
important drivers in the other two more recent periods of 1998-2002 and 2003-2007. We 
also find that the set of drivers differs by interest rate volatility. When market uncertainty 
is high, firm age and earnings volatility matter much more to borrowers when making the 
decision on corporate debt mix. 
Third, this study documents that in general public debt and private debt are 
substitutes for each other. Using the panel data of outstanding debt mix for our sample 
firms, we find evidence in strong support of the substitute effect. Using the subsample of 
513 firms with credit rating downgrades, we find that firms substitute non-bank private 
debt for public debt before a downgrade event. After a downgrade, we find that firms 
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substitute non-bank private debt for bank debt. These results are consistent with a 
deterioration of firm credit both before and after a downgrade. Surprisingly, our analysis 
of the 446 firms with rating upgrades provides little evidence of a substitute/complement 
effect.  
Finally, we extend the substitute/complement effect among the three types of debt 
to new debt issuance events and find evidence in support of a general finding of a 
substitute effect among the three types of debt sources. In particular, when there is a new 
issue of non-bank private or public debt, the percentage outstanding of the other two debt 
types decreases after the issuance event. For the sample of bank loan issuance, we find 
evidence consistent with a substitution effect between private (both bank and non-bank 
private) and public debt.   
This study makes significant contributions to the literature on corporate debt mix 
decisions by provide a comprehensive examination of the choice of debt type and 
percentage of outstanding debt mix based on an extensive sample. We highlight the 
important role played by macroeconomic factors in determining corporate debt mix and 
how the set of determinants change over time. We provide strong evidence on the 
substitute effect between public and private debt in general, at credit rating downgrades, 
and at new issuances. Our study sheds light on one of the major corporate decisions 
regarding debt financing. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
AND DEBT MATURITY STRUCTURE 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Related literatures have emphasized the roles of product market competition, 
corporate governance, and debt maturity in mitigating the agency costs associated with 
the conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers. Specifically, intensification 
of competition in the product market can reduce managerial slacks (Hart, 1983). 
Guadalupe and Perez-Gonzalez (2010) empirically document that competition leads to 
less private benefits of control available to managers, which induces them to less 
entrench. Corporate governance is also an important mechanism to control mangers to 
work in alignment with shareholders. For instance, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
find that firms with stronger shareholder rights (good governance) had higher firm value 
and better operating performance and made fewer acquisitions in the 1990s. In addition, 
there is a strong argument that debt maturity can reduce the agency costs (e.g., Jensen 
(1986); Hart and Moore (1995)). In general, using short-term debt makes mangers to be 
more frequently monitored by creditors through refinancing activities, thus making them 
to be more aligned with shareholders. Short-term debt can also reduce the agency costs 
related to underinvestment problems and free cash flows (Myers (1977); Jensen (1986)). 
Given the roles of these three disciplinary mechanisms as discussed above, an 
interesting question is how firms choose debt maturity structure in the presence of 
competition among firms in the output markets and the presence of their existing 
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corporate governance? For example, we might want to know if firms in more competitive 
industries use less short-term maturity when their corporate governance is strong. We 
might also want to know if the relations between product market competition, corporate 
governance and debt maturity depend on types of competition. This study will answer 
such questions. 
Competition intensification in the output markets might affect firms’ choices of 
leverage as well as the choices of debt maturity structure. Seminal studies by Brander and 
Lewis (1986), Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), Maksimovic (1988), and Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990) argue that firms use debt as a strategic variable to compete in the 
output markets, suggesting that firms would consider the competition among rivals when 
making capital structure decisions.  Previous studies find evidence consistent with this 
argument. For example, Leary and Roberts (2010) find a high interdependence of a firm’s 
financing decisions to its peers’ financing decisions. Although majority of previous 
studies have focused on the general relation between competition and firm leverage, 
several studies have paid attention on the relation between competition and debt maturity. 
Glazer (1994) argues that, under imperfect market conditions, firms only get the strategic 
benefits of debt when issuing long-term debt, implying that maturity structure might be 
important for firms to respond to the rivals’ actions. More specifically, Kanatas and Qi 
(2001) predict a negative relation between industry concentration and short-term 
maturity. A recent study by Erhemjamts, Raman and Shahrur (2010) first finds evidence 
that short-term maturity increases at the low level of industry concentration, but 
decreases at the higher concentration level, which is not consistent with the prediction by 
Kanatas and Qi (2001). 
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The governance literature provides theoretical predictions and evidence about the 
relation between corporate governance and debt maturity. The entrenchment argument 
suggests that entrenched managers, especially in weak corporate governance mechanism, 
tend to make suboptimal decisions such as using less short-term maturity. The results of 
empirical studies by Benmelech (2006), Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007) and Harford, 
Li and Zhao (2008) imply that firms with weak corporate governance tend to use less 
short-term maturity and vice versa. 
In this study, we examine the impacts of product market competition and 
corporate governance on the choices of debt maturity in manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-
3999) in the period 1990-2008. Following the literature (e.g., Campello (2005), Gaspar 
and Massa (2006), Grullon and Michaely (2007), Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell 
(2007)), we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a proxy for product market 
competition. Alternatively, in a robustness analysis, we follow Fresard (2010) to use the 
U.S import tariff change as a quasi-natural experiment of product market competition. 
For corporate governance, we use governance index (G-index) as a proxy as in Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick (2003). Our study is closely related to previous studies by Benmelech 
(2006), Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007), and Erhemjamts, Raman and Shahrur (2010). 
These studies examine either corporate governance or competition on debt maturity 
separately. Different from them, we examine the effects of these two disciplinary 
mechanisms within an analysis framework. Our study is also in line with recent studies 
that consider the effects of both product market competition and corporate governance. 
For example, Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011) examine the effects of these two 
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mechanisms on firm performance and equity prices. Meanwhile, Paligorova and Yang 
(2012) examine their effects on the cost of debt.  
We come up with main findings as follows. Overall, we find empirical evidence 
that product market competition and corporate governance have significant effects on 
debt maturity, after controlling for well-documented determinants of debt maturity. More 
specifically, we find a positive relation between industry concentration and short-term 
maturity, indicating that firms in less competitive industry (high industry concentration) 
use more short-term maturity than firms operating in more competitive industries. This 
result is consistent evidence in Erhemjamts, Raman and Shahrur (2010). A further 
analysis, which takes into account the effect of being dominant firms, shows that the 
positive relation between HHI and short-term maturity is mainly driven by the agency 
effect rather than the predation effect. Therefore, our result is consistent with the agency 
effect hypothesis that, other things equal, firms might use short-term maturity to address 
the agency problems associated with the lack of competition pressures in the product 
markets. Additionally, using change in the import tariff rates as an alternative proxy for 
product market competition, we come up with consistent results. We find that firms in 
industries with experience of  reductions in the import tariff rates (more competition) use 
less short-term debt than those in industries without experience of the import tariff cuts 
(less competition). 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that short-term maturity decreases in 
corporate governance index (G-index), suggesting that firms with weak corporate 
governance tend to use less short-term maturity than the counterparts with good corporate 
governance. This result supports the entrenchment argument that entrenched managers 
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are more likely to use less short-term debt under poor quality of corporate governance. 
Consistently, our additional analysis shows that, compared with firms in low G-index 
tercile, firms in the upper G-index terciles tend to use less short-term maturity. Our result 
is consistent with previous studies by Benmelech (2006) and Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat 
(2007). These studies document that good corporate governance firms use more long-
term debt and vice versa. 
Given the above results, we test a hypothesis that, in less competitive industries 
(high industry concentration), firms with weak corporate governance tend to use less 
short-term maturity. We do this by including the interaction term between HHI and G-
index, and between HHI and dummies of G-index terciles in our regression 
specifications. Our results show mixed evidence, which is not consistent with the 
hypothesis. The estimated results of Model 3 in Table 14 show that the coefficient on the 
interaction term between HHI and G-index is negative in both ST3 and ST5 maturity 
regressions, but is significant for ST5 only. Overall, this result is consistent with our 
hypothesis. However, additional analyses use dummies of G-index terciles show the 
opposite results. The estimated results of Model 4 (Table 14) and Model 2 (columns 5 
and 6 in Table 16) show that the interaction between HHI and high G-index dummies has 
positive and significant coefficient, which is not consistent with our expectation. 
Similarly, the analysis using change in the import tariff rates as a proxy for product 
market competition provides evidence not consistent with the hypothesis.  As shown in 
Table 17, firms in the upper G-index terciles who operate in the industries with 
experience of import tariff cuts (high competition) significantly use more short-term 
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maturity, compared with firms in low G-index tercile. Instead, our hypothesis implies that 
these firms should use less short-term maturity. 
Interestingly, we find that types of competition have a significant impact on the 
relations between product market competition, corporate governance, and debt maturity. 
Following Lyandres (2006), we use competitive strategy measure (CSM) as a proxy for 
types of competition and find the existence of the positive relation between HHI and 
short-term maturity for both two subsamples of negative and positive CSM. This result 
complements evidence in Erhemjamts, Raman and Shahrur (2010). They find that the 
relation exists only in their positive CSM sample. Therefore, there is evidence that, 
regardless of ways of competition (strategic substitutes or complements), firms operating 
in less competitive industries tend to use more short-term debt, compared with those in 
more competitive industries. In addition, we find new evidence that that the negative 
relation between governance index and short-term maturity is significant when firms 
compete in strategic substitutes only. Thus, types of competition matter the effect of 
corporate governance on debt maturity.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we find empirical 
evidence consistent with the literature that both product market competition and 
corporate governance are important determinants of debt maturity choices. Previous 
studies often focus on the effect of each mechanism on debt maturity separately. 
Erhemjamts, Raman and Shahrur (2010) ignore the effect of corporate governance when 
examining the influence of industry concentration on debt maturity. Meanwhile, 
Benmelech (2006) and Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007) examine how corporate 
governance affects debt maturity without consideration of the effect of product market 
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competition. Different from them, we consider the impacts of these two substitute 
disciplinary mechanisms on debt maturity all together. 
Second, this study documents empirical evidence that the effect of product market 
competition on debt maturity was mainly driven by the agency effect rather than the 
predation effect. This interesting result means that although predatory attacks prevail in 
the output markets, especially in highly concentrated industries, they do not significantly 
affect the general relation between product market competition and debt maturity. 
Similarly, in a related paper, Grullon and Michaely (2007) find that the positive relation 
between level of competition intensification in the product market, measured by HHI, and 
payout ratios is driven by the outcomes of competition among firms, not by the predatory 
attacks. 
Finally, we provide new evidence that the impact of product market competition 
on debt maturity does not depend on types of competition. Regardless of competing in 
strategic substitutes or complements, firms in less competitive industries use more short-
term maturity than firms in more competitive industries. Lyandres (2006) also find that 
types of competition do not affect the relation between competition in the product market 
and firm leverage. Therefore, we might conclude that the effects of competition on either 
leverage or maturity structure are not dependent on ways of competition. In addition, we 
first show the ways firms compete have a significant impact on the relation between 
corporate governance and debt maturity. Our result shows that the effect of corporate 
governance on debt maturity holds only when firms compete in strategic substitutes. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the related 
literatures and develop our hypotheses. Section 2.3 provides information about data 
65 
 
 
 
sources and reports descriptive summary on firms’ characteristics. Section 2.4 discusses 
empirical results. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2  Related Literatures and Hypotheses 
In this section, we discuss a review of previous studies about the relation between 
product market competition, corporate governance, and debt maturity and develop our 
hypotheses. 
Optimal capital structure models (e.g., Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Stiglitz 
(1974)) are based on a single-firm framework, which ignore the interactions among firms 
in product markets. For example, Stiglitz (1974) argues that corporate financial policies 
such as leverage, maturity, and payout ratio are irrelevant under the perfect market 
assumptions. As an extension, seminal studies by Brander and Lewis (1986), Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1986), Maksimovic (1988), and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) take into 
account competition among firms. According to them, firms use debt as a strategic 
variable to compete and market structures play an important role in determining firms’ 
financial policies
1
. However, Glazer (1994) shows that, under imperfect market 
conditions, the strategic benefits of debt only exist when firms issue long-term debt rather 
than short-term debt or no debt. This suggests that structure of debt maturity is important 
for firms to respond their rivals’ competitive moves in the output markets. 
The literature suggests that competition in the product markets affects firms’ 
structure of debt maturity through two channels: agency and predation effects. On the one 
hand, there is a common notion that market competition works as an external disciplinary 
                                                          
1 See Zingales (1998), Kovenock and Phillips (1997), Chevalier (1995), Showalter (1999), Schargrodsky 
(2002), Campello (2003), Mackay and Phillips (2005), Xu (2007), Leary and Roberts (2010) for further 
empirical evidence about the relation between competition in the product markets and capital structure.  
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mechanism (e.g., Hart (1983) and Allen and Gale (1999)), which can reduce managerial 
slack. Consistent with this prediction, Guadalupe and Perez- Gonzalez (2010) find that 
market competition leads to less private benefits of control available to managers. 
Furthermore, under competition pressure, the allocation of resources among firms is more 
efficient, which provides a benchmark for shareholders, especially creditors to compare a 
firm’s performance with others. The above arguments imply that strong market 
competition would make the agency problems less severe and also reduce the information 
asymmetry among managers, shareholders and creditors. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the 
monitoring benefits of short-term maturity would be higher in less competitive industries 
(high industry concentration) to address the severity of agency problems and asymmetric 
information related to the lack of competition pressure. Following Grullon and Michaely 
(2007), we call the impact of competition through the agency channel as agency effect. 
For empirical evidence, Erhemjamts, Raman and Shahrur (2010) use HHI as a proxy for 
industry concentration and find that short-term maturity is positively associated with 
HHI, but negatively associated with HHI squared. They conclude that the use of short-
term maturity increases at low industry concentration, but decreases at higher industry 
concentration. 
On the other hand, predation theories by Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1990) predict that the use of debt induces predatory threats from the 
rivals through reducing price and increasing outputs to drive firms with financial 
constraints out of the markets. To optimally respond to predation threats, Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990) suggest that the sensitivity of refinancing decision to firm 
performance should be lowered. This conclusion may be applicable to debt maturity 
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structure. In a related paper, Hoberg, Phillips and Prabhala (2012) find that firms facing 
with predation threats pay lower dividends and keep higher cash, implying that firms 
would have more conservative financial policies such as lower leverage and long-term 
maturity to reduce the disadvantages of potential predation threats. Theoretically, using 
short-term maturity would make firms more vulnerable to predatory attacks because of 
higher liquidity risk. Kanatas and Qi (2001) examine if firms choose long-term or short-
term capital market debt or bank credit, given an incentive conflict between managers 
and creditors and imperfect market conditions. Their model predicts that the use of short-
term debt is decreasing in industry concentration. Thus, product market competition 
might affect firm’s choice of debt maturity through the potential predation. We name this 
impact predation effect as in Grullon and Michaely (2007). 
The governance literature documents that corporate governance has significant 
impact on firms’ debt maturity. Theoretically, entrenched managers tend to make 
suboptimal decisions that benefit themselves rather than shareholders. For example, they 
would prefer using less short-term debt to avoid the monitoring by external creditors. 
Therefore, corporate governance mechanisms are designed to discipline such 
discretionary behaviors. In fact, the literature provides well-documented evidence that 
good corporate governance makes managers to better align with shareholders (e.g., 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)). We argue that, other things equal, good corporate 
governance ensures that managers choose optimal maturity that benefits shareholders and 
vice versa. More specifically, we expect that firms with good (weak) corporate 
governance use more (less) short-term maturity. Empirical studies by Benmelech (2006) 
and Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007) find that long-term debt maturity is positively 
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associated with G-index, indicating that weak corporate governance firms tend to use 
more long-term debt or equivalently less short-term debt. In addition, Harford, Li and 
Zhao (2008) examine the effect of corporate governance on financial policies and find 
that firms with stronger boards use higher leverage and more short-term debt as well. 
Based on the review above, we come up with main hypotheses as follows. First, 
following the literature, we use HHI as a proxy for product market competition. 
Consistent with Erhemjamts, Raman and Shahrur (2010), we expect a positive relation 
between HHI and short-term maturity. Although predation theories (Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1986), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Kanatas and Qi (2001)) imply that short-
term maturity decreases in industry concentration, we posit that predatory attacks often 
occur at very highly concentrated industries such as duopolistic markets. Therefore, we 
predict that the general positive relation between HHI and short term maturity might be 
driven by the agency effect rather than predation effect. We test this prediction by 
examining the effect of being dominant firms. 
About the relation between corporate governance and debt maturity, we predict 
that firms with weak corporate governance use less short-term maturity than firms with 
good corporate governance. This hypothesis is based on the entrenchment argument and 
is consistent with evidence in Benmelech (2006) and Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007). 
Following Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), we use G-index as a proxy for corporate 
governance. We expect a positive relation between G-index and short-term maturity. 
Competition in the product markets can reduce managerial slacks (see for 
example Hart (1983), Allen and Gale (1999), and Guadalupe and Perez- Gonzalez 
(2010)). This implies that, under less competition pressure, managers are more likely to 
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entrench themselves by making suboptimal decisions such as using less short-term debt. 
This argument leads to our hypothesis that weak corporate governance firms in less 
competitive industries (high industry concentration) tend to use less short-term maturity. 
We test this prediction by including the interaction term between HHI and G-index in our 
regression specifications. We expect a negative coefficient on this interaction term. 
2.3 Data 
In this section, we discuss formation of the sample and provide descriptive 
statistics of firm characteristics. 
2.3.1 Sample 
We examine the impact of product market competition and corporate governance 
on maturity structure in manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) in the period 1990-2008. 
We choose this period because of the availability of governance data beginning from 
1990. Previous studies such as Campello (2005), Gaspar and Massa (2006), Grullon and 
Michaely (2007), and Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell (2007), among others, also 
examine different aspects of competition in the manufacturing industries. 
In both economics and finance literatures, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
is widely used as a proxy for product market competition. Researchers can directly 
calculate HHI from Compustat database or use the HHI provided by the U.S Economic 
Census of Manufacturers. One advantage of the Census HHI is that it covers both public 
and private firms, thus would reflect the market structure better than the Compustat-based 
HHI. Furthermore, the Census HHI is used by the U.S Department of Justice as a 
measure of market power in antitrust policies. By definition, the Census HHI is 
calculated by summing of the squares of market shares of the biggest 50 firms in an 
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industry. If there are less than 50 firms in a specific industry, HHI is the sum of the 
squares of market shares of all firms in that industry. In this study, we follow Campello 
(2005), Gaspar and Massa (2006), Grullon and Michaely (2007), and Haushalter, Klasa 
and Maxwell (2007), among others, to use the Census HHI a main proxy for product 
market competition. Because HHIs are reported every 5-year period, we follow the 
literature to use the recent HHI to fill in the years with missing observations. For 
instance, we use HHI in year 1987 to fill in the years 1990 and 1991. We use HHI based 
on 4-digit SIC codes. 
In a robustness analysis, following Fresard (2010), we use the U.S import tariff 
change as a quasi-natural experiment of product market competition. Fresard (2010) 
argues that the import tariff cut leads to harder competition among domestic 
manufacturing firms. Therefore, using the import tariff change as a proxy for product 
market competition helps us to deal with the endogeneity concerns between competition, 
corporate governance and maturity structures. Due to the limitation of data, we have the 
import tariff from 1990 through 2005 only. 
As in the literature, we use governance index (G-index) as a proxy for corporate 
governance. G-index is constructed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), which consists 
of 24 antitakeover and shareholder rights provisions from IRRC governance database. 
Under the shareholders’ points of view, a firm with low G-index has good governance 
and vice versa. Because G-index is available for the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 
2002, 2004, and 2006 only, we use the recent G-indexes to fill in the intermediate years 
as in the literature. For example, we use G-index in year 2006 to fill in the years 2007 and 
2008. 
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We obtain firm data from Compustat annual database and stock prices from 
CRSP. To form the sample, we create an initial sample of manufacturing firms in 
Compustat database from 1990 through 2008. To get information on product market 
competition and corporate governance, we match the initial sample to the Census HHI 
and G-index datasets. In addition, we require non-missing data on all variables used in 
multivariate analysis. This process leads to the final sample consisting of 6,228 firm-year 
observations. For the robustness analysis, we match the final sample to the U.S import 
tariff cut dataset and obtain a subsample including 3,973 firm-year observations in the 
period 1990-2005. 
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 11 reports descriptive statistics of firm characteristics. The first two panels 
provide a snapshot about the intensification of product market competition and corporate 
governance of the sample firms. Our proxy for product market competition, HHI, has the 
average of 729 and its median value is approximately 542. And, G-index, a measure of 
corporate governance quality, has the average and medium of 9. 
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TABLE 11: Summary statistics of market competition, corporate governance, and firm  
        characteristics 
This table reports the summary statistics for the sample firms. The sample consists of 
6,228 firm-year observations in the period 1990-2008. To be included in the sample, 
firms must operate in the manufacturing sector (SIC 2000-3999), have financial data on 
Compustat Annual Industrial file and have available information on corporate 
governance. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is based on the 4-digit SIC from the 
Census of Manufacturers. G-index is a proxy for corporate governance, which is 
constructed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). Both HHI and G-index are available 
for specific years; the missing observations are filled in using the recent indexes. Firm 
size is the market value of the firm (estimated as the book value of assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity). Fixed asset ratio is the net plant, 
property, and equipment divided by total assets. Profitability is earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by the book value of total asset. 
Leverage is total debt (debt in current liability plus long-term debt) divided by the market 
value of the firm. Market to book ratio is the firm market value scaled by the book value 
of total assets. Abnormal earnings is measured as (earnings in year t+1 - earnings in year 
t)/share price x outstanding shares in year t. Asset maturity is the book value weighted 
average of the maturities of the plant, property, and equipment (PPE) and current assets, 
measured as (PPE/Total asset) x (PPE/Depreciation expense))+ (Current asset /Total 
asset) x (Current asset/COGS). Asset return volatility is calculated as monthly stock 
return standard deviation during the fiscal year multiplied by the ratio of the market value 
of equity to the firm market value. Percentage of debt maturing in 3 years (5 years) or 
less is defined as debt that matures in 3 years (5 years) or less scaled by total debt. All 
accounting data are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
 Obs. Mean Standard 
Deviation 
25
th
 
percentile 
Median 75
th
 
percentile 
Market competition        
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) 
6228 728.92 552 340.6 541.7 1015.8 
Corporate governance         
G-index  6228 9.12 2.7 7 9 11 
Firm characteristics        
Firm size ($M) 6228 8946.8
9 
22877.6 774.23 2002.21 6293.98 
Fixed assets ratio 6228 0.26 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.34 
Profitability 6228 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.19 
Market to book 6228 2.13 1.45 1.26 1.66 2.42 
Leverage 6228 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.22 
Abnormal earnings 6228 0.02 0.18 -0.01 0.01 0.03 
Asset maturity 6228 8.37 6.6 3.86 6.4 10.77 
Asset return volatility 6228 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.1 
Percentage of  debt maturing 
in 3 years or less (ST3) 
6228 0.48 0.37 0.14 0.41 0.9 
Percentage of  debt maturing 
in 5 years or less (ST5) 
6228 0.64 0.35 0.36 0.68 1 
Proportion of observations 
with credit ratings 
0.49      
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The last panel reports various characteristics of the sample firms. The average 
firm holds assets with market value of $9 billion, approximately. While, the market value 
of assets held by the median firm is about $2 billion. The average and median firm has 
fixed asset ratio of 0.26 and 0.23, respectively. The median firm has profitability of 14%, 
which is a bit higher than that of the average firm (13%). As in the literature, we use 
market to book as a proxy of growth opportunities. Our sample firm has market to book 
ratio with the mean of 2.13 and median of 1.66. About leverage policy, the average firm 
holds 14 % debt, while the median firm uses lower debt at 11%. The mean (median) 
values of abnormal earnings, asset maturity, and asset return volatility are 0.02, 8.37, and 
0.08 (0.01, 6.40, and 0.06), respectively. 
As in the literature, we use the proportion of debt that matures in 3 years (5 years) 
or less to measure short-term maturity structure (hereafter ST3 and ST5). On average, the 
sample firm uses 48% of ST3 and 64% of ST5. Meanwhile, the median firm uses 41% of 
ST3 and 68% of ST5. Interestingly, the median firm uses less ST3, but more ST5 than the 
average firm. The last row of Table 11 shows that about a half of the sample firms have 
credit ratings available. 
2.4 Empirical Analysis 
2.4.1 Univariate Results 
The Pearson correlation coefficients in Table 12 show a simple relation between 
short-term debt maturity, product market competition, and corporate governance. The 
positive coefficient between HHI and two measures of short-term maturity imply that 
short-term maturity is positively correlated with product market competition, which is 
consistent with our expectation. In contrast, the coefficient between G-index and short-
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term maturity measures is significantly negative, which suggests that firms with weak 
corporate governance (high G-index) tend to use more short-term debt and vice versa. 
This evidence supports the findings by Benmelech (2006) and Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat 
(2007). Additionally, the correlation coefficient between HHI and G-index is 
significantly negative as expected, indicating that these two disciplinary mechanisms are 
substitutes. 
 
TABLE 12: Pearson correlation matrix between short-term debt maturity, product market          
        competition, and corporate governance 
 
This table reports a matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients between short-term debt 
maturity, product market competition, and corporate governance. Variables are defined as 
in Table 11. * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
 
 Percentage of  
debt maturing 
in 3 years or 
less (ST3) 
Percentage of  
debt maturing 
in 5 years or 
less (ST5) 
HHI G-index 
     
Percentage of  debt maturing 
in 3 years or less (ST3) 
1       
Percentage of  debt maturing 
in 5 years or less (ST5) 
0.7779* 1     
HHI 0.0358* 0.0288* 1   
G-index -0.1340* -0.0999* -0.0538* 1 
 
 
Following Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), we classify firms with G-index of 
5 or below into low tercile, firms with G-index in between 6 and 13 into medium tercile, 
and those with G-index of 14 or higher into high tercile. Similar to them, we label firms 
in the low G-index tercile as democracy firms and those in the high G-index tercile as 
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dictatorship firms. Next, we compare the average short-term maturity across HHI 
quintiles and G-index terciles. The results are reported in Table 13.  
A closer look at each row of the two panels in Table 13 reveals that although there 
is no pattern that the average short-term maturity (ST3 and ST5) increases across HHI 
quintiles, the average ST3 and ST5 is statistically different between two extreme HHI 
quintiles. Regardless of corporate governance quality, firms in the highest HHI quintile 
use more ST3 and ST5 than those in the lowest HHI quintile, implying that firms in less 
competitive industries tend to use more short-term debt than those in more competitive 
industries. For instance, on average, democracy firms in the highest HHI quintile have 
68% (78%) debt that matures in three years (five years) or less, compared with the 
corresponding 55% (68%)  debt held by the counterparts in the lowest HHI quintile. 
The analysis by column of Panel A in Table 13 shows that, within each HHI 
quintile, firms with low G-index (good corporate governance) use relatively more short-
term maturity (ST3) than others with medium and high G-index (weak corporate 
governance). For instance, within the lowest HHI quintile, democracy firms use 56% debt 
maturing in three years or less; meanwhile, medium G-index and dictatorship firms use 
only 48% and 31%, respectively. Thus, consistent with the result from the correlation 
analysis above, there is empirical evidence that firms with good corporate governance 
(low G-index) use more short-term debt than those with poor corporate governance (high 
G-index), regardless of the competition intensification in the product markets. This 
general result still holds, but is relatively weaker for the alternative measure of short-term 
maturity, ST5 as shown in Panel B of Table 13. 
  
76 
 
 
 
TABLE 13: Short-term maturity across HHI quintiles and G-index terciles 
 
This table reports a comparison of average short-term maturity (ST3 and ST5) across 
HHI quintiles and G-index terciles. Results for ST3 and ST5 are in Panel A and Panel B, 
respectively. The average HHI across HHI quintiles is also reported in the bottom of each 
panel. The last column of each panel provides a test of the difference in average ST3, 
ST5, and HHI between the highest and lowest HHI quintiles. * denotes significance at 1 
percent level. 
 
Panel A: Percentage of debt that matures in 3 years or less (ST3) across HHI quintiles 
and G-index terciles 
 
 HHI quintiles 
 Lowest 2 3 4 Highest 
Highest-
lowest 
difference 
Low G-index (Democracy) 
(G-index<=5) 
0.56 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.68 0.12* 
Medium G-index 
(6<=G-index<=13) 
0.48 0.49 0.44 0.46 0.50 0.02* 
High G-index (Dictatorship) 
(G-index >=14) 
0.31 0.43 0.39 0.41 0.69 0.38* 
Average HHI 173.4 392.8 569.1 903.0 1626.6 1453.2* 
 
Panel B: Percentage of debt that matures in 5 years or less (ST5) across HHI quintiles and 
G-index terciles 
 
 HHI quintiles 
 Lowest 2 3 4 Highest 
Highest-
lowest 
difference 
Low G-index (Democracy) 
(G-index<=5) 
0.68 0.66 0.71 0.75 0.78 0.10* 
Medium G-index 
(6<=G-index<=13) 
0.66 0.63 0.59 0.61 0.66 0.00 
High G-index (Dictatorship) 
(G-index >=14) 
0.48 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.75 0.27* 
Average HHI 173.4 392.8 569.1 903.0 1626.6 1453.2* 
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2.4.2 Multivariate Results 
2.4.2.1  Model Specification and Variable Selections 
In our regression models, the dependent variable is short-term maturity measured 
by ST3 and ST5. Our interest variables are HHI, G-index, and their interaction terms. To 
analyze the effect of corporate governance in further details, we group G-index into low, 
medium and high tercile as in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and use their dummies 
and the interaction terms with HHI in the regression models. We also include year 
dummies and 2-digit SIC dummies to control for the time and industry fixed effects. 
We select other control variables based on previous studies (Barclay and Smith, 
1995; Johnson, 2003; Barclay, Max and Smith, 2003; Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman, 
2005; Billett, King and Mauer, 2007). Firm quality is an important determinant of debt 
maturity. For example, Diamond (1991) argues a non-linear relation between firm quality 
and maturity: firms with the lowest and highest credit ratings prefer short-term debt, 
while firms in the middle range use long-term debt. We use firm size as proxy for credit 
quality and expect a negative coefficient on it. In addition, we include firm sized squared 
and expect that its coefficient is positive. The use of short-term maturity can address the 
underinvestment problem, especially in high growth firms (Myers, 1977). Thus, we use 
market to book as a proxy for investment opportunities and predict a positive coefficient 
on this variable. As in Johnson (2003), Billett, King and Mauer (2007) and Brockman, 
Martin and Unlu (2010), we control for firm leverage and expect a negative sign on it. 
Signaling models (Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 1991) argue that firms use maturity 
structure to signal their credit quality to financial markets. This implies that high quality 
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firms prefer short-term maturity because they might benefit from the efficiency of 
monitoring by lenders. 
Following Barclay and Smith (1995), we include abnormal earnings and expect 
that it has positive coefficient. Firms often match the maturity of asset to that of liabilities 
in an attempt to reduce the agency costs associated with the shareholders-bondholders 
conflicts (Myers, 1977). Thus, we include asset maturity and expect that it has a negative 
coefficient. Following Johnson (2003), we control for asset return volatility as an 
alternative proxy for credit risk and expect a negative sign on this variable. Brockman, 
Martin and Unlu (2010) argue that firms with high volatility of cash flows might prefer 
long term debt to short-term debt. We also control for credit ratings and predict that firms 
with ratings are likely to have access to financial markets, thus can borrow more long-
term debt. Finally, we include term structure as a proxy for the effect of tax on debt 
maturity and expect that its coefficient is negative. 
2.4.2.2   Base Results 
In this section, we discuss our base regression results. The dependent variables are 
two measures of short-term maturity (ST3 and ST5). Recall that our interest variables are 
HHI, G-index and their interaction terms. In Model 1, we regress ST3 and ST5 on HHI 
and control variables only. Model 2’s explanatory variables consist of HHI, G-index and 
other control variables. In Model 3, we add an interaction term between HHI and G-index 
as an additional independent variable. The explanatory variables of Model 4 include HHI, 
dummies of medium and high G-index tercile, interaction terms between HHI and G-
index tercile dummies, and other control variables. The dummy of low G-index tercile is 
omitted in Model 4. We tabulate the estimated results in Table 14. 
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As expected, HHI has positive and statistically significant coefficient in both ST3 
and ST5 maturity regressions across all four models, implying that short-term maturity is 
statistically increasing in industry concentration. Consistently, Erhemjamts, Raman and 
Shahrur (2010) document a positive coefficient on HHI in short-term maturity 
regressions. Recall that the univariate analysis above also finds that firms in the highest 
HHI quintile (highly concentrated industry) use more short-term maturity than their 
counterparts in the lowest HHI quintile (less concentrated industry). Collectively, we find 
that firms in less competitive industries (high industry concentration) use more short-term 
maturity than those in more competitive industries (low industry concentration). This 
result is consistent with the agency effect hypothesis. We will explain the interaction 
between HHI and G-index below. 
The effect of corporate governance on debt maturity is examined in Models 2-4. 
The result of Model 2 shows that the estimated coefficient on G-index is negative for 
both ST3 and ST5 regressions, but it is statistically significant at 5% level for ST3 only. 
However, the result of Model 3 shows conflicting signs and insignificance on G-index’ 
coefficient. While not significant at 5% level, the coefficient on G-index is negative in 
ST3 regression, but is positive in ST5 regression. Therefore, we find weak evidence to 
support our hypothesis on a negative association between G-index and short-term 
maturity. As expected, the interaction term between HHI and G-index in Model 3 has 
negative coefficient for both ST3 and ST5, but is statistically significant for ST5 only. 
Thus, there is evidence that weak corporate governance firms operating in less 
competitive industry (high industry concentration) use less short-term maturity as our 
expectation. To further analyze the effect of corporate governance on debt maturity, we 
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break out the raw G-index into three terciles as in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and 
use their dummies and interaction terms with HHI as explanatory variables.  
The last two columns of Table 14 show that the estimated coefficient on high G-
index dummy is significantly negative, while the dummy of medium G-index has 
negative and insignificant coefficient. By and large, these results provide empirical 
evidence that firms in upper G-index terciles (poor corporate governance) tend to use less 
short-term maturity, compared with those in low G-index tercile. Interestingly, signs of 
the coefficients on the interaction between HHI and G-index tercile dummies are mixed. 
In particular, the coefficient on the interaction between HHI and medium G-index 
dummy is insignificantly negative, while that on the interaction between HHI and high G-
index dummy is statistically positive. This result means that, in less competitive 
industries, firms in high G-index tercile (weak corporate governance) use more short-
term maturity than those in low G-index tercile. This result does not support our 
hypothesis.  
Overall, the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients on other control 
variables in both ST3 and ST5 regressions are consistent with previous literature. 
Consistent with previous studies by Johnson (2003) and Brockman, Martin and Unlu 
(2010), among others, the coefficient on firm size is statistically negative, while that of 
firm size squared is statistically positive in Models 1-4. Collectively, our results support 
Diamond’s (1991) prediction on the non-linear relation between firm quality and debt 
maturity. Except for ST3 regressions in Models 1&3, variable market to book has 
negative and significant coefficient across all models, which does not support Myers’ 
(1977) prediction. Our finding is consistent with empirical evidence documented in 
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Johnson (2003) and Billett, King and Mauer (2007), meanwhile not consistent with 
others. For instance, Barclay and Smith (1995), Barclay, Max and Smith (2003), and 
Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2005) find that long-term debt decreases in market to 
book, which is consistent with Myers (1977). We find a negative association between 
leverage and two proxies for short-term maturity across Models 1-4, which is consistent 
with well-documented evidence in capital structure literature. Furthermore, our result 
supports signaling theories on debt maturity. 
Like Johnson (2003) and Billett, King and Mauer (2007), we find that the 
coefficient on variable abnormal earnings is statistically positive in all models, indicating 
that good firms can signal their high quality to financial markets through refinancing their 
debt more frequently. Consistent with Myers’ (1977) argument and empirical evidence in 
Johnson (2003) and Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010), we find that two measures of 
short-term maturity are negatively associated with asset maturity. Not as expected, the 
coefficient on asset return volatility is positive, but not significant at 5% level in all 
models. Johnson (2003), for example, finds that short-term maturity is increasing in asset 
return volatility. Consistent with the literature, we find that the coefficient on ratings 
dummy is statistically negative, implying that rated firms are likely to borrow less short-
term debt or equivalently more long-term debt than unrated firms. Finally, variable term 
structure has positive, but not significant coefficient at 5% level, which does not support 
theoretical prediction on the negative association between term structure and short-term 
maturity. 
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2.4.2.3  The Effect of Being Dominant Firms 
The above analysis finds strong evidence in support of the agency effect 
hypothesis about a positive relation between industry concentration and short-term 
maturity, which not consistent with Kanatas and Qi’s prediction (2001). However, 
predatory attacks often occur in highly concentrated industries such as oligopoly markets, 
implying that the predation effect might exist at higher level of industry concentration. In 
this section, we test if predation effect exists by analyzing if the positive relation between 
HHI and short-term maturity is different between dominant and non-dominant firms. Our 
approach is similar to Grullon and Michaely (2007). Following them, we define the 
dominant firm as the one with the largest market equity value in year t within a specific 
4-digit SIC industry. In our regression, dominant is a dummy variable which takes one if 
a firm is the dominant firm and zero otherwise. 
We argue that dominant firms have sufficient resources to avoid predatory attacks 
and they might trigger a predation. Therefore, the positive relation between HHI and 
short-term maturity should be stronger among dominant firms, and equivalently weaker 
among non-dominant firms. We test this prediction by including an interaction term 
between HHI and the dominant dummy. A significant coefficient on this interaction term 
indicates that the predation effect exists and vice versa. We also examine whether the 
effect of corporate governance on debt maturity is different between dominant and non-
dominant firms. We do this analysis by including an interaction term between G-index 
and the dominant dummy. Furthermore, an interaction term between HHI, G-index and 
dominant dummy is included in our regressions. The results are provided in Table 15. 
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Overall, the sign and significance of other control variables’ coefficient are with 
the same as in Table 14. It is not worth discussing their estimated results here. Instead, 
we focus on interpreting the results of the variables in our interests. Table 15 shows that 
short-term maturity significantly increases in industry concentration but decreases in G-
index, which is consistent with the base results. More specifically, the coefficient on HHI 
is significantly positive across three models for both ST3 and ST5 regressions. G-index 
has negative and statistically significant coefficient in the ST3 regression. However, the 
result in ST5 regression is weaker. 
The coefficient on the interaction between HHI and the dominant dummy has 
mixed signs and is not statistically significant, indicating that there is no existence of the 
predation effect. Thus, the positive relation between industry concentration and short-
term maturity is mainly driven by the agency effect, even in high level of industry 
concentration. In addition, the estimated results of Models 2-3 show that the interaction 
between G-index and dominant dummy has positive coefficient, but not statistically 
significant. Thus, being dominant firms has no impact on the relation between corporate 
governance and short-term maturity. Furthermore, the coefficient on the interaction 
between HHI, G-index and dummy variable dominant is negative, but not significant. Not 
as expected, the coefficient on the dummy for dominant has mixed signs and is not 
statistically significant at 5% level for all three models. This means there is no evidence 
that dominant firms use more short-term maturity than the non-dominant firms. 
 2.4.2.4  The Effect of Types of Competition 
This section examines if types of competition have any effects on the relation 
between product market competition, corporate governance, and short-term maturity. 
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Following Lyandres (2006), we use competitive strategy measure (CSM) as a proxy for 
types of competition. CSM is simply the correlation between the ratio of the implied 
change in the firm’s profit (     to the implied change in its sales (      over two 
consecutive years and the change in the rival’s combined sales (     between two years, 
as defined in the following formula: 
         
    
    
      
The implied changes in sales and profits of each firm are estimated using 
Lyandres’ approach (2006). For the sake of brevity, we do not discuss her approach here. 
We use earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) as a proxy for profit and require at least 
10 observations available to estimate CSM. Given the estimates of implied changes in 
sales and profit for each firm, for each year-industry, we calculate the correlation defined 
in the above formula for each firm, then calculate the average CSM for each 4-digit 
industry and assign this CSM to all firms in that industry. By definition, a negative and 
positive CSM indicates that firms compete in strategic substitutes and complements, 
respectively. According to Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), firms compete in 
strategic substitutes (complements) if a more aggressive strategy by a firm lowers (raises) 
its rivals’ profits. 
We classify the main sample with valid CSM data into two subsamples of 
negative and positive CSM. As mentioned above, we discard any firms with less than 10 
observations available when estimating CSM. As a result, the sample size reduces from 
6,228 to 6,089 observations. For each subsample, we re-estimate Models 2 and 4 in the 
base analysis section (Table 14), using the same dependent and explanatory variables. As 
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previously, we also control for time and fixed industry effects. The results are tabulated 
in Table 16. Again, we will focus on the estimated results of the interest variables rather 
than other control variables. In general, the sign and significance of their coefficients on 
other control variables are consistent with Table 14.  
The estimated results for Model 1 are reported in columns 1-4. As expected, the 
coefficient on HHI is significantly positive in ST3 and ST5 maturity regressions for both 
negative and positive CSM samples, which implies that firms in less competitive 
industries (high concentration) use more short-term maturity, regardless of whether firms 
are competing in strategic substitutes or complements. This result confirms the general 
result in the base analysis and provides more insights that types of competition do not 
matter the relation between competition in the output markets and debt maturity. Our 
result extends the finding by Erhemjamts, Raman and Shahrur (2010) stating that the 
positive association between industry concentration and short-term debt maturity only 
exists if firms compete in strategic complements. 
As shown in columns 1-4 of Table 16, the variable G-index has negative 
coefficient for both ST3 and ST5 regressions, however its coefficient is statistically 
significant for the subsample of negative CSM only. While consistent with the base result 
on the negative relation between G-index and short-term maturity, this result provides 
new evidence that this relation depends on types of competition. More specifically, we 
find new evidence that weak corporate governance firms tend to use less short-term debt 
when they are competing in a way of strategic substitutes in the product markets. 
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For Model 2, we estimate the regressions of two measures of short-term maturity 
on HHI, dummies of G-index terciles and interactions between HHI and the dummies as 
in Model 4 of Table 14. Similarly, the reference group is low G-index tercile. Columns 5-
8 report the estimated results. The coefficient on HHI still has positive sign, but not 
statistically significant at 5% level, for both two subsamples. Thus, this result is 
statistically weaker than the above result and the base result. In general, the estimated 
results for G-index tercile dummies and their interactions with HHI are similar to those of 
Model 4 in Table 14. The dummies of medium and high G-index terciles all have 
negative coefficients, but their coefficients are statistically significant for the negative 
CSM sample only. Consistent with our finding in Table 14, this result suggests that firms 
with upper G-index terciles use less short-term maturity, compared with those in low G-
index tercile.  However, this relation holds for firms who compete in strategic substitutes. 
Consistent with Table 14, the coefficient on the interaction between HHI and medium G-
index dummy is insignificantly negative for both two subsamples. In contrast, the 
interaction between HHI and high G-index dummy has positive and significant 
coefficient for the sample of negative CSM, indicating that, in less competitive industries, 
firms in high G-index tercile use more short-term maturity than firms in low G-index 
tercile. Again, this result does not support our hypothesis.  
2.4.2.5   Robustness Check: Alternative Proxy for Competition 
There is a concern about the possibilities of endogeneity between product market 
competition, corporate governance, and debt maturity. To address this concern, following 
Fresard (2010), we use the U.S import tariff changes as an alternative proxy for product 
market competition. Theoretically, changes in the import tariffs are exogenous shocks to 
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product market competition, thus making the competition harder or softer. Other thing 
equals, when the import tariff rates are cut or import quotas are lift, the supply of foreign 
products tends to increase in the domestic economy. As consequences, the demand-
supply law suggests that competitions among domestic firms will be harder. 
We define that, for a given year, a specific industry experiences a reduction in the 
import tariff when a negative change in the import tariff rate is 2, 2.5, or 3 times larger 
than the average change of the import tariff in that industry. The first and last cut-off 
provides the least strict and the strictest measure of the import tariff cut, respectively. We 
use the dummy variables tariff cut 2, 2.5 and 3 x mean (∆T) to indicate a year-industry 
with a reduction in the import tariff rates. Due to the limitation of data on the import tariff 
rates, the sample used in this analysis includes 3,973 firm-year observations in the period 
1990-2005 
We re-estimate Models 3 and 4 in Table 13 using the dummies of the tariff cut 
instead of HHI. The estimated results are provided in Table 17. Panel A of Table 17 
reports the regression results of ST3 and ST5 on the tariff cut dummies, G-index, and 
their interaction terms. As expected, all three measures of the import tariff cut (tariff cut 
2, 2.5, and 3) have negative and significant coefficients, suggesting that firms in the 
industries with experience of reductions in the import tariff rate use less short-term 
maturity. In other words, there is evidence that firms facing with higher competition 
resulted from reductions in the import tariff rate prefer short-term debt. Equivalently, this 
result is consistent with the above finding that firms in highly concentrated industries 
(less competition) use more short-term maturity. In addition, the coefficient on G-index is 
significantly negative across Panel A, which is consistent with the above finding on the 
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negative relation between G-index and short-term maturity. Interestingly, the interaction 
terms between tariff cut dummies and G-index have positive and significant coefficient, 
which implies that weak governance firms in the industries with the import tariff 
reductions tend to use more short-term maturity. Unfortunately, this finding is not 
consistent with that of the analysis using HHI as a proxy for product market competition. 
Overall, the sign and significance of other control variables are consistent with Table 14. 
The results of ST3 and ST5 regressions on the dummies of the tariff cuts, G-index 
terciles and their interactions are presented in Panel B of Table 17. Except for one case, 
the estimated coefficients on the import tariff cut dummies are significantly negative, 
which is consistent with the result in Panel A. In regard of the G-index terciles, we find 
that the dummy variable medium G-index has negative and significant coefficient. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient on variable high G-index is also negative, but its significance 
is weak. In general, these results imply that, compared with firms in low G-index tercile 
(democracy firms), there is evidence that firms in the upper G-index terciles (dictatorship 
firms) use less short-term maturity. This is consistent with the above result about the 
negative relation between G-index and short-term maturity. Across Panel B, all 
interaction terms between three measures of import tariff cut and medium and high G-
index terciles have positive and significant coefficients. This implies that, within 
industries with  experience of reductions in the import tariff rates, firms in the upper G-
index terciles (weak governance) use less short-term maturity than firms in low G-index 
tercile (good governance). 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This empirical study examines the effects of product market competition and 
corporate governance on firms’ debt maturity structure. As in the literature, we use the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a proxy for product market competition and governance 
index (G-index) as a proxy for corporate governance. Previous studies often look at the 
effect of either product market competition or corporate governance on debt maturity 
separately. Differently, we examine the effect of these two disciplinary mechanisms on 
debt maturity within one analysis framework, based on the idea that these two 
mechanisms are substitutes (see, for example Allen and Gale (1999)). 
Consistent with the literature, we find that firms in less competitive industries 
(high industry concentration) are more likely to use more short-term maturity than firms 
in more competitive industries (low industry concentration). Additionally, we provide 
evidence that this relation is mainly driven by the agency effect rather than the predation 
effect. About the relation between corporate governance and debt maturity, we find that 
firms with weak corporate governance (high G-index) use less short-term maturity, 
compared with firms with high corporate governance (low G-index). This result supports 
the entrenchment argument stating that entrenched managers tend to use less short-term 
maturity (Benmelech (2006)) and is consistent with empirical evidence in Benmelech 
(2006) and Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007). However, we find mixed evidence about 
the combined effect of product market competition and corporate governance on debt 
maturity, indicating that their effect on debt maturity is complicated. Furthermore, we 
find new empirical evidence that types of competition does not matter the relation 
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between product market competition and debt maturity, but matter the relation between 
corporate governance and debt maturity.   
Finally, we realize that endogeneity issue is common in corporate finance. 
Following Fresard (2010), we use change in the U.S import tariff rates as a quasi-natural 
experiment of competitive environment in the output markets in an attempt to deal with 
the possibilities of endogeneity issues among product market competition, corporate 
governance, and debt maturity. Using this alternative proxy for competition could deal 
with the endogeneity between product market competition and debt maturity, and 
between product market competition and corporate governance. However, we could not 
control for the potential endogeneity between corporate governance and debt maturity. 
This is a limitation of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3:  INSIDE DEBT COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE POLICIES 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Inside debt or debt-like compensation is defined as pensions and deferred 
compensation. These terms are used interchangeably in the literature. Different from 
other forms of traditional compensation, the payoff of inside debt is positive in 
bankruptcy and proportional to the firm’s liquidation value (Edmans and Liu, 2011). 
Therefore, inside debt is unsecured debt and has payoff similar to that of debt. Because of 
this debt-like characteristic, executives with inside debt holdings have the same claims 
against their firms as debtholders when the firms go bankcrupt. This implies that inside 
debt induces executives to behave like debtholders.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue about the important role of debt-like 
compensation in addressing the asset substitution (risk shifting) problem. However, this 
research area has been ignored due to the unavailability of data and the lack of theoretical 
foundations as well. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) trigger this line of research and find 
that pensions can reduce overall firm risks. Edmans and Liu (2011) first theoretically 
show that inside debt is an effective alternative compensation mechanism to mitigate the 
agency costs associated with the shareholder-bondholder conflict. The availability of data 
on pensions and deferred compensation as a result of a new disclosure regulation by SEC 
(effective in spring 2007) also facilitates further research in this area. 
In line with recent studies on the effect of inside debt on the firm’s policy choices 
(Cassell, Huang, Sanchez and Stuart, 2012; Liu, Mauer and Zhang, 2012; Peng, 2012; 
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and White, 2012), we examine how inside debt affects the firm’s financial and 
investment policies. In particular, using ExecuComp data on pensions and deferred 
compensation from 2006 to 2011, we examine the effect of inside debt on three important 
policy decisions: firm leverage, debt maturity structure, and investment policies (R&D 
and capital expenditure). To address the concern of the common issue of endogeneity in 
corporate finance, we use simultaneous equations systems, which model inside debt and a 
specific policy as endogenous variables. We estimate the systems by two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) approach. We also provide 3SLS estimated results as robustness checks. 
In general, we find that inside debt and firm leverage have a positive relationship. 
The result also holds for its components (i.e., pensions and deferred compensation). This 
result supports the prediction of Edmans and Liu (2011), but is not consistent with 
evidence provided in Cassell, Huang, Sanchez and Stuart (2012). Their OLS regression 
result shows that firm leverage is significantly decreasing in inside debt. These 
conflicting findings indicate the complicated relation between inside debt and debt policy 
as argued by Cen (2007). In a study examining determinants of inside debt, Cen (2007) 
finds that inside debt is first increasing in firm leverage, then decreasing later on, which 
implies a non-linear relationship between inside debt and firm leverage.  
Interestingly, we find the first empirical evidence that, in one direction, inside 
debt and its components positively affect short-term maturity, which would imply that 
CEOs with high inside debt holdings are likely to borrow more short-term debt. This 
result is not consistent with the theoretical prediction that the risk-decreasing incentive 
induced by inside debt makes CEOs prefer less short-term maturity to avoid the risks of 
rolling over debt more frequently. However, the result can be explained in the sense that 
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the CEOs, like debtholders, would find monitoring role of short-term debt more efficient 
in preserving the firm value. In other direction, we find that higher short-term maturity 
leads to lower inside debt compensation. Collectively, our results show no evidence on 
the two-way positive relationship between inside debt and short-term debt maturity, as 
expected. 
Consistent with the prediction of Edmans and Liu (2011) and empirical evidence 
provided in the literature (for example, Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; and Cassell, 
Huang, Sanchez and Stuart, 2012), we find that CEOs with inside debt holdings have 
conservative investment policies. More specifically, we find a negative relationship 
between inside debt and high risk investment (R&D), which indicates that CEOs with 
inside debt holdings tend to invest less in R&D activities. This finding is consistent with 
empirical evidence in Cassell, Huang, Sanchez and Stuart (2012). However, we find 
weak evidence about the negative relationship between inside debt and capital 
expenditures, implying that there is a little evidence that CEOs with inside debt would 
spend less for low-risk investments. Our further analysis shows that the negative 
relationship between inside debt and R&D is mainly driven by pensions, while the 
relationship between inside debt and capital expenditures are driven by both pensions and 
deferred compensation.  
We also confirm the existing evidence documented in the literature that variables 
such as firm age and size, leverage, market to book, tenure, and CEO age are important 
determinants of inside debt. Additionally, we find that equity-based incentives and other 
form of compensation such as cash and bonus compensation are also important factors 
determining inside debt. To be specific, we find that inside debt is significantly 
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increasing in vega and cash compensation, whereas is decreasing in short-term maturity 
and delta. This evidence is new in the literature. 
This study contributes to the literature on inside debt by providing further 
evidence of how inside debt significantly affects the firm’s policy choices. Our result on 
the positive relationship between inside debt and firm leverage is in favor of the 
theoretical prediction of Edmans and Liu (2011), but is inconsistent with empirical 
evidence in the literature (Cassell, Huang, Sanchez and Stuart , 2012). This inconsistence 
indicates a puzzle of the impact of inside debt on the firm’s debt policy. We also extend 
the literature by showing the complicated relationship between inside debt and debt 
maturity. In particular, we first document that, in one direction, short-term maturity 
increases in inside debt. However, in other direction, inside debt decreases in short-term 
maturity. As a further contribution, we find that inside debt might negatively affect not 
only high risk investment (R&D), but also low risk investment (CAPEX). This would 
suggest that, differing from equity-based incentives, inside debt might not lead to a 
reallocation of capital between R&D activities and capital expenditures. In addition, we 
provide new evidence that cash and bonus compensation, as well as incentives from stock 
and options compensation play an important role in determining inside debt 
compensation.  
It is important to note that Cassell, Huang, Sanchez and Stuart (2012) also look at 
the effect of inside debt on firm leverage and investment policy (only R&D). However, 
they do not control for the possibility of endogeneity between inside debt and firm 
leverage. They also use the relative debt-to-equity ratio, defined as CEO debt-to- equity 
ratio over the firm debt-to-equity ratio as the proxy of inside debt in their leverage 
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regression. This would be problematic because firm debt appears on both sides of the 
regression model. Thus, their OLS results on the leverage regression would be biased. 
Differently, we use the CEO personal leverage as the proxy for inside debt and carefully 
control for the endogeneity issue by employing simultaneous equation systems in which 
inside debt and a policy measure are endogenous. Our study also differs from theirs in a 
way that we do analysis for not only inside debt but also its components. The result of 
Liu, Mauer and Zhang (2012) suggests that the effects of the components of inside debt 
on firm policies are not the same. Finally, we extend their analysis on investment policy 
by considering both high and low risk investment (R&D and capital expenditure). 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss the related literature 
and hypothesis development. Section 3.3 describes the construction of the data sample 
and provides descriptive statistics of firm and CEO characteristics. Section 3.4 reports 
empirical results and Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) first mentioned that debt-like compensation (i.e, 
pensions and deferred compensation) might address  the agency costs associated with the 
asset-substitution (risk-shifting) problem. They argue that executives should be 
compensated in a way that their personal debt-equity ratio is the same as the firm debt-
equity ratio. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that pensions reduce the firm risk of 
default and also find a positive relation between pensions and firm leverage. Edmans and 
Liu (2011) first theriorically prove that, because inside debt compensation makes 
managers better align with creditors, it is efficient to mitigate the agency costs of debt 
associated with the shareholder-debtholder conflicts. 
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One line of research in the literature considers inside debt as the dependent 
variable to examine factors determining inside debt compensation. Previous studies such 
as Gerakos (2007), Sundaram and Yermack (2007), and Cen (2007) document that firm-
variables (e.g., firm size, firm age, and leverage) and CEO characteristics (tenure and 
age) are important determinants of inside debt. Furthermore, a recent paper by Liu, 
Mauer and Zhang (2012) documents that governance structure significantly determines 
inside debt. They find that the coefficients for two proxies of governance structure (G-
index and CEO-chair duality) are significantly positive in the inside debt regression, 
which suggests that the executives of firms with low quality governance should be paid 
relatively more inside debt. However, the literature has not yet documented any evidence 
if equity-based incentives and debt maturity structure can determine inside debt.  
The other line of research uses inside debt as the independent variable to analyze 
its effect on the firms’ behaviors. Wei and Yermack (2009) find that there is a wealth 
transfer from equity holders toward debt holders: bond prices rise while equity prices fall, 
and the prices of both securities are less volatile when information on CEO inside debt is 
first disclosed. This result implies that compensating the executives by inside debt may 
signal the financial markets about the less severity of the conflicts between shareholders 
and bondholders in the firms. Chen, Dou and Wang (2010) find that firms with higher 
CEO inside debt are offered lower interest rate for public debt and less strict covenants. 
In addition, White (2012) examines how pensions affect firm dividend policy and find 
that dividend yield, payout ratio and stock purchases are significantly lower when 
managers are paid higher pensions. Recently, there are two papers examining the effect 
of inside debt on cash holdings and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities. Liu, 
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Mauer and Zhang (2012) find that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings have more cash 
holdings. This result is interesting because it shows how inside debt affects CEOs 
behaviors when they allocate limited capital between R&D and capital expenditure, for 
instance. Peng (2012) looks at the relation between mergers and acquisitions and inside 
debt and finds that CEOs with higher relative debt-like compensation tend to acquire less 
risky targets and are more likely to use debt financing to fund M&A activities.  
In summary, the existing literature documents empirical evidence of the 
significant effects of inside debt on various corporate policies. However, there is still a 
gap of understandings on how inside debt compensation affects other corporate policies 
such as debt maturity. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that inside debt can alter 
managerial incentives then, in turn, affects different policy decisions such as project 
selections, capital structure, maturity, dividend policy, and choice of new security 
issuance. In this study, we focus on examining how inside debt affects three important 
policies, namely debt policy, debt maturity structure and investment policies. To deal 
with the possibility of endogeneity between inside debt and a corporate policy, we use 
simultaneous equations systems in which inside debt and a particular corporate policy are 
endogenous. Model specifications and estimating approach are described in Section 3.4. 
We develop the following hypotheses on the relation between inside debt and 
each of the three corporate policies: firm leverage, debt maturity structure, and 
investment policies (R&D and CAPEX). 
3.2.1 Relation Between Inside Debt and Leverage 
In one direction, we expect that inside debt compensation has a positive effect on 
firm leverage. This hypothesis is based on the results of several prior studies. Peng (2012) 
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find that CEOs with higher inside debt are more likely to use debt financing to fund 
M&A activities. In addition, in an event study, Wei and Yermack (2009) document a 
wealth transfer from stockholders to bondholders when the information of inside debt 
compensation was revealed, which implies that inside debt provides signal the firms’ 
quality to the debt markets. Chen, Dou and Wang (2010) find that firms who pay inside 
debt have lower cost of debt and less restrict covenants. Therefore, we can predict that 
firms would have more access to the debt markets as the markets observe the use of 
inside debt in firm compensation scheme. In the other direction, Edmans and Liu (2011) 
show that managers with inside debt are better aligned with creditors, which can mitigate 
the agency costs of debt. They predict that high leverage should lead to high inside debt 
compensation. The literature provides evidence consistent with this prediction (see 
Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Cen, 2007; Liu et al., 2012). Thus, a positive effect of 
leverage on inside debt compensation is also expected. 
3.2.2 Relation Between Inside Debt and Short-term Debt Maturity 
As shown in Edmans and Liu (2011), inside debt compensation makes managers 
work like debtholders. Thus, we expect that managers with inside debt holdings will use 
more short-term debt to make them align more with debtholders. We name this incentive 
the alignment incentive. However, the risk-averse incentive caused by inside debt 
compensation could induce managers to use less short-term maturity to reduce the risks 
of refinancing more frequently. We posit that the alignment incentive outweighs the risk-
averse incentive, suggesting a positive effect of inside debt on short-term maturity 
structure. In the other direction, firms with optimal short-term maturity structure would 
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find it efficient to offer more inside debt compensation.  Therefore, we expect a positive 
effect of short-term maturity on inside debt compensation. 
3.2.3 Relation Between Inside Debt and Investment Policies 
Edmans and Liu (2011) predict that managers with inside debt compensation are 
more risk-averse, thus have more conservative investment policies. To protect their 
wealth in the incident of bankrupt, managers with inside debt holdings might have 
incentives to take less risk when they make investment decisions. Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2006) argue that, in limited capital, risk-averse managers would reallocate 
investment dollars away from intangible assets such as R&D activities to tangible assets 
such as capital expenditures (CAPEX). Thus, we hypothesize that high inside debt leads 
to less investment in high risk R&D activities, but more investment in low risk capital 
expenditures (CAPEX). In other words, we expect a negative (positive) effect of inside 
debt on R&D (CAPEX). On the other direction, it is likely that firms with the optimal 
investment policies (low R&D, high capital expenditure) find it efficient to provide more 
inside debt compensation. Therefore, we expect that inside debt should decrease with 
R&D, but increase with CAPEX.  
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.3.1 Data 
We obtain CEO compensation from the Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp 
database from 2006 to 2011. We start from year 2006 because data on pensions and 
deferred compensation is only available from 2006, as a result of SEC’s new disclosure 
regulations (FAS 123R). ExecuComp database covers firms in the S&P 500, S&P 
Midcap 400, S&P Smallcap 600 and other companies that were once part of the S&P 
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indexes, but are currently removed. The database provides comprehensive data on salary, 
bonus, pensions, deferred compensation, total compensation, equity-based compensations 
(stock awards and outstanding stock options), and personal data for the top-five 
executives of these firms. As in Chava and Purnanadam (2010), we identify CEOs based 
on the annual CEO title flag. 
After identifying CEOs, we compile data on their wealth portfolios held at the 
fiscal year end. By definition, an executive’s wealth portfolio consists of non-stock 
portfolio (cash salary and bonus, pensions, deferred compensation, and other 
compensations) and stock-based wealth portfolio (common stock, restricted stock awards, 
and stock options holdings). We follow Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2001) to 
calculate the Black- Scholes values of outstanding stock options and equity-based 
incentives (vega and delta) for each CEO. In addition, we get rid of any CEOs with no 
inside debt compensation (i.e., no information on both pensions and deferred 
compensation available) and also require sufficient information to calculate vega and 
delta for each CEO. We also collect CEO personal characteristics such as age and tenure 
provided in ExecuComp. 
Following the literature, we exclude financial and utilities firms (SIC6000-6999 
and SIC4000-4999). Accounting data and stock prices are obtained from Compustat 
industrial annual files and CRSP, respectively. After merging CEO wealth portfolio 
dataset to Compustat data, we have a sample of 1,932 CEOs for 1,419 firms in the period 
of 2006-2011. The final sample consists of 6,748 firm-year observations. 
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3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 18 reports descriptive statistics of the main characteristics of the 
sample firms. The average (median) firm is 27 (25) years old. The average net sales of 
the sample firms is close to $6.1 billion and the median sales is about $1.5 billion. The 
average fixed assets ratio, which is used as a proxy for asset tangibility, is 0.25 and the 
median is 0.18. The average profitability, measured as the ratio of EBITDA and total 
asset, is 0.14 and the median is 0.13. For debt policy, the sample firms have the average 
market leverage of 14% and median of 11%. Following the literature, we use market to 
book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities. The average market to book ratio is 
substantially high at 1.86, and the market to book median is also high at 1.55. For 
investment policies, the sample firms spend, on average, 3% of total assets for research 
and development activities (R&D). The median firm spends 1% of total asset for R&D. 
However, the firms spend slightly higher proportion of total assets for net capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) with the mean and median of 5% and 3%, respectively. For debt 
maturity, the average firm holds 37% (58%) of debt that matures in three (five) years or 
less and the median firm holds 27% (57%) of debt maturing in three (five) years or less.  
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TABLE 18: Descriptive statistics of firm and CEO characteristics  
 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics of firm characteristics. Firm age is the difference 
between the first year which a firm’s stock first appears in CRSP database and the fiscal 
year. Firm size is net sales in millions of dollars. Fixed asset ratio is the net plant, 
property, and equipment divided by total asset. Profitability is the earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by the book value of 
total asset. Leverage is total debt (debt in current liability plus long-term debt) divided by 
the market value of the firm (estimated as the book value of assets minus the book value 
of equity plus the market value of equity). Market to book ratio is the market value of the 
firm scaled by the book value of total assets. Abnormal earnings is measured as (earnings 
in year t+1 - earnings in year t)/share price x outstanding shares in year t. Asset maturity 
is the book value weighted average of the maturities of the plant, property, and equipment 
(PPE) and current assets, measured as (PPE/Total asset) x (PPE/Depreciation expense))+ 
(Current asset /Total asset) x (Current asset/COGS). R&D is the ratio of research and 
development expenditure and total asset. CAPEX is net capital expenditure (calculated as 
capital expenditure minus sale of property, plant and equipment) scaled by total asset. 
Proportion of debt maturing in 3 years (5 years) or less is defined as debt that matures in 
3 years (5 years) or less scaled by total debt.  
 
Panel B reports summary statistics of CEO characteristics. Total compensation is the 
variable TDC1 in Execucomp. Cash compensation is the sum of current salary and cash 
bonus. Equity value is the sum of the value of CEO outstanding common stock holdings 
plus the Black- Scholes value of outstanding options held by CEOs at the fiscal year end. 
Vega is the dollar change of CEO option portfolios for 1% change in stock return 
volatility. Delta is the dollar change of CEO stock and option portfolios for 1% change in 
stock price. We follow Guay (1999) and Core & Guay (2002) to calculate the dividend-
adjusted Black- Scholes values of executive options, vega, and delta. Pensions are the 
present value of accumulated pension benefits from all pension plans. Deferred 
compensation is total aggregate balance in deferred compensation plans at fiscal year 
end. CEO personal leverage is defined as the sum of pensions and deferred compensation 
divided by the sum of pensions and deferred compensation plus equity value. Pension 
(deferred compensation) ratio is calculated as pension (deferred compensation) divided 
by the sum of pensions and deferred compensation plus equity value. Personal debt-
equity ratio is the sum of pensions and deferred compensation scaled by equity value. 
Relative debt-equity ratio is defined as personal debt-equity ratio divided by firm debt-
equity ratio, where firm debt-equity ratio is total debt scaled by the market value of 
equity. Tenure is the number of years as the CEO of the firm. Age is the present age of 
CEOs at the fiscal year. To mitigate the influence of large outliers, the relative debt-
equity ratio is winsorized at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. All other accounting variables are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. 
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TABLE 18 (continued) 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics 
 
 
Obs. Mean 
Standard  
deviation 
25
th
 
percentile 
Median 
75
th
 
percentile 
Firm age (years) 6748 26.95 15.23 13 25 43 
Firm size ($M) 6748 6058.28 14015.98 531.56 1506.97 4740.9 
Fixed assets ratio 6748 0.25 0.21 0.09 0.18 0.35 
Profitability 6748 0.14 0.1 0.09 0.13 0.18 
Leverage 6748 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.22 
Market to book 6748 1.86 1.02 1.19 1.55 2.16 
R&D 6748 0.03 0.06 0 0.01 0.05 
CAPEX 6748 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.06 
Proportion of  debt maturing 
in 3 years or less (ST3) 
5338 0.37 0.34 0.07 0.27 0.58 
Proportion of  debt maturing 
in 5 years or less (ST5) 
5338 0.58 0.35 0.3 0.57 0.98 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of CEO characteristics 
 
 
 Obs. Mean Standard  
deviation 
25
th
 
percentile 
Median 75
th
 
percentile 
Wealth portfolios    
Total compensation ($000s) 6748 5395.39 5410.91 1780.02 3630.32 6922.64 
Cash compensation ($000s) 6748 956.54 698.06 566.89 805 1070 
Equity value ($000s) 6748 49888.17 102464 7740.5 18579.04 45472.77 
Pensions ($000s) 6748 2514.72 5965.14 0 0 1501.03 
Deferred comp.($000s) 6748 2014.38 5818.39 0 45.12 1315.02 
Equity-based incentives    
Vega ($000s) 6748 146.95 220.33 19.98 61.65 170.96 
Delta ($000s) 6748 560.64 1094.9 83.21 209.28 539.35 
Inside debt     
Personal  leverage 6748 0.11 0.16 0 0.02 0.17 
Pension ratio 6748 0.06 0.12 0 0 0.06 
Deferred comp. ratio 6748 0.04 0.08 0 0 0.05 
Personal debt-equity ratio 6748 0.19 0.4 0 0.02 0.2 
Relative debt-equity ratio 5702 1.13 2.13 0 0.18 1.07 
Other characteristics     
Tenure (years) 6748 7.11 6.82 0.08 5 9 
Age (years) 6748 55.14 6.92 29 55 60 
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Panel B of Table 18 provides descriptive statistics of CEO wealth portfolios, 
inside debt compensation, and other personal characteristics. The top of panel B provides 
a snapshot of CEO wealth portfolios. The mean (median) of CEO total compensation, 
measured as TDC1 variable in ExecuComp database, is approximately $5.4 (3.6) million. 
The average and median cash compensation (cash plus bonus) is about $0.96 million and 
$0.86 million, respectively. Obviously, the largest component of CEO wealth portfolio is 
stock and option holdings (equity holdings), which illustrates the common use of stock-
based compensation in reality. The average CEO holds stock and options with 
approximately estimated value of $50 million and the median CEO holds about $18.6 
million of stock and options in their wealth portfolios. Note that the value of stocks held 
by a CEO is calculated as his number of common outstanding stocks multiplied by the 
stock price at the fiscal year end. We follow the dividend-adjusted Black-Scholes model 
used by Guay (1999) and Core & Guay (2002) to estimate the values of outstanding 
options held by a CEO. 
The figures also show that inside debt accounts for a substantial proportion in 
CEO wealth portfolios. The average CEO receives slightly higher pensions than deferred 
compensation ($2,515 thousand vs. $2,014 thousand). In contrast, the median CEO has 
substantially higher deferred compensation than pensions ($45,000 vs. $0). To compare 
with cash compensation, it is clear that the mean of both pensions and deferred 
compensation is much higher than that of cash compensation. However, the median of 
cash compensation is significantly higher than that of pensions and deferred 
compensation. Note that, by definition, pensions are the present value of accumulated 
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pension benefits from all pension plans. Deferred compensation is total aggregate balance 
in deferred compensation plans at fiscal year end.  
The summary statistics of equity-based incentives (vega and delta) are also 
reported in the second part of Panel B in Table 18. Vega is defined as the dollar change 
of the executive’s option portfolio for 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta is 
measured as the dollar change of the executive’s stock and option portfolios for 1% 
change in stock price. Vega and delta are estimated based on the approach by Guay 
(1999) and Core & Guay (2002). The mean (median) vega is close to $147,000 
($62,000). Delta is higher than vega with the mean at $561,000 and median at $209,000, 
approximately.  
Following the literature, we calculate five proxies for inside debt compensation. 
Their descriptive statistics are provided in Panel B. The mean (median) CEO personal 
leverage, which is defined as the sum of pensions plus deferred compensation scaled by 
the sum of pensions and deferred compensation plus equity value, is 11% (2%). The 
average (median) ratios of pensions and deferred compensation are 6% (0%) and 4 % 
(0%), respectively. Note that pension (deferred compensation) ratio is pension (deferred 
compensation) scaled by the sum of pensions and deferred compensation plus equity 
value. Two alternative proxies for inside debt are personal debt-equity ratio (defined as 
the sum of pensions and deferred compensation scaled by equity value), and relative 
debt-equity ratio (defined as personal debt-equity ratio divided by firm debt-equity ratio, 
where firm debt-equity ratio is total debt scaled by the market value of equity). The mean 
(median) personal debt-equity ratio is 19% (2%). The average relative debt-equity ratio is 
1.13 and its median is 0.18.  As in Liu, Mauer and Zhang (2012), we use the first three 
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proxies: personal leverage, pension and deferred compensation ratios for the main 
analysis. Doing analysis for pension and deferred compensation ratios provides additional 
information about which inside debt component drives the effect of inside debt on 
corporate policies. In addition, we use personal debt-equity and relative debt-equity ratios 
in a robustness analysis. 
The bottom of panel B in Table 18 also provides additional information about 
CEO tenure and age. The average and median CEO serves his firm for about 7 years and 
5 years, respectively. The mean and median CEO age is about 55 years. 
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Table 19 reports Pearson correlation coefficients among inside debt, leverage, 
debt maturity, and R&D and CAPEX expenditures. This correlation matrix simply 
reveals basic relations among these variables. Firm leverage is significantly positively 
correlated with personal leverage, pension ratio, deferred compensation ratio, and 
personal debt-equity. This correlation is consistent with the prediction of Edmans and Liu 
(2011) on a positive relationship between inside debt and firm leverage and is consistent 
with previous empirical evidence (Sundaram and Yermack (2007); Chen, Dou and Wang 
(2010); Cen (2007); Liu, Mauer and Zhang (2012). Nevertheless, firm leverage is 
negatively correlated with relative debt-equity ratio, which is consistent with the finding 
in Cassell, Huang, Sanchez and Stuart (2012) that inside debt negatively affects firm 
leverage. Two measures of short-term debt maturity (ST3 and ST5) are negatively 
correlated with personal leverage, pension ratio, deferred compensation ratio, and 
personal debt-equity ratio, whereas is positively correlated with relative debt-equity ratio. 
Finally, consistent with Edmans and Liu (2011) and Cassell, Huang, Sanchez and Stuart 
(2012), Table 19 shows that R&D expenditure is negatively correlated with all proxies of 
inside debt, which implies that a CEO with inside debt have conservative investment 
policies. Net capital expenditure (CAPEX) is also negatively correlated with all proxies 
of inside debt, which is not consistent with the hypothesis that inside debt positively 
affect CAPEX due to the reallocation of capital between R&D and CAPEX. Note that the 
correlation analysis does not consider the impacts of other control variables as the 
multivariate analysis. The next section provides empirical analysis in a multivariate 
regression framework. 
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3.4 Empirical Analysis 
Empirical studies such as Coles et al. (2006) and Brockman et al. (2010) 
document evidence on the joint determinants between corporate policies and managerial 
compensation incentives. We also posit that corporate policies and inside debt 
compensation are jointly determined. To explore this causal relation between them, we 
set up a simultaneous two-equation system as follows: 
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
In this system, policy measure represents leverage, debt maturity, R&D and 
CAPEX expenditures. Inside debt represents proxies for inside debt compensation. More 
specifically, in the first equation of the system, the dependent variable is a specific policy 
decision (e.g., firm leverage) and the interested explanatory variable is a proxy for inside 
debt (e.g., CEO personal leverage). In the second equation, the proxy for inside debt (e.g., 
CEO personal leverage) is the dependent variable, and the policy decision (e.g., firm 
leverage) is an explanatory variable. Recall that we use three proxies: CEO personal 
leverage, pension ratio, and deferred compensation ratio in the main analysis and two 
alternative proxies: personal debt-equity ratio and relative debt-equity ratio to provide 
robustness checks. Equity incentives are vega and delta, which control for the effect of 
managerial incentives induced by equity-based compensation packages such as stocks 
and options. The set of other control variables includes firm-level variables, which are 
selected from the related literatures. The model also controls for time and industry fixed 
effects by adding year dummies and 2-digit SIC dummies into the system. 
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Following Johnson (2003) and Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2005), we use 
two- stage least squares (2SLS) approach to estimate the above simultaneous equations 
system and report the second-stage 2SLS regression results in the main analysis. 
Wooldridge (2002) proves that the system 2SLS estimator is not efficient. Therefore, to 
provide robustness checks, we re-estimate the system by three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
approach and report the main results only. 
3.4.1 Inside Debt and Firm Leverage  
3.4.1.1  Variable Selections 
Based on the general model setting above, we set up a simultaneous system of 
two equations in which firm leverage and inside debt are endogenous. The leverage 
equation includes inside debt and other explanatory variables selected from the vast 
literature on capital structure. While, the inside debt equation contains leverage and other 
independent variables borrowed from the existing studies on inside debt compensation. 
For the leverage equation, we include vega and delta as two proxies for equity-
based incentives. Previous studies such as Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and 
Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) provide empirical evidence on the positive (negative) 
relation between firm leverage and vega (delta). Cash compensation is the sum of salary 
and bonus. Guay (1999) argues that CEOs with higher cash compensation has more 
opportunity to diversify his investments outside the firm; therefore they tend to be less 
risk averse. We therefore expect that cash compensation positively impact firm leverage 
as evidence found in Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). As in Johnson (2003), we use 
firm size, profitability, fixed asset ratio, market to book, abnormal earnings, and the 
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dummy of net operating loss carryforwards and investment tax credit as the other 
important independent variables determining the firm’s debt policy. 
In the inside debt equation, we control for managerial incentives induced from 
equity-based compensation including vega and delta. In their studies on managerial 
incentives, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010), and 
Chava and Purnannadam (2010) argue that CEOs with high vega (delta) are less (more) 
risk averse. Therefore, we expect a positive (negative) relation between vega (delta) and 
inside debt. 
We include cash compensation to control for the substitute effect between this 
form of compensation and inside debt. Gerakos (2007) finds that pension benefits 
substitute for other forms of compensation, which suggests a negative relation between 
them. The existing literature documents that number of years servicing as the CEO and 
CEO age are important determinants of inside debt. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find 
that CEOs with higher tenure have more inside debt compensation and that pension 
increases monotonically with CEO age. Gerakos (2007) and Chen, Dou and Wang (2010) 
also find a positive relation between CEO age and inside debt. Therefore, we add CEO 
tenure and age in the inside debt equation. For firm variables, we include firm age, size, 
and market to book ratio. The literature provides evidence that older, larger firms pay 
higher inside debt compensation than younger, smaller firms (see Sundaram and 
Yermack, 2007; Chen, Dou and Wang, 2010; Cen, 2007; Lee and Tang, 2011). We use 
market to book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities. The agency costs associated 
with severe asset substitution problem in the firms with high growth opportunities are 
relatively high, which suggests that these firms should use more inside debt 
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compensation. Thus, we expect that inside debt is increasing in market to book. 
Inconsistent with this expectation, Gerakos (2007) finds a negative relation between 
market to book ratio and pensions.   
Tax deferral would be an important motivation for firms and CEOs to prefer 
inside debt because, by law, both of them can defer tax until payments of inside debt 
compensation occur in the future. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that, for some 
firms, pensions possibly offer net tax savings between firms and executives when either 
of them might expect to have different marginal tax rates in the future. However, they do 
not find significant relation between tax status and inside debt. To test this tax status 
argument, we include dummies of net operating loss carryforwards and investment tax 
credit as two proxies for tax status.  
Theoretically, profitability, fixed asset ratio, and abnormal earnings are important 
determinants of capital structure decisions. However, the literature on inside debt 
provides no theoretical prediction on the relation between them and inside debt. 
Therefore, we exclude these variables in the inside debt equation. As discussed above, 
tenure, CEO age, and firm age are important variables of the determinants of inside debt. 
Therefore, we exclude these variables in the leverage equation. With restrictions of these 
variables, the simultaneous equation system properly identifies. 
3.4.1.2   Results 
Table 20 reports the second-stage results of simultaneous equation regressions for 
firm leverage and inside debt compensation using two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
approach. The endogenous variables of Model 1 are firm leverage and personal leverage. 
Those of Models 2&3 are firm leverage and pension ratio, and firm leverage and deferred 
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compensation, respectively. The odd columns of Table 20 present the 2SLS results of the 
leverage regression, while the even columns present the results of the inside debt 
regression. 
For the leverage regression, columns 1, 3 and 5 show the results consistent with 
those of univariate analysis about the positive relation between firm leverage and inside 
debt. To be specific, the estimated coefficients on personal leverage, pension ratio and 
deferred compensation ratio are positive and statistically significant at 1% level, which 
suggests that inside debt positively affects firm leverage. This finding is consistent with 
Edmans and Liu’s (2011) prediction on a positive relation between inside debt and 
leverage. Furthermore, the significant coefficients on pensions and deferred 
compensation imply that both of these two components of inside debt drive the positive 
relation between inside debt and firm leverage. 
Across the three models, the sign and significance of other control variables are 
almost consistent with the capital structure literature. The results show that equity-based 
incentives have significant effects on leverage choice. Specifically, the coefficients on 
both vega and delta are negative and statistically significant. Nevertheless, the negative 
sign of the coefficient on vega is inconsistent with empirical evidence documented in 
prior studies by Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) 
and Chava and Purnannadam (2010). They find a positive relation between vega and 
leverage. Consistent with these studies, we find that CEOs with higher delta tend to take 
lower leverage. 
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TABLE 20: Inside debt and firm leverage 
 
This table presents the second-stage results of simultaneous equation regressions for 
leverage and inside debt compensation using two-state least squares (2SLS) approach. 
The first-stage regression results estimating the predicted values of leverage and inside 
debt compensation are not reported. Three proxies for inside debt compensation are 
personal leverage, pension and deferred compensation ratios. Definitions of these 
variables are the same as in Table 18. Columns 1-2 report the estimated results for 
leverage and personal leverage (Model 1). The results for leverage and pension ratio are 
presented in columns 3-4 (Model 2). The last two columns provide the results for 
leverage and deferred compensation ratio (Model 3). Vega (log) is the dollar change of 
CEO option portfolio for 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta (log) is the dollar 
change of CEO stock and option portfolio for 1% change in stock price. We follow Guay 
(1999) and Core & Guay (2002) to estimate vega and delta. Cash compensation (log) is 
the sum of current salary and cash bonus. CEO tenure (log) is the number of years as the 
CEO of the firm. CEO age (log) is CEO present age at the fiscal year. Firm age (log) is 
the difference between the first year which a firm’s stock first appears in CRSP and the 
fiscal year. Firm size is the log of net sales. Other variables are defined as in Table 18. 
All regressions include 2-digit SIC dummies and year dummies. Robust t- statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
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TABLE 20 (continued) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Leverage 
 
(1) 
Personal 
leverage 
(2) 
Leverage 
 
(3) 
Pension 
ratio 
(4) 
Leverage 
 
(5) 
Deferred 
comp. ratio 
(6) 
Personal leverage 
(predicted) 
0.1335 
     (3.51)*** 
     Pension ratio (predicted) 
  
0.2907 
   
   
(4.46)*** 
   Deferred compensation  
ratio (predicted) 
   
0.3973 
 
     
(4.06)*** 
 Leverage (predicted) 
 
0.2828
 
0.2123
 
0.0368
  
(2.87)*** 
 
(2.50)** 
 
(0.66) 
Vega -0.0056 0.0088 -0.0059 0.0056 -0.0058 0.0032 
 
(4.08)*** (5.58)*** (4.28)*** (4.36)*** (4.20)*** (3.36)*** 
Delta -0.0049 -0.0494 -0.0040 -0.0270 -0.0043 -0.0202 
 
(2.43)** (19.14)*** (2.05)** (13.14)*** (2.22)** (13.83)*** 
Cash compensation 0.0275 0.0048 0.0248 0.0083 0.0295 -0.0021 
 
(7.14)*** (0.98) (6.24)*** (2.14)** (7.84)*** (0.73) 
CEO tenure 
 
0.0200 
 
0.0087 
 
0.0105 
  
(10.02)*** 
 
(5.60)*** 
 
(8.86)*** 
CEO age 
 
0.1736 
 
0.1224 
 
0.0449 
  
(13.07)*** 
 
(11.94)*** 
 
(5.96)*** 
Firm age 
 
0.0174 
 
0.0099 
 
0.0076 
  
(7.38)*** 
 
(4.88)*** 
 
(6.06)*** 
Firm size 0.0105 0.0408 0.0095 0.0220 0.0095 0.0180 
 
(5.00)*** (16.12)*** (4.69)*** (10.74)*** (4.51)*** (12.38)*** 
Profitability -0.1157 
 
-0.1203 
 
-0.1207 
 
 
(5.79)*** 
 
(6.01)*** 
 
(6.03)*** 
 Fixed asset ratio 0.1007 
 
0.0978 
 
0.1029 
 
 
(7.59)*** 
 
(7.36)*** 
 
(7.80)*** 
 Market to book -0.0313 0.0174 -0.0294 0.0111 -0.0310 0.0042 
 
(18.43)*** (4.53)*** (16.71)*** (3.35)*** (18.21)*** (1.98)** 
Abnormal earnings 0.0515 
 
0.0502 
 
0.0518 
 
 
(5.73)*** 
 
(5.59)*** 
 
(5.80)*** 
 Net operating loss 
carryforwards dummy 
0.0171 0.0085 0.0185 0.0034 0.0156 0.0042 
(6.07)*** (1.77)* (6.49)*** (0.87) (5.52)*** (1.42) 
Investment tax credit 
dummy 
-0.0173 -0.0050 -0.0168 -0.0077 -0.0183 0.0034 
(5.14)*** (1.30) (5.00)*** (2.43)** (5.39)*** (1.55) 
Constant 0.0135 -0.9066 0.0301 -0.6554 0.0009 -0.2287 
 
(0.37) (15.42)*** (0.81) (13.75)*** (0.03) (6.86)*** 
Observations 6748 6748 6748 6748 6748 6748 
R-squared 0.41 0.33 0.41 0.27 0.41 0.15 
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Firm size has positive sign and is statistically significant, which is consistent with 
Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010), but is not consistent with Barclay, Max and Smith 
(2003), Johnson (2003), and Billett, King and Mauer (2007). Consistent with the 
literature, profitability has negative and significant impact on leverage. In addition, the 
coefficient on fixed asset ratio is statistically positive, suggesting that firms with higher 
asset collateral use more debt. This finding is consistent with Johnson (2003) and 
Barclay, Max and Smith (2003), but inconsistent with Brockman, Martin and Unlu 
(2010). The sign and significance of market to book ratio and abnormal earnings are 
consistent with Johnson (2003). Again, our results confirm that tax status has significant 
effect on firm leverage. The net operating loss carryforwards (investment tax credit) 
dummy is statistically positive (negative), which supports prior research by Barclay, Max 
and Smith (2003), Johnson (2003), and Billett, King and Mauer (2007). The above 
analysis shows that, by and large, the inclusion of inside debt in the traditional leverage 
regression leads to the results consistent with the literature of capital structure, and that 
inside debt compensation is an important determinant of debt policy. 
For the inside debt regression, the 2SLS results are provided in the even columns. 
Specifically, columns 2 and 4 are for the CEO personal leverage regression and pension 
ratio, respectively. Column 6 is for the deferred compensation ratio regression. 
It can be seen from columns 2, 4 and 6 in Table 20 that, the estimated coefficients 
on leverage are all significantly positive across the three models, suggesting that CEO 
personal leverage, pension ratio, and deferred compensation ratio are all increasing in 
firm leverage. Generally, as predicted in Edmans and Liu (2011), firm leverage positively 
affects inside debt. This finding is also consistent with empirical evidence in Sundaram 
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and Yermack (2007), Chen, Dou and Wang (2010), Cen (2007), and Liu, Mauer and 
Zhang (2012). 
As shown in columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 20, vega has positive and significant 
coefficients. In contrast, the coefficients on delta are negative and highly significant. This 
evidence implies that CEOs with high vega (delta) tend to have more (less) inside debt. 
This interesting finding is new to the literature of inside debt. The coefficient on cash 
compensation is positive for the CEO personal leverage and pension ratio regressions, but 
is significant for the pension ratio regression only. Column 6 shows no significant 
relation between cash compensation and deferred compensation ratio. Thus, there is weak 
evidence on the impact of cash compensation on inside debt.  
The sign and significance of the well-known variables such as CEO tenure and 
age, firm age, and firm size are consistent with prior research (see Sundaram and 
Yermack, 2007; Gerakos, 2006; Chen, Dou and Wang, 2010; and Liu, Mauer and Zhang, 
2012). All of these variables positively affect inside debt. In addition, market to book 
ratio variable has positive and significant coefficient in all three models, which implies 
that the firms with high growth opportunities tend to use more inside debt. This finding is 
consistent with Edmans and Liu’s (2011) prediction and empirical evidence in Gerakos 
(2007) and Liu, Mauer and Zhang (2012). 
Furthermore, the dummy of net operating carryforwards has positive but 
insignificant coefficient. The dummy of investment tax credit has negative and significant 
coefficient in the pension ratio regression, but has negative (positive) and insignificant 
coefficient in the CEO personal leverage (deferred compensation ratio) regression. 
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Collectively, there is weak evidence on the effect of the tax status on inside debt 
compensation, which is consistent with Sundaram and Yermack (2007). 
3.4.2 Inside Debt and Debt Maturity Structure 
3.4.2.1  Variable Selections 
From the general model specification discussed earlier, we develop a 
simultaneous two-equation system that endogenizes short-term debt maturity and inside 
debt. In this equation system, the maturity equation contains inside debt as the treatment 
variable and other control variables suggested from the debt maturity literature. 
Meanwhile, the inside debt equation includes short-term debt maturity and control 
variables selected from previous research in inside debt. The motivations for using 
appropriate control variables are discussed in details as follows. 
The literature finds evidence of significant relations between managerial 
incentives and debt maturity. Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) find that a positive 
(negative) association between CEO vega (delta) and short-term maturity. Chava and 
Purnannadam (2010) find that CFOs with high vega (delta) use less (more) long-term 
maturity. However, they do not find any impacts of CEO vega and delta on debt maturity. 
Following these studies, we control vega and delta in the maturity equation. We also 
include cash compensation and expect a negative relation between this variable and short-
term debt maturity. 
Following previous studies (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Johnson, 2003; Barclay, 
Max and Smith, 2003; Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman, 2005; and Billett, King and 
Mauer, 2007), we include other control variables including firm size, firm sized squared, 
market to book, leverage, asset maturity, abnormal earnings, term structure, and dummy 
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of net operating loss carry forwards and investment tax credit in the maturity equation. 
We use firm size as a proxy for firms’ credit quality. Diamond (1991) theoretically shows 
that firms with the lowest and highest credit ratings prefer short-term debt, while firms in 
the middle range use more long-term debt. The inclusion of firm size squared is to test 
this non-linear relation. To be consistent with the literature, we expect that the coefficient 
for firm size and firm sized squared is negative and positive respectively. Following 
previous studies such as Barclay and Smith (1995), Johnson (2003), and Datta, Iskandar-
Datta and Raman (2005), we use market to book as a proxy for investment opportunities 
and expect a positive coefficient on this variable. Myers (1977) predicts that high growth 
firms prefer short-term debt to address the underinvestment problem, suggesting a 
positive relation between market to book and short-term maturity.  
The capital structure literature provides strong empirical evidence of a negative 
relation between leverage and short-term maturity structure (see for example, Johnson, 
2003; Billett, King and Mauer, 2007; and Brockman, Martin and Unlu, 2010). Following 
the literature, we control for firm leverage in the maturity equation and expect a negative 
coefficient on this variable. Myers (1977) argues that firms attempt to match their asset 
maturity and liabilities to address the underinvestment problem. Thus, we include the 
variable asset maturity and expect a negative coefficient for this variable. Following 
Barclay and Smith (1995), we include a measure of abnormal earnings and expect a 
positive coefficient for this variable because high quality firms can benefit from the 
monitoring efficiency associated with short-term maturity. In theories, signaling models 
such as Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) suggest that firms use maturity structure to 
inform their credit quality to financial markets. Finally, we control for term structure and 
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the dummy of net operating loss carryforwards and investment tax credit to test the tax-
related hypothesis. 
For the inside debt equation, the motivations for selecting appropriate control 
variables are discussed in Sections 3.4.1 and it is not worth repeating here. To properly 
indentify the simultaneous equation system, we restrict zero coefficients on CEO tenure, 
CEO age, and firm age in the maturity equation. Previous studies (for example, Barclay 
and Smith, 1995; Johnson, 2003; Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman, 2005)  find evidence 
that variables such as firm size squared, asset maturity, abnormal earnings, and term 
structure are important determinants of debt maturity. Nevertheless, the inside debt 
literature provides no theoretical linkages between these variables and inside debt. Thus, 
we exclude them in the inside debt equation. 
3.4.2.2  Results 
Table 21 provides the estimates of the second-stage simultaneous equation 
regression of short-term debt maturity and inside debt using 2SLS approach. As in the 
literature, we use two measures of short-term debt maturity, namely proportions of debt 
maturing in three years or less (ST3) and debt maturing in 5 years or less (ST5). The 
endogenous variables in Model 1 are short-term debt maturity (ST3 or ST5) and CEO 
personal leverage. Those of Models 2 and 3 are short-term debt maturity and pension 
ratio, and short-term debt maturity and deferred compensation ratio, accordingly. The 
2SLS results for ST3 and ST5 are tabulated in the odd columns of Panel A and Panel B of 
Table 21, respectively. The results of inside debt are in the even columns.  
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TABLE 21: Inside debt and debt maturity 
 
This table shows the second-stage results of simultaneous equation regressions for the 
structure of debt maturity and inside debt compensation using two-state least squares 
(2SLS) approach. The first-stage regression results estimating the predicted values of 
debt maturity and inside debt compensation are not reported. Three proxies for inside 
debt compensation are personal leverage, pension and deferred compensation ratios. 
Definitions of these variables are the same as in Table 18. Panel A (B) reports the 
estimated results for proportion of debt maturing in 3 years (5 years) or less and inside 
debt. In each panel, columns 1-2 report the estimated results for debt maturity and 
personal leverage (Model 1). The results for debt maturity and pension ratio are presented 
in columns 3-4 (Model 2). The last two columns provide the results for debt maturity and 
deferred compensation ratio (Model 3). Vega (log) is the dollar change of CEO option 
portfolio for 1% change in stock return volatility. Delta (log) is the dollar change of CEO 
stock and option portfolio for 1% change in stock price. We follow Guay (1999) and 
Core & Guay (2002) to estimate vega and delta. Cash compensation (log) is the sum of 
current salary and cash bonus. CEO tenure (log) is the number of years as the CEO of the 
firm. CEO age (log) is CEO present age at the fiscal year. Firm age (log) is the difference 
between the first year which a firm’s stock first appears in CRSP and the fiscal year. Firm 
size is the log of net sales. Firm size squared is the square of firm size. Term structure is 
the spread between the yield on 10-year government bonds and the yield on six-month 
government bonds at the fiscal year end. Yield data comes from the FRED at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Other variables are defined as in Table 18. All regressions 
include 2-digit SIC dummies and year dummies. Robust t- statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 21 (continued) 
Panel A: Regressions of the proportion of debt that matures in 3 years or less on inside 
debt 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 ST3 
 
 
(1) 
Personal 
leverage 
(2) 
 ST3 
 
(3) 
Pension 
ratio 
(4) 
ST3 
 
(5) 
Deferred 
comp. ratio 
(6) 
Personal leverage 
(predicted) 
0.4223 
     (3.73)*** 
     Pension ratio 
(predicted)   
0.6395
   
  
(3.53)*** 
   Deferred compensation 
   
1.1931 
 ratio (predicted) 
    
(3.88)*** 
 ST3 (predicted) 
 
-0.1467
 
-0.1311
 
-0.0297
  
(2.57)** 
 
(2.89)*** 
 
(0.93) 
Vega -0.0140 0.0084 -0.0142 0.0055 -0.0138 0.0029 
 
(3.19)*** (4.46)*** (3.21)*** (3.63)*** (3.16)*** (2.60)*** 
Delta 0.0070 -0.0640 0.0052 -0.0382 0.0079 -0.0238 
 
(1.02) (22.41)*** (0.78) (16.56)**
* 
(1.14) (15.19)*** 
Cash compensation -0.0203 0.0122 -0.0234 0.0124 -0.0141 -0.0002 
 
(1.80)* (2.50)** (2.02)** (3.34)*** (1.28) (0.06) 
CEO tenure 
 
0.0256 
 
0.0133 
 
0.0115 
  
(11.39)*** 
 
(7.62)*** 
 
(8.57)*** 
CEO age 
 
0.2167 
 
0.1656 
 
0.0472 
  
(12.64)*** 
 
(11.89)**
*  
(5.14)*** 
Firm age 
 
0.0194 
 
0.0117 
 
0.0082 
  
(6.66)*** 
 
(4.72)*** 
 
(5.24)*** 
Firm size -0.2104 0.0452 -0.2090 0.0245 -0.2111 0.0190 
 
(8.04)*** (16.99)*** (7.97)*** (11.55)**
* 
(8.11)*** (12.29)*** 
Firm size squared 0.0110 
 
0.0111 
 
0.0109 
 
 
(7.22)*** 
 
(7.23)*** 
 
(7.18)*** 
 Market to book -0.0058 0.0074 -0.0058 0.0042 -0.0053 0.0024
 
(0.82) (3.15)*** (0.83) (2.27)** (0.75) (1.90)* 
Leverage -0.5809 -0.0788 -0.6084 -0.0284 -0.5305 -0.0583 
 
(14.32)**
* 
(1.92)* (14.70)**
* 
(0.86) (12.52)**
* 
(2.53)** 
Asset maturity -0.0028 
 
-0.0029 
 
-0.0026 
 
 
(4.22)*** 
 
(4.29)*** 
 
(3.97)*** 
 Abnormal earnings 0.0416 
 
0.0471 
 
0.0382 
 
 
(2.18)** 
 
(2.49)** 
 
(1.99)** 
 Term structure 0.0233 
 
0.0224 
 
0.0256 
 
 
(1.71)* 
 
(1.64) 
 
(1.88)* 
 Net operating loss 
carryforwards dummy 
-0.0134 -0.0050 -0.0095 -0.0102 -0.0207 0.0047
(1.47) (1.24) (1.03) (3.10)*** (2.26)** (2.03)** 
Investment tax credit 
dummy 
-0.0189 0.0088 -0.0161 0.0012 -0.0228 0.0065 
(1.48) (1.59) (1.27) (0.28) (1.77)* (1.91)* 
Constant 1.4193 -0.9807 1.4428 -0.7355 1.3703 -0.2204 
 
(11.13)**
* 
(13.15)*** (11.04)**
* 
(12.30)**
* 
(11.08)**
* 
(5.09)*** 
Observations 5338 5338 5338 5338 5338 5338 
R-squared 0.15 0.32 0.15 0.28 0.15 0.14 
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TABLE 21 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Regressions of the proportion of debt that matures in 5 years or less on inside 
debt 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
ST5 
 
(1) 
Personal 
leverage 
(2) 
ST5 
 
(3) 
Pension 
ratio 
(4) 
ST5 
 
(5) 
Deferred 
comp. ratio 
(6) 
Personal leverage 
(predicted) 
0.4017 
     (3.38)*** 
     Pension ratio 
(predicted)   
0.6488
   
  
(3.43)*** 
   Deferred compensation  
    
1.0123 
 ratio (predicted) 
    
(3.12)*** 
 ST5 (predicted) 
 
-0.3981 
 
-0.3539 
 
-0.0758 
  
(3.62)*** 
 
(3.85)*** 
 
(1.22) 
Vega -0.0190 0.0040 -0.0194 0.0016 -0.0184 0.0021 
 
(4.11)*** (1.69)* (4.17)*** (0.83) (4.02)*** (1.53) 
Delta 0.0156 -0.0639 0.0149 -0.0382 0.0144 -0.0237 
 
(2.17)** (23.92)*** (2.13)** (17.59)*** (2.01)** (15.80)*** 
Cash compensation -0.0194 0.0094 -0.0232 0.0099 -0.0131 -0.0007 
 
(1.65)* (1.90)* (1.92)* (2.60)*** (1.14) (0.23) 
CEO tenure 
 
0.0266 
 
0.0142 
 
0.0117 
  
(11.87)*** 
 
(8.02)*** 
 
(8.76)*** 
CEO age 
 
0.2490 
 
0.1942 
 
0.0533 
  
(12.39)*** 
 
(11.88)*** 
 
(4.79)*** 
Firm age 
 
0.0190 
 
0.0113 
 
0.0081 
  
(6.52)*** 
 
(4.55)*** 
 
(5.24)*** 
Firm size -0.0849 0.0375 -0.0852 0.0177 -0.0826 0.0176 
 
(3.25)*** (9.73)*** (3.25)*** (5.66)*** (3.18)*** (7.97)*** 
Firm size squared 0.0026 
 
0.0027 
 
0.0024 
 
 
(1.66)* 
 
(1.72)* 
 
(1.56) 
 Market to book -0.0117 0.0037 -0.0117 0.0009 -0.0114 0.0017
 
(1.63) (1.39) (1.63) (0.44) (1.59) (1.18) 
Leverage -0.3641 -0.1364 -0.3925 -0.0793 -0.3206 -0.0682 
 
(8.58)*** (2.90)*** (9.04)*** (2.02)** (7.25)*** (2.57)** 
Asset maturity -0.0031 
 
-0.0033 
 
-0.0028 
 
 
(4.33)*** 
 
(4.47)*** 
 
(4.04)*** 
 Abnormal earnings 0.0202 
 
0.0250 
 
0.0186 
 
 
(1.01) 
 
(1.27) 
 
(0.92) 
 Term structure 0.0156 
 
0.0147 
 
0.0177 
 
 
(1.11) 
 
(1.04) 
 
(1.26) 
 Net operating loss 
carryforwards dummy 
-0.0152 -0.0095 -0.0110 -0.0141 -0.0217 0.0039
(1.59) (2.16)** (1.14) (3.93)*** (2.25)** (1.56) 
Investment tax credit 
dummy 
-0.0347 -0.0011 -0.0322 -0.0075 -0.0376 0.0046 
(2.62)*** (0.18) (2.45)** (1.40) (2.80)*** (1.21) 
Constant 1.1866 -0.8341 1.2188 -0.6054 1.1311 -0.1932 
 
(8.80)*** (9.09)*** (8.84)*** (7.96)*** (8.61)*** (3.75)*** 
Observations 5338 5338 5338 5338 5338 5338 
R-squared 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.28 0.11 0.14 
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For the short-term maturity regression, the odd columns of Panels A&B in Table 
21 show that, for both ST3 and ST5 regressions, the coefficients on all measures of inside 
debt compensation (CEO personal leverage, pension ratio, and deferred compensation 
ratio) are positive and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that a positive 
relation between inside debt and short-term maturity exits and that both pensions and 
deferred compensation drive this relation. This empirical evidence is first documented in 
the literature. However, the results are not consistent with those of the univariate analysis 
which show that both ST3 and ST5 are negatively correlated with CEO personal 
leverage, pension ratio, and deferred compensation ratio. It is worth noting that the 
univariate analysis simply provides basic results because it does not consider various 
control variables which could determine firms’ maturity choices. 
It can be seen from the odd columns of Table 21 (Panels A-B) that the estimates 
of other control variables are consistent with the existing literature, except for equity-
based incentives. Vega has significant and negative coefficients in both ST3 and ST5 
regressions, implying that CEOs with higher vega will borrow less short-term debt. 
Whereas, delta has positive coefficients in ST3 and ST5 regressions, but the results are 
significant for ST5 regression only. Our results would indicate further explorations about 
the impacts of managerial equity incentives on firms’ maturity choices. Brockman, 
Martin and Unlu (2010) find evidence of positive (negative) relation between CEO vega 
(delta) and short-term maturity. Consistently, Chava and Purnannadam (2010) find the 
existence of a negative (positive) association between vega (delta) and long-term 
maturity for a sample of CFOs. However, they do not find significant results for the 
CEOs of the same firms. According to them, these results can be explained by the fact 
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that CFOs rather than CEOs are responsible for practical policy decisions such as 
maturity choices.  
For both ST3 and ST5 regressions, the coefficients on cash compensation are 
negative in models 1-3, but are significant at 10 % level in Model 1 and 5% level in 
Model 2 only. Thus, there is weak evidence of negative relation between cash 
compensation and short-term debt maturity. The coefficients on firm size are statistically 
negative for both ST3 and ST5, whereas those of firm size squared are significantly 
positive for ST5 regression only. Collectively, these results support Diamond’s (1991) 
prediction on the non-linear relation between firms’ quality and maturity structure. 
Previous studies such as Johnson (2003), and Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) find the 
same results. 
As in Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010), we find that market to book has 
insignificantly negative coefficient for both ST3 and ST5 regressions. Myers (1977) 
predicts that firms use short-term debt to mitigate the underinvestment problem which is 
more severe in firms with high growth opportunities. However, the existing literature 
provides mixed evidence. Johnson (2003) and Billett, King and Mauer (2007) find a 
negative relation between market to book and short-term debt. Meanwhile, consistent 
with Myers (1977), Barclay and Smith (1995), Barclay, Max and Smith (2003), and 
Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2005) find a negative relation between market to book 
and long-term debt. Both leverage and asset maturity have significantly negative 
coefficients in ST3 and ST5 regressions, which is consistent with Johnson (2003) and 
Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010).  
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The odd columns of Table 21 show that the coefficients on abnormal earnings are 
positive for all three models, but are statistically significant in ST3 regressions only. 
Thus, consistent with Johnson (2003) and Billett, King and Mauer (2007), we find that 
abnormal earnings positively affects short-term maturity choices, suggesting that good 
firms (high future abnormal earnings) can signal their high quality to the financial 
markets through borrowing more short-term debt. Regarding the tax argument 
hypothesis, the coefficients on term structure are positive but not significant at 5% level 
for both ST3 and ST5 regressions, which is not consistent with the prediction on the 
negative relation between term structure and short-term maturity. In addition, it can be 
seen from columns 1, 3 and 5 in Table 21 that the dummies of net operating loss 
carryforwards and investment tax credit have negative coefficients as expected but their 
coefficients are not statistically significant at 5% level. Therefore, consistent with the 
literature (see for example, Johnson, 2003; Billett, King and Mauer, 2007), our results do 
not support the hypotheses on the impacts of tax status on debt maturity.  
For the inside debt regression, the even columns of Panels A-B in Table 21 show 
that the coefficients on ST3 and ST5 are negative, but are statistically significant for 
Models 1-2 only. This result implies that short-term debt maturity negatively affects 
inside debt, in general. Combined with the above result, we find the first evidence of a 
positive relationship between inside debt and short-term maturity. Particularly, in one 
direction, high inside debt leads to high short-term maturity.  However, for the causation 
direction, an increase in short-term maturity leads to a decrease in inside debt 
compensation.  
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For the other explanatory variables, the even columns of Panels A-B in Table 21 
show that the coefficient on leverage is significantly negative in all three models. 
Interestingly, this result is not consistent with the above finding about a positive 
relationship between inside debt and firm leverage in Section 3.4.1. The sign and 
significance of other variables are consistent with the results of the inside debt regression 
in Section 3.4.1. More specifically, this section confirms the significant impacts of 
equity-based incentives on inside debt that vega (delta) positively (negatively) affects 
inside debt. In addition, inside debt is increasing in cash compensation, CEO tenure, CEO 
age, firm size, firm age, and market to book. Again, there is no evidence on the impact of 
the tax status on inside debt.  
3.4.3  Inside Debt and Investment Policies 
3.4.3.1  Variable Selections 
Following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and Billett, King and Mauer (2007), 
we use R&D expense (capital expenditure, CAPEX) as a proxy for high (low) risk 
investment policies. Based on the general model, we build a simultaneous equation 
system which models R&D and inside debt as endogenous and another two-equation 
simultaneous system in which CAPEX and inside debt are endogenous. We denote these 
two simultaneous equation systems as R&D system and CAPEX system, respectively. 
For the R&D equation in the R&D system and CAPEX equation in the CAPEX 
system, the selection of control variables is motivated from Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2006). We include vega and delta to control for incentives induced from equity-based 
compensation packages. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) find that vega positively 
(negatively) affects R&D (CAPEX), whereas the impacts of delta on these investment 
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policies are mixed. Again, cash compensation is used as a proxy for risk-taking behavior. 
Guay (1999) argues that higher cash compensation makes managers more diversified, 
which induces them to be less risk averse. We expect that cash compensation has a 
positive impact on R&D, but a negative impact on CAPEX.  Based on the entrenchment 
argument (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) which suggests that CEOs may overinvest to 
build their empire and avoid the threat of being fired, we thus include tenure to test this 
hypothesis and expect that CEOs with longer tenure spend more on both R&D and 
CAPEX.  
Following the literature, we also include firm size, market to book, leverage, 
surplus cash, and stock returns in the R&D and CAPEX equations. Firm size is the log of 
net sales and is expected to have negative (positive) impact on R&D (CAPEX). Market to 
book and sale growth are used as proxies for the firm’s investment opportunities. Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2006) find both R&D and CAPEX are increasing in these two 
variables. Because debt financing is an important source to fund investment 
opportunities, we include leverage as an explanatory variable in both R&D and CAPEX 
equations. The asset substitution hypothesis states that shareholders get most benefits 
from investing in risky projects if those projects succeed. So, we expect that R&D 
(CAPEX) is positively (negatively) related to leverage. Surplus cash is used as a proxy 
for capital constraints. Firms with more cash available can fund more risky R&D 
activities and expend more on new projects. Therefore, we expect surplus cash to have a 
positive effect on both R&D and CAPEX. Stock return is used to as a proxy measuring 
firm performance. The entrenchment argument predicts that managers who are facing 
with poor performance can overinvest in manager-specific investments which are costly 
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for shareholders to replace them (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). We expect that stock return 
negatively affects both R&D and CAPEX.  
The control variables in the inside debt equation in both R&D system and 
CAPEX system are kept the same as in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. For identification 
purposes, we exclude CEO age, firm age, and the dummy of net operating loss 
carryforwards and investment tax credit from the R&D and CAPEX equations. In theory, 
these variables are important determinants of inside debt, but no theoretical predictions 
about their roles on R&D and CAPEX. Furthermore, we restrict three variables sale 
growth, surplus cash, and stock return to enter the inside debt equation to help identify 
the simultaneous equation systems. 
3.4.3.2   Results 
The second-stage 2SLS results of the R&D system and CAPEX system are 
provided in Table 22 and Table 23, respectively. In Model 1, R&D/CAPEX and personal 
leverage are endogenously determined. Similarly, R&D/CAPEX and pension ratio 
(deferred compensation ratio) are endogenous variables in Model 2 (Model 3). Results 
for R&D (CAPEX) equation are tabulated in the odd columns of Table 22 (Table 23). 
Meanwhile, the results of the inside debt equation in R&D (CAPEX) system are 
presented in the even columns of Table 22 (Table 23). 
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TABLE 22: Inside debt and high-risk investment (R&D) 
 
This table reports the second-stage results of simultaneous equation regressions for R&D 
and inside debt compensation using two-state least squares (2SLS) approach. The first-
stage regression results estimating the predicted values of R&D and inside debt are not 
reported. Three proxies for inside debt compensation are personal leverage, pension and 
deferred compensation ratios. Definitions of these variables are the same as in Table 18. 
Columns 1-2 report the estimated results for R&D and personal leverage (Model 1). The 
results for R&D expenditure and pension ratio are presented in columns 3-4 (Model 2). 
The last two columns contain the results for R&D expenditure and deferred compensation 
ratio (Model 3). Vega (log) is the dollar change of CEO option portfolio for 1% change in 
stock return volatility. Delta (log) is the dollar change of CEO stock and option portfolio 
for 1% change in stock price. We follow Guay (1999) and Core & Guay (2002) to 
estimate vega and delta. Cash compensation (log) is the sum of current salary and cash 
bonus. CEO tenure (log) is the number of years as the CEO of the firm. CEO age (log) is 
CEO present age at the fiscal year. Firm age (log) is the difference between the first year 
which a firm’s stock first appears in CRSP and the fiscal year. Firm size is the log of net 
sales. Sales growth is calculated as the log of (salest – salest-1). Surplus cash is cash from 
assets-in-place scaled by total asset. Stock return is the equity return measured over the 
fiscal year. Other variables are defined as in Table 18. All regressions include 2-digit SIC 
dummies and year dummies. Robust t- statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 22 (continued) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
R&D 
 
(1) 
Personal 
leverage 
(2) 
R&D 
 
(3) 
Pension 
ratio 
(4) 
R&D 
 
(5)  
Deferred 
comp. ratio 
(6) 
Personal leverage 
(predicted) 
-0.0517 
     (2.21)** 
     Pension ratio 
(predicted)   
-0.1065
   
  
(3.09)*** 
   Deferred compensation 
ratio (predicted)    
-0.0177 
 
   
(0.26) 
 R&D (predicted) 
 
-0.2130 
 
-0.2230 
 
-0.0212 
  
(2.04)** 
 
(2.69)*** 
 
(0.38) 
Vega 0.0054 0.0087 0.0055 0.0061 0.0051 0.0031 
 
(10.67)**
* 
(5.12)*** (10.95)**
* 
(4.50)*** (9.87)*** (3.06)*** 
Delta -0.0064 -0.0545 -0.0068 -0.0304 -0.0041 -0.0211 
 
(4.90)*** (24.87)*** (6.11)*** (17.89)*** (2.68)*** (17.11)*** 
Cash compensation 0.0048 0.0127 0.0056 0.0134 0.0040 -0.0003 
 
(3.63)*** (3.09)*** (4.12)*** (4.32)*** (3.07)*** (0.12) 
CEO tenure 0.0019 0.0227 0.0020 0.0105 0.0006 0.0109 
 
(2.30)** (12.66)*** (2.83)*** (7.54)*** (0.61) (10.33)*** 
CEO age 
 
0.1688 
 
0.1185 
 
0.0439 
  
(12.66)*** 
 
(11.47)*** 
 
(5.83)*** 
Firm age 
 
0.0163 
 
0.0090 
 
0.0073 
  
(6.86)*** 
 
(4.41)*** 
 
(5.81)*** 
Firm size -0.0080 0.0435 -0.0077 0.0227 -0.0102 0.0188 
 
(5.75)*** (19.88)*** (6.35)*** (13.17)*** (6.26)*** (14.73)*** 
Market to book 0.0028 0.0107 0.0031 0.0079 0.0023 0.0025 
 
(2.37)** (5.90)*** (2.58)*** (5.61)*** (1.90)* (2.57)** 
Leverage 0.0001 0.0326 0.0045 0.0599 -0.0015 -0.0272 
 
(0.02) (1.91)* (0.94) (4.45)*** (0.30) (2.74)*** 
Sale growth -0.0148 
 
-0.0148 
 
-0.0130 
 
 
(3.15)*** 
 
(3.21)*** 
 
(2.72)*** 
 Surplus cash 0.2013 
 
0.1983 
 
0.2055 
 
 
(15.32)**
*  
(15.06)**
*  
(15.61)**
*  Stock return -0.0880 
 
-0.0881 
 
-0.0820 
 
 
(4.77)*** 
 
(4.79)*** 
 
(4.45)*** 
 Net operating loss 
carryforwards dummy 
0.0004
 
-0.0040
 
0.0044
(0.10) (1.44) (2.20)** 
Investment tax  
credit  dummy 
0.0073 
 
0.0042 
 
0.0030 
(1.52) 
 
(1.08) 
 
(1.05) 
Constant 0.0617 -0.8696 0.0540 -0.6230 0.0722 -0.2242 
 
(5.95)*** (14.52)*** (4.97)*** (12.84)*** (7.53)*** (6.73)*** 
Observations 6748 6748 6748 6748 6748 6748 
R-squared 0.50 0.33 0.50 0.27 0.50 0.15 
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  For R&D regression, columns 1, 3 and 5 in Table 22 show that the estimated 
coefficients on personal leverage (Model 1) and pension ratio (Model 2) are negative and 
statistically significant. In Model 3, the estimate on deferred compensation ratio is also 
negative but is not significant at 5% level. These results are consistent with the univariate 
results and supports Edmans and Liu’s prediction on a negative relation between inside 
debt compensation and investment policies. Furthermore, the negative and significant 
coefficient on pension ratio implies that pensions dominate deferred compensation in the 
negative relation between inside debt and R&D expense. 
For capital expenditure (CAPEX) regression, the odd columns of Table 23 
illustrates that all measures of inside debt compensation have negative and significant 
coefficients, which suggests that a negative relation between inside debt and CAPEX 
exists and both pensions and deferred compensation drive this relation. Again, these 
results are consistent with the univariate analysis and with the theoretical prediction of 
Edmans and Liu (2011).  Thus, consistent with the stated hypothesis, we find that CEOs 
with more inside debt compensation tend to spend less for both high-risk and low risk 
investments. As a contribution to prior research on managerial compensation incentives 
and investment policies, this finding provides empirical evidence that risk-decreasing 
incentives induced from compensation packages result in more conservative investment 
policies. Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) find unclear effects of risk-decreasing 
incentives measured by delta on both R&D and CAPEX. 
In general, the sign and significance of other control variables in both R&D and 
CAPEX equations are consistent with the investment literature. More specifically, the 
odd columns of Tables 22-23 show that vega has a positive and significant impact on 
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R&D, but negative for CAPEX. In contrast, delta has a negative impact on R&D. 
However, the impact of delta on CAPEX is not significant. Therefore, we find consistent 
results as in Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) that CEOs with high vega tend to invest 
more for high risk projects, but less for low risk projects. Consistent with Guay’s 
argument (1999), we also find that cash compensation positively and negatively affect 
R&D and CAPEX, respectively.  Except for Model 3 in the R&D regression, the 
coefficients on tenure are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that, consistent 
with the entrenchment hypothesis, CEOs with longer tenure spend more for both R&D 
and capital expenditure. As expected, firm size have a positive impact on R&D, but 
negative impact on CAPEX. In all regressions of R&D and CAPEX, the coefficients on 
market to book are significantly positive, which is consistent with Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2006) and Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010). However, we find that sale 
growth has a negative impact on R&D, but a positive impact on CAPEX. Regarding the 
impacts of financing sources, consistent with Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), we find 
that the impact of leverage on R&D is insignificant, whereas its impact on CAPEX is 
significantly negative. In addition, the surplus cash positively affects R&D, but has an 
insignificant impact on CAPEX. Consistent with the literature, the odd columns of Tables 
22-23 show that stock return has negative and significant coefficients, implying that poor 
performance negatively affects the firm’s investment policies. 
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TABLE 23: Inside debt and low-risk investment (CAPEX) 
 
This table reports the second-stage results of simultaneous equation regressions for net 
capital expenditures (CAPEX) and inside debt using two-state least squares (2SLS) 
approach. The first-stage regression results estimating the predicted values of CAPEX and 
inside debt are not reported. Three proxies for inside debt compensation are personal 
leverage, pension and deferred compensation ratios. Definitions of these variables are the 
same as in Table 18. Columns 1-2 report the estimated results for CAPEX and personal 
leverage (Model 1). The results for CAPEX and pension ratio are presented in columns 3-
4 (Model 2). The last two columns contain the results for CAPEX and deferred 
compensation ratio (Model 3). Vega (log) is the dollar change of CEO option portfolio for 
1% change in stock return volatility. Delta (log) is the dollar change of CEO stock and 
option portfolio for 1% change in stock price. We follow Guay (1999) and Core & Guay 
(2002) to estimate vega and delta. Cash compensation (log) is the sum of current salary 
and cash bonus. CEO tenure (log) is the number of years as the CEO of the firm. CEO age 
(log) is CEO present age at the fiscal year. Firm age (log) is the difference between the 
first year which a firm’s stock first appears in CRSP and the fiscal year. Firm size is the 
log of net sales. Sales growth is calculated as the log of (salest – salest-1). Surplus cash is 
cash from assets-in-place scaled by total asset. Stock return is the equity return measured 
over the fiscal year. Other variables are defined as in Table 18. All regressions include 2-
digit SIC dummies and year dummies. Robust t- statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 23 (continued) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
CAPEX 
 
(1)   
Personal 
leverage 
(2) 
CAPEX 
 
(3) 
Pension 
ratio 
(4) 
CAPEX 
 
(5)  
Deferred 
comp. ratio 
(6) 
Personal leverage 
(predicted) 
-0.0566 
     (2.71)*** 
     Pension ratio 
(predicted)   
-0.0726
   
  
(2.40)** 
   Deferred compensation 
(predicted)    
-0.1936 
 ratio (pr icted)     (3.04)***  
CAPEX (predicted) 
 
-0.1633 
 
-0.2211 
 
-0.0705 
  
(3.13)*** 
 
(5.29)*** 
 
(0.52) 
Vega -0.0020 0.0077 -0.0020 0.0041 -0.0018 0.0028 
 
(4.21)*** (4.92)*** (4.39)*** (3.28)*** (3.85)*** (2.89)*** 
Delta -0.0004 -0.0524 0.0005 -0.0302 -0.0014 -0.0208 
 
(0.30) (23.75)*** (0.48) (17.26)**
* 
(1.00) (16.43)*** 
Cash compensation -0.0053 0.0166 -0.0051 0.0157 -0.0060 -0.0009 
 
(3.96)*** (4.15)*** (3.69)*** (5.05)*** (4.64)*** (0.33) 
CEO tenure 0.0020 0.0216 0.0015 0.0098 0.0029 0.0109 
 
(2.68)*** (11.64)*** (2.31)** (6.73)*** (3.07)*** (10.31)*** 
CEO age 
 
0.1800 
 
0.1355 
 
0.0432 
  
(13.63)*** 
 
(13.11)**
*  
(5.66)*** 
Firm age 
 
0.0236 
 
0.0142 
 
0.0073 
  
(10.00)*** 
 
(7.13)*** 
 
(5.75)*** 
Firm size 0.0037 0.0418 0.0029 0.0245 0.0048 0.0191 
 
(3.28)*** (23.48)*** (3.04)*** (17.11)**
* 
(3.51)*** (16.61)*** 
Market to book 0.0037 0.0092 0.0036 0.0070 0.0035 0.0025 
 
(5.06)*** (5.61)*** (4.95)*** (5.28)*** (5.02)*** (2.60)*** 
Leverage -0.0165 0.0539 -0.0139 0.0663 -0.0231 -0.0279 
 
(3.77)*** (3.45)*** (3.02)*** (5.17)*** (4.86)*** (2.72)*** 
Sale growth 0.0096 
 
0.0104 
 
0.0083 
 
 
(3.22)*** 
 
(3.56)*** 
 
(2.70)*** 
 Surplus cash 0.0095 
 
0.0093 
 
0.0120 
 
 
(1.33) 
 
(1.28) 
 
(1.74)* 
 Stock return -0.1030 
 
-0.1001 
 
-0.1052 
 
 
(6.96)*** 
 
(6.87)*** 
 
(7.03)*** 
 Net operating loss  
carryforwards dummy 
0.0001
 
-0.0047
 
0.0041
(0.02) (1.66)* (2.06)** 
Investment tax credit  
dummy 
0.0106 
 
0.0048 
 
0.0025 
(2.44)** 
 
(1.37) 
 
(0.93) 
Constant 0.0541 -0.8966 0.0534 -0.6833 0.0587 -0.2182 
 
(5.86)**
* 
(16.67)*** (5.49)*** (16.19)**
* 
(7.03)*** (6.06)*** 
Observations 6748 6748 6748 6748 6748 6748 
R-squared 0.46 0.26 0.46 0.19 0.46 0.15 
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The even columns of Table 22 and Table 23 present the second-stage 2SLS 
results for the inside debt regression in the R&D system and CAPEX system, 
respectively. The even columns of Table 22 show that, except for Model 3, the estimated 
coefficients of R&D are significantly negative. Thus, consistent with Edmans and Liu 
(2011) and Gerakos (2007), we find that R&D negatively affects inside debt, in general. 
We also find similar effect of CAPEX on inside debt. Specifically, the even columns of 
Table 23 indicate that, CAPEX has negative and significant coefficient in Models 1-2, 
which implies that CAPEX has negative effect on inside debt. Collectively, we find 
evidence that both high and low risk investment polices (R&D and CAPEX) have 
negative impacts on inside debt. Furthermore, combined with the results above, we find a 
negative relationship between inside debt and R&D, and between inside debt and 
CAPEX. 
In general, the sign and significance of other control variables of the inside debt 
equation in R&D and CAPEX systems are consistent with Sections 3.4.1- 3.4.2. The even 
columns of Tables 22-23 show that, except for Model 3, firm leverage has statistically 
positive coefficient in Models 1-2. In general, this result is consistent with the above 
finding about the positive relationship between inside debt and firm leverage. Again, the 
odd columns of Tables 22-23 show that equity-based incentives (vega, delta), cash 
compensation, CEO tenure and age, firm size and age, and market to book play an 
important role in determining inside debt compensation. The directions of the effects of 
these variables are similar to the findings in Sections 3.4.1- 3.4.2. Consistently, no 
significant impact of the tax status on inside debt is found. 
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3.4.4 Robustness Checks 
In this section, we provide robustness checks of the effect of inside debt on 
corporate policies by using the three-stage least squares (3SLS) approach and two 
alternative proxies for inside debt. Theoretically, the 2SLS estimators are unbiased, but 
not efficient because the 2SLS approach ignores correlations between errors. Instead, the 
3SLS approach gives more efficient estimates than 2SLS approach (Wooldridge, 2002).  
In addition, previous studies also use personal debt-equity and relative debt-equity ratios 
as two alternative proxies for inside debt (see for example, Sundaram and Yermack, 
2007; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez and Stuart, 2012; White, 2012). A concern is whether our 
results still hold for these two proxies. Using three previous proxies for inside debt 
(personal leverage, pension and deferred compensation ratios) and two alternative proxies 
(personal debt-equity, and relative debt-equity ratio), we re-estimate the simultaneous 
equation systems in Sections 3.4.1- 3.4.3 by 3SLS approach. The 3SLS results are 
presented in Table 24. For the sake of brevity, we report the estimated coefficients on the 
key variables only. In general, the sign and significance of other control variables are 
similar to those of 2SLS regressions. 
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Panel A of Table 24 reports the 3SLS the estimated results for the simultaneous 
equation systems between firm leverage and various proxies of inside debt. Consistent 
with the 2SLS results, the coefficients on all proxies of inside debt in Models 1-5 are 
significantly positive at 5% level, suggesting that, in one direction, inside debt positively 
affects firm leverage. On the other hand, the coefficient on firm leverage is positive in 
Models 1-4, and is statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels, except for Model 2. 
However, firm leverage has negative and significant coefficient in Model 5 in which the 
relative debt-equity ratio is used as proxy for inside debt. Recall that the relative debt-
equity ratio variable is calculated as the personal debt-equity scaled by firm debt-equity 
ratio. Therefore, debt appears in two sides of each equation in the systems in which firm 
leverage and relative debt-equity ratio are endogenous. As a consequence, using this 
proxy might not estimate correctly the relation between inside debt and firm leverage. 
Collectively, except for one case (Model 5), the 3SLS results confirm a positive 
relationship between inside debt and leverage. 
Panels B & C in Table 24 provide the 3SLS results for the simultaneous 
regressions between inside debt and short-term maturity (ST3 and ST5). For both two 
measures of debt maturity, the coefficients on personal leverage, pension and deferred 
compensation ratios are significantly positive and have values similar to the 2SLS 
counterparts. In addition, the estimated coefficients on personal debt-equity and relative 
debt-equity ratios are also positive and significant at 1% level. Thus, the 3SLS results 
support the above finding that, in one direction, inside debt positively affects short-term 
debt maturity. In other direction, the coefficients on ST3 and ST5 in the inside debt 
regression are significantly negative, except for Models 3 &4. In general, this result is 
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also consistent with the finding in Section 3.4.2 that short-term maturity leads to lower 
inside debt compensation. 
The results of the simultaneous regressions between inside debt and high risk 
investment (R&D) are provided in Panel D of Table 24. Overall, the 3SLS results of 
Models 1-3 are consistent with the above finding about a negative relationship between 
inside debt and R&D. The result of Model 4 shows that there is no evidence on a negative 
relationship between personal debt-equity ratio and R&D. Meanwhile, in Model 5, the 
coefficient on relative debt-equity ratio is significantly negative, suggesting that, in one 
direction, inside debt negatively affects R&D. In other causation direction, column 10 of 
Panel D shows that the estimated coefficient on R&D is significantly positive. 
Unexpectedly, this result is not consistent with the results based on other proxies of 
inside debt (personal leverage, pension and deferred compensation ratios). 
Panel E of Table 24 presents the 3SLS results for the simultaneous regressions 
between inside debt and low risk investment (CAPEX). The odd columns show that all 
proxies of inside debt have negative and significant coefficient, except for the relative 
debt-equity ratio in Model 5. In general, the 3SLS results indicate that, in one direction, 
capital expenditures decrease in inside debt. However, the even columns show that the 
sign of the coefficient on CAPEX is mixed for different proxies of inside debt, implying 
weak evidence of the causal relation between CAPEX and inside debt. Combined with 
the 2SLS results, we conclude that the evidence of the positive relationship between 
inside debt and low risk investment (capital expenditures) is statistically weak. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This study is among the line of growing research which investigates the 
importance of inside debt (i.e., pensions and deferred compensation) as an alternative 
mechanism to mitigate the debt-related agency costs. The goal of this study is to 
investigate how inside debt compensation affects corporate policy decisions. More 
specifically, we examine the effects of inside debt on three important corporate policies, 
namely leverage, debt maturity, and investment policies. To address the concern about 
the endogeneity between inside debt and corporate policies, we employ simultaneous 
equations systems and estimate the systems by two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. 
For the purpose of robustness checks, we also re-estimate the simultaneous equations 
systems by 3SLS approach. The study comes up with several main findings as follows. 
First, we find a positive relationship between inside debt compensation and firm 
leverage, suggesting that CEOs with high inside debt holdings tend to use higher 
leverage. Further analysis shows that both pensions and deferred compensation drive this 
relationship. Second, our results show that, in one direction, inside debt positively affects 
short-term maturity, indicating that CEOs with high inside debt compensation borrow 
more short-term debt. In other direction, we find empirical evidence that inside debt 
decreases in short-term maturity. The results are consistent for two components of inside 
debt (pensions and deferred compensation).  
Third, we find that, in general, inside debt compensation induces CEOs to have 
conservative investment policies, which supports the prediction by Edmans and Liu 
(2011). In particular, we find strong evidence on the negative relationship between inside 
debt and R&D activities, which implies that CEOs with inside debt tend to invest less in 
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high-risk investments. However, there is weak evidence on the negative relationship 
between inside debt and low risk investments (capital expenditures). Furthermore, 
pensions rather than deferred compensation drive the negative relation between inside 
debt and R&D. Meanwhile, the weak relationship between inside debt and capital 
expenditures are driven by both pensions and deferred compensation. 
Finally, a by-product of this study is to provide new evidence of the determinants 
of inside debt compensation. This study is the first to document a significant relation 
between inside debt and equity-based incentives. In particular, we find that inside debt 
compensation is significantly increasing (decreasing) in vega (delta). This result is 
important because it indicates that excessive risk taking induced by high vega can be 
deterred by high inside debt in the compensation packages. Therefore, this result is also 
consistent with the prediction of Edmans and Liu (2011) that inside debt can mitigate the 
agency costs associated with debt borrowing. We also document first evidence that inside 
debt is negatively related to short-term maturity, which would imply that the role of 
inside debt compensation in addressing the debt-related agency costs is reduced when the 
firms use more short-term debt in their capital structure. 
Given the results of this study, we suggest future research examine in further the 
relation between inside debt and other corporate policies such as hedging policy. It is 
interesting to know how inside debt compensation affects firms’ policies for hedging 
activities such as using financial derivatives. 
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TABLE B: The likelihood of debt source: investment grade vs. speculative grade 
       firms 
 
This table reports the results of multinomial logistic regressions predicting the probability 
of debt source separated into an investment grade and a speculative grade sample. The 
data source is the incremental sample (N=5,079). Columns 1 & 4 and columns 2 & 5 
report the log-odds ratios of the probability of issuing non-bank debt (144A) and public 
debt versus bank debt, respectively. Columns 3 & 6 report the log-odds ratio of the 
probability of issuing public debt relative to non-bank private debt. Variables are defined 
as in Table 3. All regressions include industry dummies based on the Fama-French 48 
industry classifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 Investment firms Speculative firms 
 
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(1) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(2) 
Public vs.  
Non-bank 
(3) 
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(4) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(5) 
Public vs.  
Non-bank 
(6) 
Firm age (log) 
  
-0.398 0.216 0.614 -0.047 -0.025 0.022 
(0.148)*** (0.084)** (0.162)*** (0.074) (0.119) (0.132) 
Firm size -0.038 0.565 0.603 0.080 0.313 0.233 
  (0.168) (0.078)*** (0.177)*** (0.079) (0.115)*** (0.130)* 
Fixed asset ratio -0.028 0.417 0.445 -0.179 0.642 0.821 
  (0.536) (0.244)* (0.566) (0.240) (0.357)* (0.404)** 
Profitability 
  
-3.196 -0.383 2.814 -2.974 -4.549 -1.575 
(2.389) (1.504) (2.652) (0.797)*** (1.321)*** (1.438) 
Altman's Z-score <1.81 0.148 0.055 -0.093 0.299 0.202 -0.097 
  (0.494) (0.210) (0.519) (0.194) (0.292) (0.329) 
Earnings volatility 
  
-3.840 -11.729 -7.888 -0.379 -2.973 -2.594 
(3.574) (3.600)*** (4.913) (0.656) (1.727)* (1.814) 
A or better rating 
  
-0.302 0.438 0.741 
   (0.309) (0.144)*** (0.327)** 
   B or better rating 
     
0.887 2.215 1.327
   
(0.175)*** (0.323)*** (0.352)*** 
Market to book 0.400 0.020 -0.380 0.255 0.181 -0.075 
  (0.145)*** (0.101) (0.162)** (0.069)*** (0.123) (0.130) 
Leverage 
  
-0.407 -0.226 0.181 0.134 -0.974 -1.108 
(1.490) (0.810) (1.608) (0.532) (0.853) (0.950) 
Principal amount (log) 
  
-0.596 -1.135 -0.539 -0.148 -0.527 -0.379 
(0.154)*** (0.078)*** (0.161)*** (0.080)* (0.112)*** (0.129)*** 
No outstanding public 
or private debt (t-1) 
  
0.502 -0.081 -0.583 0.848 0.198 -0.651 
(0.345) (0.189) (0.372) (0.172)*** (0.274) (0.304)** 
Regulated industry 
  
-18.187 -22.652 -0.466 0.034 1.628 1.594 
(2.767)*** (1.222)*** (2.899) (1.147) (1.010) (1.369) 
Prime interest rate -0.082 0.545 0.627 -0.907 0.062 0.969 
  (0.185) (0.086)*** (0.196)*** (0.109)*** (0.148) (0.176)*** 
Slope 
  
-0.298 0.260 0.558 -1.199 -0.140 1.058 
(0.319) (0.144)* (0.337)* (0.183)*** (0.252) (0.297)*** 
GDP growth 
  
-0.235 -0.262 -0.027 -0.451 -0.346 0.105 
(0.133)* (0.070)*** (0.145) (0.072)*** (0.114)*** (0.127) 
Interest rate volatility 0.248 -0.871 -1.120 0.146 -0.826 -0.972 
(0.339) (0.195)*** (0.372)*** (0.197) (0.339)** (0.369)*** 
Constant 20.063 19.487 -4.574 5.889 -3.784 -9.674 
  (0.000) (1.646)*** (0.000) (1.833)*** (2.285)* (2.743)*** 
Observations 2208 2208 2208 2312 2312 2312 
Pseudo R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.17 
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TABLE D: The likelihood of debt source: low vs. high interest rate volatility 
 
This table reports the results of multinomial logistic regressions predicting the probability 
of debt source for the samples of low and high interest rate volatility. The data source is 
the incremental sample (N=5,079). Columns 1 & 4 and columns 2 & 5 report the log-
odds ratios of the probability of issuing non-bank debt (144A) and public debt versus 
bank debt, respectively. Columns 3 & 6 report the log-odds ratio of the probability of 
issuing public debt relative to non-bank private debt. Variables are defined as in Table 3. 
All regressions include industry dummies based on the Fama-French 48 industry 
classifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
Low interest rate volatility High  interest rate volatility 
  
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(1) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(2) 
Public vs.  
Non-bank 
(3) 
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(4) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(5) 
Public vs.  
Non-bank 
(6) 
Firm age (log) 
  
-0.073 0.104 0.177 -0.160 0.144 0.304 
(0.116) (0.099) (0.147) (0.085)* (0.088) (0.115)*** 
Firm size -0.020 0.406 0.427 0.111 0.593 0.482 
  (0.114) (0.087)*** (0.137)*** (0.089) (0.084)*** (0.116)*** 
Fixed asset ratio -0.253 0.534 0.787 -0.304 0.689 0.993 
  (0.358) (0.297)* (0.445)* (0.278) (0.262)*** (0.360)*** 
Profitability 
  
-2.406 -0.317 2.089 -1.976 -3.775 -1.799 
(1.238)* (1.567) (1.903) (0.960)** (1.278)*** (1.483) 
Altman's Z-score <1.81 
  
0.171 -0.100 -0.271 0.404 0.057 -0.348 
(0.309) (0.258) (0.385) (0.224)* (0.225) (0.298) 
Earnings volatility 
  
-0.267 -8.806 -8.538 -0.400 -4.775 -4.375 
(0.933) (3.354)*** (3.456)** (0.908) (2.565)* (2.683) 
Unrated firm -2.077 -4.868 -2.791 -1.019 -1.587 -0.568 
  (0.311)*** (0.760)*** (0.811)*** (0.216)*** (0.345)*** (0.387) 
Investment grade 
  
-1.126 0.497 1.624 -0.852 0.680 1.532 
(0.303)*** (0.247)** (0.372)*** (0.230)*** (0.213)*** (0.292)*** 
Market to book 0.106 0.108 0.002 0.316 0.122 -0.194 
  (0.123) (0.129) (0.167) (0.072)*** (0.094) (0.109)* 
Leverage 
  
0.011 -0.251 -0.262 -0.118 -0.767 -0.649 
(0.854) (0.872) (1.165) (0.647) (0.748) (0.926) 
Principal amount (log) 
  
-0.225 -0.999 -0.774 -0.389 -1.003 -0.614 
(0.123)* (0.091)*** (0.146)*** (0.093)*** (0.088)*** (0.119)*** 
No outstanding public 
 or private debt (t-1) 
  
1.080 0.109 -0.971 1.045 -0.004 -1.049 
(0.268)*** (0.211) (0.325)*** (0.195)*** (0.226) (0.280)*** 
Regulated industry 
  
-0.097 0.108 0.205 -1.087 -0.032 1.056 
(1.259) (1.486) (1.876) (1.287) (0.995) (1.537) 
Prime interest rate 2.296 2.205 -0.092 -0.773 0.229 1.002 
  (2.275) (0.797)*** (2.369) (0.146)*** (0.113)** (0.179)*** 
Slope 
  
7.114 4.350 -2.764 -0.654 0.415 1.069 
(5.320) (1.845)** (5.533) (0.223)*** (0.202)** (0.291)*** 
GDP growth 
  
2.413 0.962 -1.451 -1.204 -1.000 0.204 
(1.120)** (0.408)** (1.170) (0.134)*** (0.112)*** (0.163) 
Interest rate volatility 
  
39.715 14.103 -25.612 -2.454 -3.003 -0.549 
(22.498)* (7.605)* (23.357) (0.406)*** (0.395)*** (0.528) 
Constant -44.265 -44.899 -1.634 -2.869 3.631 7.500 
  (32.197) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.852)** (0.000) 
Observations 1907 1907 1907 2613 2613 2613 
Pseudo R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.24 0.24 0.24 
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TABLE E: Estimating the proportions of debt mix: investment grade vs. speculative 
       grade firms 
 
This table reports the results of the fractional multinomial logistic model (FMLM) 
estimating the proportions in the debt mix for the samples of investment grade and 
speculative grade firms. The data source comes from the debt mix sample (N=11,329). 
The dependent variables are the proportions of outstanding bank debt, non-bank private 
debt, and public debt. Their definitions are as in Table 6. Columns 1 & 4 and columns 2 
& 5 provide the log-odds ratios of the proportions of outstanding non-bank private debt 
and public debt relative to the proportion of outstanding bank debt, respectively. For 
comparison, columns 3 & 6 report the log-odds ratios of the proportion of outstanding 
public debt versus non-bank private debt. A or better rating is a dummy variable, taking 1 
if the firm has a rating of A or above. Similarly, B or better rating is a dummy variable, 
equal to 1 if the firm has a rating of B or above. Other control variables are defined as in 
Table 3. All regressions include industry dummies based on the Fama-French 48 industry 
classifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Investment firms Speculative firms 
  
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(1) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(2) 
Public vs.  
Non-bank 
(3) 
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(4) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(5) 
Public vs.  
Non-bank 
(6) 
Firm age (log) 
  
-0.142 0.100 0.242 -0.099 0.197 0.296 
(0.041)*** (0.027)*** (0.046)*** (0.026)*** (0.039)*** (0.043)*** 
Firm size 
  
-0.102 0.082 0.183 -0.213 0.033 0.246 
(0.035)*** (0.021)*** (0.038)*** (0.025)*** (0.031) (0.038)*** 
Fixed asset ratio 
  
-0.647 0.436 1.084 -0.175 0.161 0.336 
(0.141)*** (0.083)*** (0.158)*** (0.080)** (0.115) (0.133)** 
Profitability 
  
-3.215 -1.072 2.143 -3.938 -2.743 1.195 
(0.817)*** (0.512)** (0.931)** (0.338)*** (0.426)*** (0.474)** 
Altman's Z-score <1.81 
  
-0.068 -0.284 -0.216 0.137 0.428 0.291 
(0.125) (0.069)*** (0.134) (0.069)** (0.082)*** (0.101)*** 
Earnings volatility 
  
-0.516 0.556 1.072 0.821 0.853 0.032 
(1.513) (0.955) (1.636) (0.364)** (0.461)* (0.542) 
A or better rating 
  
-0.113 0.363 0.476 
   (0.090) (0.047)*** (0.095)*** 
   B or better rating 
     
0.142 0.183 0.041
   
(0.065)** (0.082)** (0.096) 
Market to book 
  
0.169 0.012 -0.157 0.265 -0.025 -0.290 
(0.053)*** (0.037) (0.061)*** (0.032)*** (0.052) (0.058)*** 
Leverage 
  
-0.472 0.908 1.380 -0.526 -2.220 -1.694 
(0.453) (0.271)*** (0.502)*** (0.198)*** (0.255)*** (0.302)*** 
No outstanding public  
or private debt (t-1) 
  
-0.907 -2.013 -1.106 -1.873 -3.458 -1.585 
(0.158)*** (0.116)*** (0.194)*** (0.087)*** (0.165)*** (0.185)*** 
Regulated industry 
  
-0.288 -0.613 -0.326 -1.718 1.217 2.935 
(0.211) (0.328)* (0.364) (0.384)*** (0.323)*** (0.545)*** 
Prime interest rate 
  
-0.616 0.324 0.939 -0.750 0.787 1.537 
(0.055)*** (0.027)*** (0.059)*** (0.038)*** (0.044)*** (0.054)*** 
Slope 
  
-0.631 0.619 1.250 -1.078 1.301 2.379 
(0.092)*** (0.047)*** (0.098)*** (0.063)*** (0.075)*** (0.091)*** 
GDP growth 
  
-0.207 0.021 0.228 -0.150 0.112 0.262 
(0.037)*** (0.020) (0.040)*** (0.026)*** (0.030)*** (0.036)*** 
Interest rate volatility 0.244 -0.123 -0.367 -0.020 -0.275 -0.256 
(0.105)** (0.058)** (0.111)*** (0.081) (0.092)*** (0.113)** 
Constant 
  
6.019 -4.732 -10.751 7.532 -8.092 -15.624 
(0.957)*** (0.475)*** (1.053)*** (0.681)*** (0.587)*** (0.768)*** 
Observations 4600 4600 4600 5652 5652 5652 
169 
 
 
 
TABLE F: Estimating the proportions of debt mix: low vs. high interest rate volatility 
       
This table reports the results of the fractional multinomial logistic model (FMLM) 
estimating the proportions in the debt mix for the samples of low and high interest rate 
volatility. The data source comes from the debt mix sample (N=11,329). The dependent 
variables are the proportions of outstanding bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public 
debt. Their definitions are as in Table 6. Control variables are defined as in Table 3.  
Columns 1 & 4 and columns 2 & 5 provide the log-odds ratios of the proportions of 
outstanding non-bank private debt and public debt relative to the proportion of 
outstanding bank debt, respectively. For comparison, columns 3 & 6 report the log-odds 
ratios of the proportion of outstanding public debt versus non-bank private debt. All 
regressions include industry dummies based on the Fama-French 48 industry 
classifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Low interest rate volatility High  interest rate volatility 
  
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(1) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(2) 
Public vs.  
Non-bank 
(3) 
Non-bank  
vs. Bank 
(4) 
Public  
vs. Bank 
(5) 
Public vs.  
Non-bank 
(6) 
Firm age (log) 
  
-0.121 0.090 0.211 -0.090 0.190 0.280 
(0.036)*** (0.032)*** (0.045)*** (0.027)*** (0.029)*** (0.037)*** 
Firm size 
  
-0.237 0.053 0.290 -0.202 0.159 0.361 
(0.033)*** (0.023)** (0.038)*** (0.024)*** (0.022)*** (0.031)*** 
Fixed asset ratio 
  
-0.452 0.295 0.747 -0.061 0.562 0.623 
(0.116)*** (0.097)*** (0.142)*** (0.082) (0.092)*** (0.118)*** 
Profitability 
  
-4.016 -1.829 2.188 -3.684 -2.449 1.234 
(0.498)*** (0.444)*** (0.609)*** (0.388)*** (0.474)*** (0.543)** 
Altman's Z-score <1.81 
  
0.057 0.004 -0.052 0.034 0.049 0.016 
(0.102) (0.076) (0.118) (0.073) (0.072) (0.096) 
Earnings volatility 
  
1.067 0.997 -0.071 1.193 0.396 -0.796 
(0.471)** (0.453)** (0.636) (0.567)** (0.640) (0.750) 
Unrated firm 
  
-0.933 -0.184 0.750 -0.056 0.277 0.332 
(0.118)*** (0.101)* (0.147)*** (0.074) (0.094)*** (0.110)*** 
Investment grade 
  
-0.359 0.602 0.961 -0.324 0.747 1.071 
(0.093)*** (0.074)*** (0.108)*** (0.068)*** (0.065)*** (0.087)*** 
Market to book 
  
0.167 0.017 -0.151 0.288 0.052 -0.236 
(0.042)*** (0.043) (0.057)*** (0.034)*** (0.037) (0.046)*** 
Leverage 
  
-1.238 -1.329 -0.092 -0.184 -0.660 -0.476 
(0.295)*** (0.264)*** (0.374) (0.224) (0.257)** (0.319) 
No outstanding public  
or private debt (t-1) 
  
-1.553 -2.764 -1.211 -1.688 -2.649 -0.961 
(0.112)*** (0.122)*** (0.165)*** (0.113)*** (0.155)*** (0.190)*** 
Regulated industry 
  
-0.733 -1.702 -0.970 -0.463 -0.323 0.140 
(0.372)** (0.481)*** (0.626) (0.261)* (0.393) (0.541) 
Prime interest rate 
  
-0.833 0.554 1.387 -0.679 0.423 1.102 
(0.165)*** (0.119)*** (0.190)*** (0.046)*** (0.034)*** (0.055)*** 
Slope 
  
-0.888 0.911 1.800 -0.761 0.678 1.439 
(0.356)** (0.258)*** (0.413)*** (0.068)*** (0.057)*** (0.085)*** 
GDP growth 
  
0.093 0.007 -0.086 -0.416 0.189 0.605 
(0.069) (0.048) (0.079) (0.039)*** (0.034)*** (0.049)*** 
Interest rate volatility 
  
0.984 -0.114 -1.099 -0.888 0.442 1.330 
(1.229) (0.843) (1.406) (0.122)*** (0.121)*** (0.162)*** 
Constant 
  
7.794 -4.704 -12.498 7.431 -7.854 -15.286 
(2.094)*** (1.500)*** (2.382)*** (0.697)*** (0.515)*** (0.830)*** 
Observations 5012 5012 5012 5240 5240 5240 
